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 Recruiting talented student-athletes is integral to the success of an athletics 
program. Yet, some universities and individuals therein have been willing to violate 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) recruiting regulations to lure talented 
athletes to play at their institution. Institutional and isomorphic pressures of discouraging 
unethical recruiting behavior and practice rely heavily upon the rationalization and 
institutionalizing of social phenomena through written policy in NCAA Bylaw 13. These 
policies may be identified as cartel agreements, where a group creates rules to control 
actions that assure economic profit. Although recruiting top talent may lead to increased 
victories and revenues, most NCAA athletic departments do not make a profit and being 
sanctioned for violating NCAA recruiting rules may lead to damaged institutional 
reputation. In response, universities have invested resources to protect institutional 
prestige through a comprehensive NCAA rules compliance program. Nevertheless, 
undisclosed recruiting violations transpire because there are financial incentives to 
violate NCAA rules.  
 iv
Three separate works were utilized to examine the economic, institutional, and 
individual factors of NCAA institutional control. First, institutional factors of reported 
NCAA recruiting violations were analyzed through a series of chi-square tests. 
Correlative institutional factors were found in particular types of Bylaw 13 violations 
including conference affiliation, geographic region, sports involved in a major infraction, 
and size of full-time athletic compliance staff when the violation occurred. Second, 
hierarchical loglinear regression was used to analyze the results from a survey of 7,200 
current student-athletes regarding undisclosed recruiting violations. Various violation 
types of Bylaw 13 correlatively involved institutions from Bowl Championship Series 
(BCS) conferences, based on geographic regions, revenue sports, and individual factors 
of race, sex, and income level. Third, a qualitative instrumental case study examined the 
economic, administrative, and individual relationships regarding NCAA institutional 
control of athletics recruiting at a perceivably compliant Division I (FBS), BCS 
conference-affiliated institution. Findings from this study suggested that the systemic 
pressure to win championships and maintain institutional control become difficult to 
balance with the added pressure of high stakes recruiting that can influence the financial 
stability of an athletic department. The conclusion of this work will assess systemic 
alternatives regarding NCAA recruiting violations and propose legal remedies to curtail 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
“An anonymous source has notified ESPN that State University is under NCAA 
investigation for violations that occurred while recruiting a player.”  Does this sound 
familiar? Similar reports to this hypothetical situation resound as allegations of 
wrongdoing quickly circulate through various media channels and into the homes of 
people across the United States. Instantly, the integrity of the institution and individuals 
involved with the allegations is questioned by people ranging from college athletics 
media “experts” to the average fans discussing the allegations on their lunch break. In 
one such situation, ESPN columnist Pat Forde asserted that a university “should be 
crushed by the NCAA, the Pacific 10, and its own administration” (Forde, 2009) prior to 
a complete investigation by the NCAA of alleged violations by the university’s football 
and men’s basketball programs. Thus, the integrity of an entire university may become 
impugned by such accusations, while some other institutions are held up as model 
institutions that win championships without accusations of violating NCAA rules. 
Although the accusation and/or violation of NCAA rules can lead to negative publicity 
of a university and can compromise the achievements of athletics programs, NCAA rules 
are not the law. 
According to the United States Supreme Court in NCAA v. Tarkanian (1988),  
__________ 




the NCAA rules are not legally binding because the NCAA is not a “state actor” bound 
by all constitutional duties of a government entity. State action occurs when individual 
constitutional rights are violated by a government entity or persons with governmental 
authority (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 1961). The issue of whether or not 
the NCAA functions as a state actor was raised by former UNLV basketball coach Jerry 
Tarkanian after he was suspended, faced a significant demotion and pay cut after being 
caught committing multiple NCAA recruiting violations.  The Court reasoned that the 
NCAA is a voluntary association of universities and that any one of its member 
institutions could withdraw membership if it so desired. Also, the Court held that NCAA 
rules did not necessarily constitute state law because the “source of the rules adopted by 
the NCAA is not [the state], but the collective membership, the vast majority of which 
was located in other States.”  Thus, the adoption and enforcement of NCAA rules does 
“not transform them into state rules, and the NCAA into a state actor, since [the 
University] retains plenary power to withdraw from the NCAA and to establish its own 
standards.” Are you sure this is a correct quote because Universities/its is not correct 
syntax Therefore, the establishment of NCAA rules does not constitute law, but the 
NCAA’s legitimacy has become so influential and institutionalized that it has taken upon 
itself the aura of legality. Meyer & Rowan (1988) refer to this process of legitimizing an 
aura of legality as the “Myth of Rationality” (p.131). Through these means, NCAA 
violations have become the quintessential monikers identifying which member 
institutions are charlatan. 
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The primary basis to the definition of NCAA rules is the recruitment of 
prospective student-athletes. Two levels of severity exist for NCAA rules violations. 
There are major infractions, which are more severe in nature and “provide an extensive 
recruiting advantage” (NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.2), and secondary infractions, which are 
less severe in nature and “provide a minimal recruiting advantage” (NCAA Bylaw 
19.02.2.1). However, multiple secondary violations may constitute a major violation 
(NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.1). Consequently, the severity of the penalties proscribed to an 
institution for violating NCAA rules depends upon the level of competitive advantage 
gained by the university found in violation of the recruiting rules. Furthermore, it is the 
recruiting process that has led researchers to find that NCAA member universities act as 
a classic economic cartel by controlling inputs into college athletics to maximize profits 
and control action through established mandates (Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992; 
Kahn, 2006; Grant, Leady, & Zygmont, 2008). Therefore, any thorough research 
regarding NCAA governance must address the issues of the recruitment of student-
athletes. 
Recruiting is the process of attracting new players to infuse a particular sport 
with needed talent to win championships (Dumond, Lynch, & Platania, 2008). The 
recruiting process typically begins by university coaches identifying the positional or 
talent needs of their particular sport, then seeking to address the needs by finding, 
evaluating, and getting prospects to commit to play at the university. These players can 
be found locally, regionally, nationally, and sometimes internationally. Once talented 
student-athletes are identified, certain coaches (who have passed an NCAA certification 
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exam) will begin to gauge the prospective student-athletes’ interest by making contact 
through postal mail, electronic mail and/or telephone calls. For most prospective student-
athletes, this process will begin well before their senior-year in high school. If continued 
mutual interest occurs, the contact with the prospect will continue and the evaluation 
process is initiated. Coaches evaluate prospects through multiple means such as 
reviewing game film of the prospect, attending the prospects’ competitions, and 
attendance at a summer camp or clinic on the university campus. When the interest of 
the prospect and coaches is mutually heightened, a prospect will visit the university 
campus. These campus visits are either official visits (where the university pays for the 
prospects’ travel, food, lodging, and entertainment) or unofficial visits (where the 
prospect pays for the costs of the visit). Sometime during this process, the prospect is 
offered a one-year scholarship which promises that the university will pay for his or her 
cost of attendance (including tuition, room, board, and books) in exchange for playing 
the sport at the university. If the prospect agrees, he or she will sign a contract, known as 
the National Letter of Intent (NLI), agreeing to follow NCAA eligibility standards in 
return for the scholarship offer. Alternatively, prospects not offered a scholarship are 
asked to “walk on” by receiving no financial assistance, but having the opportunity to 
compete for a future scholarship as a member of the team.  
The recruiting process is extremely competitive because the benefits of effective 
recruiting are tangible and hundreds of universities, including archrivals, may pursue the 
same prospect simultaneously. Because “athletes are the most essential human resource 
involved in the production of intercollegiate athletics” (Chelladurai & Reimer, 1997, 
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p.134; Cunningham & Dixon, 2003), their performance can lead to increased winning 
percentages and revenue through ticket sales and postseason or bowl game appearances 
(Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006). Additionally, Brown (2001) found that recruiting an elite 
college football player can increase marginal revenues of an athletic department by as 
much as $500,000 annually. Many universities with the top ranked recruiting classes 
have been found to win championships or have Top 10 finishes in college football 
(Croley, 2008). Recruiting can also have a major impact on the employment status of a 
coach because it is one measure of coaching success (Cunningham & Dixon, 2003). 
Simply put, “recruiting is the lifeblood of the program” (O’Neil, 2008), which can lead 
to the success or demise of the athletics program and its coaches.  
The demand for successful recruiting has caused coaches to become increasingly 
more creative in the recruiting process. For example, coaches may utilize the latest 
technology such as Twitter or Facebook to contact prospects, or utilize video 
conferencing as a means of personalizing a telephone call to prospects. From time to 
time, this creativity may enter into the realm of questionable recruiting practices that 
may be overly demanding to the time, financial resources, and educational pursuits of 
the prospective student-athlete (NCAA Bylaw 6.3). In order to prevent these questionable 
practices, the NCAA has adopted specific rules to address recruiting practices. 
Prior to analyzing recruiting rules, it is critical to identify and describe the parties 
involved in the recruiting process. The two key parties present in recruiting are the 
prospect and coach. Prospective student-athletes, or prospects, are students that have 
entered the ninth grade, or seventh grade in basketball (NCAA Bylaw 13.02.11). A 
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recruited prospective student-athlete is no longer considered a prospect when he or she: 
a) registers, enrolls, and attends class, b) practices with the team, or c) registers, enrolls, 
and attends summer classes at the university. The coaches are the instigators of the entire 
recruiting process because they: a) identify which athletes to recruit, b) the modalities 
and methods of recruitment used to entice a prospect, c) contact and evaluate the talent 
of the prospect, and d) ultimately decide whether or not a prospect will come to the 
campus. There are coaching limitations established by the NCAA as to what individuals 
can recruit. NCAA Bylaw 11.7.4 establishes how many coaches can recruit on or off-
campus according to the type of sport. These limitations influence the role of the 
institutional staff members in the recruiting process.  Tangential roles of institutional 
staff and boosters also influence the recruiting process. Institutional staff members 
include: the university president, director of athletics, university administrators, athletic 
administrators, professors, and university staff members. While it is permissible for 
institutional staff members to talk to prospects in certain situations, the recruiting role of 
institutional staff is supportive of the coaches and to ensure that the recruiting process is 
compliant with NCAA rules. Boosters, or representatives of athletic interest, are any 
individuals that promote, have graduated from, donate to, assist in recruiting prospects 
to, or provide benefits to student-athletes at a university (NCAA Bylaw 6.4.2). Boosters 
are not technically permitted to recruit, but the vast number of alumni and donors 
throughout the world make boosters an excellent resource for recruiting. However, 
boosters have been central to major recruiting violations at many universities including 
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Oklahoma, Ohio State, Florida, UNLV, and SMU. Specific NCAA regulations seek to 
control the actions of all parties involved in the recruiting process. 
NCAA Bylaw 13 regulates the modality, materials, location, frequency, and 
incentives that are utilized in the recruiting process for coaches, institutional staff, 
representatives of athletic interest (known as boosters), student-athletes (currently 
competing at the institution), and prospective student-athletes. Specifically, Article 13 
regulates the actions of the aforementioned stakeholders concerning contacts and 
evaluations of prospects (Bylaw 13.1), offers of cash or gift inducements to prospects 
(Bylaw 13.2), minimum admissions standards (Bylaw 13.3), methods, types, and size of 
recruiting materials sent to prospects (Bylaw 13.4), transportation (Bylaw 13.5), official 
and unofficial visits to the campus (Bylaw 13.6 & 13.7), types of entertainment (Bylaw 
13.8), National Letter of Intent (NLI) and financial aid contractual agreements between 
the institution and the prospect (Bylaw 13.9), publicity of recruitment to the media 
(Bylaw 13.10), tryout limitations for prospects (Bylaw 13.11),  institutional summer 
camps and clinics (Bylaw 13.12), restrictions on high school all-star games (Bylaw 
13.13), institutional use of recruiting funds (Bylaw 13.14),  and institutional use of pre-
college expenses (Bylaw 13.15). These recruiting mandates consist of approximately 50 
pages of text and are exhaustive in nature, which can oftentimes be confusing for 
stakeholders to comprehend. To clarify the intent and application of these rules, each 
NCAA member institution employs compliance officers on its campus to educate, 
monitor, and ensure compliance with NCAA mandated bylaws. Yet, the presence of 
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compliance personnel does not necessarily lead to complete compliance with recruiting 
mandates. 
Recruiting violations are the most prevalent major violations that occur in the 
highest level of NCAA competition, Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). Over 
73% of all reported major violations that occurred in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics 
programs were related to the recruitment of prospective student-athletes stipulated in 
Article 13 of NCAA legislation (Clark & Batista, 2009a). Also, recruiting violations 
account for 47.03% of all reported secondary violations (Clark & Batista, 2009a), 
suggesting that recruiting violations are considered much more serious types of 
violations than most other NCAA mandates. Factors that influence reported major 
violations of Article 13 are Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conference affiliation, the 
Southern and Midwestern geographical regions, male sports, and the revenue sports of 
football and men’s basketball. Nevertheless, there is a belief that more violations occur 
without the knowledge of the NCAA (Sack, 1991).  
There has been minimal research of the extent to which recruiting violations have 
occurred without the knowledge of the NCAA. Sack (1991) found that the underground 
economy of paying student-athletes and recruits “under the table” is extensive in NCAA 
football. On the institutional level, Sack (1991) found that African-American football 
players from a low socio-economic status and major football conferences located in the 
South were more likely to accept impermissible recruiting inducements and extra 
benefits. However, this study has considerable limitations regarding its generalizability 
to the entire population of NCAA Division I (FBS) student-athletes. Sack (1991) 
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sampled only former football student-athletes that eventually played in the National 
Football League (NFL), thereby surveying less than 1% of the total NCAA Division I 
(FBS) student-athlete population. Therefore, the extent to which unreported recruiting 
violations are occurring in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics, without the knowledge of 
the NCAA, is relatively unknown. This dissertation will utilize Bowen’s Cost Theory of 
Revenue, the cartel behavior of the NCAA and higher education institutions, and the 
myth of rationality (Meyer & Rowan, 1988) in analyzing institutional control of reported 
and unreported recruiting infractions.  
If reported or unreported violations are discovered by the NCAA Committee on 
Infractions or the media, considerable damage to the prestige of an institution can occur. 
Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue (1980) found that universities aspire to prestige 
manifested by educational excellence, reputation for integrity, and institutional success, 
but are willing to expend all revenues generated to reach this prestigious ambition. Thus, 
each institution generates as much revenue as possible and expends all of these revenues 
with the cumulative effect being increased fiscal inefficiency (Bowen, 1980). While the 
NCAA and institutions of higher education have been found to act like cartels that seek 
to maximize profits (Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992; Kahn, 2006; Grant, Leady, 
Zygmont, 2008), universities also seek to obtain prestige through increasing revenues in 
order to spend them all (Bowen, 1980). Therefore, NCAA member institutions are fixed 
on a divergent path between cartel behaviors seeking to maximize profits, and spending 
all of the money raised to pursue institutional prestige by winning championships. This 
creates a tenuous relationship between intercollegiate athletics’ pursuit of championships 
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and the educational institution’s pursuit of academic prestige which collide on each 
campus of NCAA member institutions. The NCAA utilizes mandate policy instruments 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1989) through rules and regulations to reconcile this tenuous 
relationship, but the unintended weaknesses of mandate policy (e.g. financial incentives 
to violating NCAA recruiting rules) can jeopardize the pursuit of prestige of the entire 
institution. Consequently, NCAA-affiliated universities accept cartel behavior in 
athletics by asserting institutional control in NCAA rules compliance while seeking to 
achieve heightened institutional prestige with a “win-at-all costs” mantra. By following 
the rules, but being willing to break them to win, a myth of rationality may exist within 
the NCAA member institutions. 
To discern why recruiting violations occur and what factors can prevent future 
violations from occurring, the following work will examine NCAA recruiting violations 
in three separate articles. The first article will examine reported major and secondary 
NCAA recruiting violations. Moreover, this study will investigate: a) the commitment of 
human resources to rules compliance, b) the impact of compliance personnel presence on 
the various types of recruiting violations, and c) institutional factors of typologies 
established in reported recruiting violations of NCAA Article 13. The second article will 
examine unreported recruiting violations, expanding the sample from Sack (1991) to all 
NCAA Division I (FBS) sports. Also, this study will investigate: a) the extent to which 
unreported violations occur within a population sample of prospective student-athletes, 
b) what types of unreported recruiting violations are occurring, and c) institutional and 
individual factors of unreported recruiting violations.  The purpose of the third study is 
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to examine the institutional and individual factors that lead to institutional control of 
NCAA recruiting at a Bowl Championship Series (BCS) affiliated conference institution 
of higher education. The cumulative analysis of the findings in the studies will be 
discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation.  The purpose of this work is to identify 
why various types of recruiting violations occur and what factors lead to these 
violations, and to provide effective methods universities can implement to protect the 


















DOES ATHLETIC COMPLIANCE STAFF SIZE REALLY MATTER? AN 
INSTITUTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF REPORTED MAJOR NCAA DIVISION I (FBS) 
RECRUITING VIOLATIONS  
Introduction 
 Universities and coaches may be openly labeled as cheaters through allegations 
of NCAA violations. In fact, some media outlets refer to such alleged actions as 
negligent, unethical, and reputation damaging (Forde, 2008). Though ethical lapses in 
the formal organizational structure of higher education are not singular to athletics 
(Kelley & Chiang, 2007), intercollegiate athletics rules violations may adversely affect 
the overall institutional prestige of a university. Furthermore, the recruitment of athletes 
to universities has been found to be integral to the success of an athletics program 
(Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; DuMond, Lynch, & Platania, 2008) and one measure of 
coaching success (Cunningham & Dixon, 2003; Chelladurai & Reimer, 1997). Due to 
the importance of recruiting, the element of “recruiting advantage” gained through 
breaking the rules is embedded in the definition of a major NCAA violation (NCAA 
Bylaw 19.02.2.2). Because institutional prestige was found to be the objective of higher 
education fiscal spending (Bowen, 1980), universities must invest resources to protect 
institutional prestige by curtailing NCAA recruiting violations through a comprehensive 
NCAA rules compliance program.  
To accomplish this system known as institutional control, universities have hired 
athletics compliance administrators to manage the comprehensive NCAA rules 
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compliance program. However, the ability of compliance coordinators to successfully 
curtail future NCAA violations is contingent upon multiple factors. Kihl (2007) found 
that individual factors of employing moral judgment and practical knowledge of rules 
interpretations, not “hiding behind the rules” (p. 299), and understanding of the 
expectations of sport industry stakeholders are integral to a successful compliance 
coordinator. The understanding of stakeholders’ expectations through the lens of the 
formal organizational structure of NCAA athletics may further elucidate why particular 
institutions are involved in violations of NCAA recruiting regulations stipulated in 
NCAA Bylaw 13.  
 This study explores the institutional factors of reported NCAA major recruiting 
violations. Expectations for universities’ stakeholders may follow these institutional 
factors and identify patterns that explain why particular recruiting violations are reported 
by the NCAA. Therefore, this study proceeds with a review of the extant literature 
regarding the organizational cartel structure of NCAA athletics particular to rules 
enforcement. Research questions from the literature review will lead to remainder of this 
study. The purpose of this work is to discover what (if any) institutional typologies that 
are correlated with various types of reported NCAA major recruiting violations pursuant 
to NCAA Bylaw 13 in order to expand the existing boundary assumptions as to why such 
phenomena occur. It is the desire of the authors to identify institutional susceptibility to 
particular recruiting violations in order to provide athletic administrators with practical 
findings that may assist in focusing monitoring efforts for athletics compliance 
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coordinators to curtail prestige-damaging NCAA major recruiting infractions from 
occurring. 
Review of the Literature 
Extant literature asserts that the NCAA functions as a classic economic cartel by 
controlling inputs into college athletics to maximize profits (Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 
1992; Kahn, 2006; Grant, Leady, Zygmont, 2008; DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996; Eckard, 
1998) and control the perception of competitive balance or recruiting advantage through 
NCAA recruiting regulations in NCAA Bylaw 13. A cartel is an economic collusion 
where firms in the marketplace cooperate to control production and sales in order to 
maximize profits (Kahn, 2006; Grant et al. 2008). Three challenges presented to an 
economic collusion are: a) agreement on the appropriate actions of the group, b) 
preventing cheating, and c) controlling entry into the group (Grant et al. 2008). 
Therefore, the NCAA is concerned about the appropriate recruitment of prospective 
student-athletes to control entry into the NCAA and seeks to prevent cheating in the 
recruiting process. All three of these characteristics are mandated through recruiting 
policies that have become institutionalized by member institutions of the NCAA. 
Recruiting prospective-student athletes is essential to controlling entry into the 
economic cartel of the NCAA. The recruiting process is extremely competitive because 
the benefits of effective recruiting are tangible and hundreds of universities, including 
archrivals, may pursue the same prospect simultaneously (DuMond et al., 2008). 
Because “athletes are the most essential human resource involved in the production of 
intercollegiate athletics” (Chelladurai & Reimer, 1997, p.134; Cunningham & Dixon, 
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2003), their performance may lead to increased winning percentages and revenue 
through ticket sales and postseason or bowl game appearances (Humphreys & Ruseski, 
2006). Recruiting and signing an elite college football player can increase marginal 
revenues of an athletic department by as much as $500,000 annually (Brown, 2001) and 
$1 million for an elite college basketball player (Brown, 1994). Many universities with 
the top ranked recruiting classes have been found to win championships or have Top 10 
finishes in college football (Croley, 2008). Recruiting can also have a major impact on 
the employment status of a coach because it is means of measuring the success of a 
college coach (Cunningham & Dixon, 2003). Simply, “recruiting is the lifeblood of the 
program” (O’Neil, 2008), which can lead to the perceived success or failure of a 
university athletics program and its coaches. 
Due to the high impact of recruiting, the establishment of rules and sanctions for 
rules violations has been implemented to define appropriate actions and prevent 
cheating. NCAA recruiting rules follow the recruiting process (DuMond et al., 2008). 
This process typically begins by university coaches identifying the positional or talent 
needs of their particular sport, then seeking to address positional team needs by finding, 
evaluating, and getting prospects to commit to play at their university. These players can 
be found locally, regionally, nationally, and sometimes internationally. Once talented 
athletes are identified, certain coaches (who have passed an NCAA certification exam) 
will begin to gauge the prospective student-athletes’ interest by making contact through 
postal mail, electronic mail, electronic messages (e.g. text-messaging or instant 
messaging), and/or telephone calls. This point in the recruiting process is known as the 
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contact phase, where proper actions, modality, and locations of contacts/evaluations of 
talent occur and is controlled by NCAA Bylaws 13.1 and 13.4. For most prospective 
student-athletes, this process will begin well before their senior-year in high school. If 
continued mutual interest occurs, the contact with the prospect will continue and the 
evaluation process is initiated. Coaches evaluate prospects through multiple means such 
as reviewing game film of the prospect, attending the prospects’ competitions or 
practices, and attendance at a summer camp or clinic on the university campus (Bylaw 
13.12). When the interest of the prospect and coaches is mutually heightened, a prospect 
will visit the university campus. These campus visits are either official visits (where the 
university pays for the prospects’ travel, food, lodging, and entertainment) or unofficial 
visits (where the prospect pays for the costs of the visit). Official visits (NCAA Bylaw 
13.6) and unofficial visits (NCAA Bylaw 13.7) are also regulated by the NCAA. 
Limitations on the forms and amount of entertainment (Bylaw 13.8), transportation 
(Bylaw 13.5), academic assistance (Bylaw 13.3), and conducting a physical tryout of 
prospects (Bylaw 13.11) are restricted by the NCAA. Universities are also limited in the 
forms and use of recruiting funds (Bylaw 13.14) and pre-college expenses (Bylaw 13.15) 
given to prospects during the recruiting process. 
Sometime during the recruiting process, some prospects are offered a one-year 
scholarship which promises that the university will pay for his or her cost of attendance 
(including tuition, room, board, and books) in exchange for playing the sport at the 
university. If the prospect agrees, he or she will sign a contract, known as the National 
Letter of Intent (NLI), agreeing to follow NCAA eligibility standards in return for the 
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scholarship offer (Bylaw 13.9). However, the NCAA rules prohibit the publicizing of 
prospects scholarship offers and visits to the media (Bylaw 13.10) in order to protect the 
student from undue pressures (NCAA Constitution 2.11). Alternatively, prospects not 
offered a scholarship are asked to “walk on” by receiving no financial assistance, but 
having the opportunity to compete for a future scholarship as a member of the team. 
From time to time, university alumni (boosters), coaches, or staff may offer money, cars, 
loans, and/or houses to entice a prospect to play for a particular university. According to 
the NCAA, these inducements are unethical conduct (Bylaw 10.1) and in violation of 
recruiting rules (Bylaw 13.2). In order for a university to be a member institution of the 
NCAA, universities are obligated to abide by the rules and regulations of the NCAA 
(NCAA Constitution 1.3.2). 
 The agreement of appropriate actions of NCAA member institutions lead to 
established sanctions that are essential to enforce rules compliance. In order to prevent 
cheating, sanctions are placed upon institutions or individuals within the NCAA cartel 
for violating the rules. These sanctions can be restrictions on production, actions, 
monetary fines, and the stigma that the rules violator cheats. The severity of the NCAA 
violation depends on the amount of recruiting or competitive advantage gained from a 
particular action in the recruiting process. There are two levels of severity to NCAA 
infractions on the institutional level: a) major violations (the most severe) that provide a 
“significant recruiting advantage” (Bylaw19.02.2.2) and b) secondary violations (less 
severe) that provide a “minimal recruiting advantage” (Bylaw 19.02.2.1). When an 
institution does not adequately establish a rules compliance program, the added moniker 
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of either “failure to monitor” or “lack of institutional control” may be added to a major 
violation. The lack of institutional control epithet may lead to heightened sanctions by 
the NCAA and increased public scrutiny for not being able to prevent cheating in its own 
athletic department. On the individual level, coaches may be individually sanctioned by 
the NCAA by a “show-cause order.” This is where an institution must demonstrate to the 
NCAA Committee on Infractions why individuals found in violation of rules should be 
permitted to coach without additional restrictions (Bylaw 19.02.1). While the most 
severe institutional violations are deemed a lack of institutional control, the most severe 
individual sanctions can be found in a show-cause order.   
When the expected cost associated with the sanction from a violation of the cartel 
agreement is less than the expected benefits, cartel members will have incentive to 
follow the rules (DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996). There is financial incentive to violate 
NCAA rules (Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Brown, 1994; Fleisher et al., 1992; Baxter, 
Margavio, & Lambert, 1996; DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996; Brown, 2001; Humphreys & 
Ruseski, 2006). This incentive may come in the form of increased marginal revenues by 
recruiting elite athletes (Brown, 1994; Brown, 2001), increased postseason revenues 
(Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006), or increased ticket revenues (Padilla & Baumer, 1994; 
Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; Fleisher et al., 1992; Kahn, 2006; Grant et al., 2008; 
DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996). To counterbalance this incentive for rules violations, the 
NCAA has claimed that it will increase the severity of sanctions (Wieberg, 2008). By 
increasing sanctions, Fleisher et al. (1992) found that NCAA violations will decrease. 
However, the effectiveness of the current sanctioning process of the NCAA has been 
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questioned by researchers asserting that oft-used scholarship limitations sanction may 
not curtail future NCAA violations (McEvoy, 2008). It is questionable that the costs 
associated with NCAA recruiting violations sanctions is greater than the benefits of 
breaking regulations stipulated in NCAA Bylaw 13.  
Previous research on NCAA violations has identified patterns that need further 
investigation to explain why recruiting violations occur. However, some previous 
research has not distinguished between the levels of severity of different NCAA 
violations. Prior to the formation of the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), Baxter et al. 
(1996) found that having: a) membership in a conference, b) a lower selectivity in the 
university admissions process, c) a greater number of competitors in the general 
proximity of the university, and d) universities located in the South and Southwestern 
regions of the United States were more prone to commit NCAA violations. No specific 
types of NCAA violations or their severity were discussed by Baxter et al. (1996). Also, 
Mahony, Fink, and Pastore (1999) found that NCAA violations had increased from 1952 
through 1997. In 1997, a monumental organizational structural shift occurred in NCAA 
athletics through the formation of the BCS. Six conferences (the ACC, Big East, Big 
Ten, Big 12, Pac 10, and SEC) were given automatic opportunities to compete for the 
football national championship. Following this structural change, Clark and Batista 
(2009a) found that membership in a BCS affiliated conference university increased the 
likelihood of reported major NCAA infractions. Furthermore, recruiting violations are 
numbered among the most prevalent form of NCAA major infraction and secondary 
recruiting violations have steadily increased since 2002 (Clark & Batista, 2009a). When 
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reported major recruiting violations occur, female coaches involved in the violation are 
more likely to be fired or forcibly resign than their male counterparts (Clark & Batista, 
2009b). Because the NCAA functions as a cartel, it is no surprise that revenue sports 
(football and men’s basketball) are highly correlated to the commission of major 
reported recruiting violations (Clark & Batista, 2009b). However, these previous studies 
have not examined particular aspects in the recruiting process or different types of 
recruiting violations (i.e. offers and inducements, contacts and evaluations, camps and 
clinics, etc.). Because there are multiple types of recruiting violations that may occur, a 
greater depth of analysis addressing multiple types of recruiting violations and 
institutional factors may explicate why particular recruiting violations occur in NCAA 
member institutions. Inclusive in this analysis is the influence of athletic compliance 
staff size regarding particular types of recruiting violations. This study utilizes previous 
institutional findings of Baxter et al. (1996), Mahony et al. (1999), and Clark and Batista 
(2009a & 2009b) to expand the current boundary assumptions of NCAA violations 
research. 
Research Questions 
 Through review of the literature regarding NCAA recruiting infractions, the 
following questions emerged to be addressed in this study: 
Q1: Are certain NCAA Division I (FBS) universities in various conferences, geographic 
regions, and certain sports therein more susceptible to certain types of NCAA recruiting 
violations that are reported by the NCAA?  
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Q2: Are show-cause or lack of institutional control sanctions more likely in certain types 
of reported major recruiting violations? 
Q3:  Does the size of an athletics compliance staff on a NCAA Division I (FBS) member 
institution’s campus correlate to certain types of recruiting violations being reported by 
the NCAA? 
Methodology 
 The NCAA records all public infractions reports for each major recruiting 
violation in the Legislative Services Database for the Internet (LSDBi) reported from 
1987 to the present. Each infractions report categorizes the major recruiting violation by 
the NCAA bylaws violated, the name of the University involved in the infraction, the 
sport(s) involved, and sanctions given to the institution for the rules violation. As such, 
data were collected through the use of LSDBi in order to determine the frequency of 
particular types of recruiting violations. These types of recruiting violations, established 
by NCAA mandate, follow the recruiting process and formulated the recruiting violation 
type variable consisting of NCAA Bylaws 13.1 through 13.15. NCAA Bylaws 13.3 and 
13.16 were omitted from the data analysis because there were no reported major 
recruiting infractions involving these particular recruiting rules. 
Each NCAA member institution found to have committed a major recruiting 
violation was categorized by the current conference affiliation of the University, 
geographic region where the institution resides, the sports involved with the violation, 
whether or not individuals were sanctioned with a show-cause order, and the number of 
full-time compliance staff members at the time the major infraction was committed. To 
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further test the previous findings of Clark and Batista (2009a), a dichotomous categorical 
variable of BCS conference affiliation and Non-BCS conference affiliation was created. 
Therefore, universities like SMU, which were formerly affiliated with a major BCS-like 
conference, were categorized as Non-BCS conference universities. The geographic 
regions utilized by Clark and Batista (2009a) and the United States Department of State 
and its Diplomatic Embassies (2007) were used in this study. This variable consisted of 
six areas: the South, Southwest, Midwest, West, Mid-Atlantic, and New England. 
Because there were minimal violations in the Mid-Atlantic and New England, these 
variables were combined into the Northeast variable. Each sport involved in a major 
recruiting infraction was recorded separately and categorized dichotomously as either a 
revenue sport (men’s basketball or football) or a non-revenue sport (all other sports) 
pursuant to the findings of Mahony et al. (1999) and Clark and Batista (2009b). In order 
to determine the number of full-time athletic compliance staff employed during the 
major recruiting infraction, each public infractions report was examined, institutional 
athletic websites were researched for more recent violations, and public copies of 
universities’ NCAA ten-year certification reports were examined. For each major 
recruiting infraction, the size of compliance staff was broken into three categories: a) a 
compliance staff size of one or less, b) a staff size of two, or c) a staff size of three or 
more at the time of the violation. 
Reported secondary infractions were also retrieved from the NCAA LSDBi. 
However, secondary infractions do not list the name of the member institution and 
thereby eliminating the possibility of discovering the conference affiliation and 
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geographical location of the institution. The sport affiliated with the secondary infraction 
and the NCAA recruiting bylaw violated in the secondary recruiting infraction was 
available. As such, secondary recruiting infractions in this work are utilized to identify 
what types of recruiting violations are considered less severe than the major recruiting 
infraction counterparts. Secondary recruiting infractions were not analyzed statistically 
as the major reported recruiting violations that have the institutional information sought 
by the authors. 
 Chi square analyses were conducted to test the relationship between types of 
reported major recruiting violations of NCAA Bylaw 13 and a) conference affiliation, b) 
geographic region, c) the sports involved with the violation, d) whether or not 
individuals were sanctioned with a show-cause order, e) whether or not an institution 
was charged with a lack of institutional control, and f) the number of full-time 
compliance staff members at the time the major infraction was committed. An additional 
analysis was conducted to test the relationship between the size of an athletics 
compliance staff and a) show-cause order sanctions for recruiting violations, b) lack of 
institutional control sanctions for recruiting violations, c) geographic region of the 
institution, and d) conference affiliation. Alpha levels were set at 0.05 to ascertain 
statistical significance.  
Results and Discussion 
 There are certain types of reported recruiting violations that are considered more 
severe than others by the NCAA. In order to distinguish the severity, the NCAA has 
sanctioned member institutions with major infractions for violations of particular NCAA 
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recruiting bylaws more often than other recruiting violation types. Furthermore, patterns 
of institutional characteristics that are found to deviate from the cartel agreements of the 
NCAA elucidating why particular reported major recruiting violations may occur in 
NCAA Division I (FBS) athletic programs. 
Severity of Reported Recruiting Violations 
 Secondary violations are considered less severe violations because they cause an 
inadvertent recruiting advantage and occur more frequently than reported major 
recruiting violations. Over 4,600 secondary recruiting infractions were reported by the 
NCAA from 2003 to 2008 in Division I athletic departments. Almost half of these 
secondary recruiting infractions were violations of contacts and evaluations (Bylaw 13.1) 
of prospective student-athletes (see Table 1). These contact and evaluation limitations 
include the number of telephone calls a prospect may permissibly receive, multiple 
exceptions of when and how often certain sports coaches may contact and/or evaluate 
recruits. The high frequency of secondary violations indicates that contacts and 
evaluations mandates by the NCAA are confounding many coaches, leading to multiple 
inadvertent violations of Bylaw 13.1. In response to the rate of Bylaw 13.1 violations, the 
NCAA and member institutions have issued over 550 rules interpretations that are not 
included in the NCAA regulations, but are expected to be followed. Thus, unintentional 
violations of contacts and evaluations regulations are not surprising due to the 
overabundance of mandates in Bylaw 13.1. Yet, not all secondary recruiting violations 





Reported Secondary Recruiting Infractions (2003-2008) 
 
Type of Secondary Recruiting Violation  Percent of Total  
13.1- Contacts and Evaluations 48.15 
13.6- Official Visits (paid) 17.96 
13.10- - Publicity 6.75 
13.2- Offers and Inducements 6.43 
13.11- Tryouts 5.02 
13.12- Camps and Clinics 4.86 
13.7- Unofficial Visits (unpaid) 3.30 
13.5- Transportation 2.56 
13.8-Entertainment, Reimbursement, and Employment of High 
School/Prep School/ Junior College Coaches 1.48 
13.15- Precollege Expenses 1.43 
13.9- National Letter of Intent (NLI) and Financial Aid 
Program 1.37 
13.4- Recruiting Materials 0.45 








Several intentional secondary recruiting violations are reported by the NCAA to 
occur less frequently than Bylaw 13.1. The next most frequent secondary infraction 
involves official visits (Bylaw 13.6), where only 25% of the official visits secondary 
infractions were self-reported. Because the official visit is a critical part of the recruiting 
process, it is apparent that coaches and institutions are willing to utilize a “bend, but 
don’t break” philosophy with Bylaw 13.6. In other words, one can push the limitations of 
the rules and break the rules to the point where it may not be considered a major 
recruiting violation, but will provide some recruiting advantage. In recognition of this 
behavior, the NCAA added a provision to the definition of secondary violations that 
“multiple secondary violations by a member institution may collectively be considered 
as a major violation” (Bylaw 19.02.2.1). While secondary recruiting infractions may 
inform of the perceived severity of certain recruiting violations, major recruiting 
infractions “reflect a general disregard for the governing rules” (Bylaw 19.01.5) of the 
NCAA cartel structure. 
Major reported recruiting violations may be categorized into three groups (see 
Table 2).  The first group consists of approximately half of the reported major violations, 
which include major violations of offers and inducements given to prospects (Bylaw 
13.2) and violations of contacts and evaluations regulations (Bylaw 13.1). Over 80% of 
the reported major recruiting violations involved a violation of Bylaw 13.2 and 28.27% 
of the major recruiting infractions cases were centered on major violations of recruiting 
offers and inducements to prospective student-athletes. The NCAA expressed that using 
money, cars, gifts, loans, and other inducements to entice recruits to chose a university is 
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unethical conduct (Bylaw 10.1) that does not “represent the honor and dignity of fair 
play and generally recognized high standards associated with wholesome competitive 
sports” (Bylaw 10.01). Not only has the NCAA mandated that violations of Bylaw 13.2 
are among the most severe violations of NCAA rules, it is also the most frequently cited 
major recruiting violation. Major recruiting violations of contacts and evaluations 
(Bylaw 13.1) were tangentially involved with over 60% of major recruiting violations 
and the focal bylaw of 21.91%. Because Bylaw 13.1 violations are also the most 
prevalent reported secondary recruiting violation, it is apparent that multiple secondary 
violations of contacts and evaluations rules lead to many major recruiting violations of 
Bylaw 13.1. NCAA conferences and member institutions have sought to ease the 
monitoring burdens  and the repeated violations of Bylaw 13.1  through Proposal 
Number 2009-32, which seeks to alter telephone call limitations making it permissible to 
have unlimited telephone calls during a contact period. This proposal may lead to lower 
secondary violations of Bylaw 13.1, but overt attempts to violate contacts and 
evaluations restrictions may also continue leading to reported major infractions. 
Therefore, reported violations of Bylaws 13.2 and 13.1 are considered the most severe by 
NCAA enforcement standards. 
Reported violations that occur less frequently and are considered less severe 
comprise the other two groups of major recruiting infractions. The second group 
includes major violations of transportation (Bylaw 13.5), official visits (Bylaw 13.6), and 
tryouts (Bylaw 13.11) recruiting regulations. When combined together, this second group 
of major violations occurs as frequently as offers and inducements. Nevertheless, these  
 28
Table 2 
Reported Major Recruiting Violations (1987-2008) 
Type of Major Recruiting Violation (Reported by NCAA)     Percent of Total  
 
13.2- Offers and Inducements 28.27 
13.1- Contacts and Evaluations 21.91 
13.5- Transportation 10.95 
13.6- Official Visits (paid) 10.6 
13.11- Tryouts 8.13 
13.7- Unofficial Visits (unpaid) 4.95 
13.8-Entertainment, Reimbursement, and Employment of High 
School/Prep School/ Junior College Coaches 4.24 
13.12- Camps and Clinics 3.18 
13.15- Precollege Expenses 2.83 
13.4- Recruiting Materials 2.47 
13.10- Publicity 1.41 
13.9- National Letter of Intent (NLI) and Financial Aid Program 0.71 










violations are more often considered to be secondary infractions of lower severity. The 
third group includes the remainder of the reported major recruiting violations. These 
violations occur less frequently in both forms of severity. It is important to note that the 
National Letter of Intent (NLI) violations (Bylaw 13.9) were low in both major and 
secondary reported violations. This may be attributed to the brevity of the rules 
contained in Bylaw 13.9, as well as signing an NLI is the conclusion of the competition 
with other schools in the recruiting process. Although the third group did not have the 
highest frequency of major reported recruiting violations, repeated defiance of these 
recruiting bylaws may lead to major infractions. Also, insubordination of Bylaws 13.2 
and 13.1 will most quickly lead to a major recruiting violation. Thus, it is crucial to 
understand the institutional characteristics that may elucidate why particular types of 
reported major recruiting violations may occur. 
Conference Affiliation 
 The conference affiliation of a university significantly contributed to why 
particular reported NCAA major recruiting violations occurred, particularly BCS 
conference affiliation (χ2= 55.739, df=40, p=.05). Over 75% of all reported major 
recruiting violations involved universities with BCS conference affiliation. This supports 
the previous findings of Clark and Batista (2009a). Particular recruiting violations have 
been found to be more pronounced in certain BCS conferences. Beginning with the most 
severe violations of Bylaw 13.2, universities affiliated with the Big Ten, Big 12, and 
SEC were most likely to commit a major recruiting violation that is reported by the 
NCAA. Also, Big Ten Conference universities were reported to be more likely to violate 
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Bylaw 13.1 contacts and evaluations rules. Violations of slightly lower severity involved 
the Big East. Transportation major violations (Bylaw 13.5) and official visits major 
violations (Bylaw 13.6) involved institutions affiliated with the Big East, Big Ten, and 
SEC. Among these transportation violations include private jets or impermissible 
transportation outside official or unofficial visits. Therefore, several SEC conference 
schools may attempt to entice prospects through overly extravagant modes of 
transportation and official visit benefits, whereas Big East and Big Ten schools may seek 
to verify their evaluations in forms of impermissible tryouts (Bylaw 13.11). Furthermore, 
the Big East, Big Ten, and SEC were also more likely to be involved in major violations 
including entertainment (Bylaw 13.8), unofficial visits (Bylaw 13.7), precollege expenses 
(Bylaw 13.15), recruiting materials (Bylaw 13.4), publicity (Bylaw 13.10), NLI (Bylaw 
13.9), and use of recruiting funds (Bylaw 13.14). On the BCS level, the Pac 10 and ACC 
were the least likely to have been reported for major recruiting infractions. On the Non-
BCS level, institutions affiliated with the Mountain West, WAC, and Conference USA 
were more likely than the MAC and Sun Belt to be reported for major recruiting 
violations. This Non-BCS phenomenon may exist as four teams from either the 
Mountain West or WAC have participated in a BCS Bowl game and SMU (in 
Conference USA) was once numbered among the conference elite in the Southwest 
Conference. The BCS structure may influence the reporting of major recruiting 




Geographic Region  
The geographic region of the NCAA Division I (FBS) member institutions was a 
significant factor in reported major recruiting violations (χ2= 29.632, df=16, p<.05). 
With an exception of a few recruiting violation types, the South and the Midwest were 
the two regions where most reported major recruiting violations may most likely occur. 
Furthermore, universities in the Midwest may be more likely to be involved in reported 
major recruiting violations of contacts and evaluations (Bylaw 13.1), recruiting materials 
(Bylaw 13.4), and publicity (Bylaw 13.10). These violations of Bylaws 13.1, 13.4, and 
13.10 occur in the contact phase of the recruiting process, which violations were 
communicative in nature with prospects and the media. Universities located in the South 
were more likely to have reported major recruiting violations in financial matters 
including the use of recruiting funds (Bylaw 13.14) and the NLI/ financial aid program 
(Bylaw 13.9). On the other hand, universities located in the Northeast and West were 
least likely to be reported for all types of major recruiting infractions. This finding 
statistically supports the empirical findings of Clark and Batista (2009a) that the South 
and Midwest are significant factors in reported major recruiting violations. This 
discovery also differs from the findings of Baxter et al. (1996) that cite the Southwest 
region and the South as the most prone to NCAA violations. 
NCAA Sanctioned Sport  
The type of sport reported involved in a reported major recruiting infraction was 
also another statistically significant institutional factor (χ2= 11.932, df=4, p<.02). Nearly 
all of the types of reported recruiting violations involved the revenue sports of men’s 
 32
basketball and football. Camps and clinics (Bylaw 13.12) and tryouts violations (Bylaw 
13.11) serve as the anomaly where non-revenue sports were involved in a greater 
frequency of major recruiting violations than revenue sports. Both Bylaw 13.11 and 
13.12 violations occur on a university campus. Whereas revenue sports involved in 
major violations that occurred during the contacts, evaluations, visits to campus, and 
financial aid offers phases of the recruiting process were most likely to occur off-campus 
or through communicative methods (i.e. text messaging, phone calls, etc.).   
The financial repercussions of revenue generation through men’s basketball and 
football were apparent driving forces in the violation of NCAA recruiting regulations on 
the Division I (FBS) level. Thus, supporting that there may be financial incentive for 
revenue sports to violate NCAA recruiting rules (Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Humphreys 
& Ruseski, 2006) and statistically supporting the empirical findings of Clark and Batista 
(2009b) that revenue sports are a significant contributor to NCAA rules violations. 
Furthermore, this illustrates that money may be a significant factor in why most reported 
major recruiting violations occur. It is recommended that institutions focus compliance 
monitoring efforts for non-revenue sports recruiting in the areas of tryouts (Bylaw 13.11) 
and camps and clinics (Bylaw 13.12). Also, compliance monitoring efforts should 
commit most compliance resources in the monitoring of and rules education to men’s 






Institutional Typology of Reported NCAA Major Recruiting Violations 
 















13.1- Contacts and Evaluations 
 







































































13.4- Recruiting Materials 
 
Big Ten Midwest Revenue 1 
13.10- Publicity 
 
Big Ten Midwest Revenue 1 
13.9- NLI Financial Aid 
Program 
 
Big East South Revenue 1 




Compliance Staff Size  
The size of a university’s athletic compliance staff has a significant impact on 
which particular major recruiting violations are reported in NCAA Division I (FBS) 
athletics programs (χ2= 37.672, df=8, p<.01). Universities with only one compliance 
staff member were more likely have been cited with a major recruiting infraction, 
compared to other universities with more compliance staff members. Thus, universities 
with only one compliance coordinator may be more susceptible to all types of reported 
major recruiting violations. In some cases, two or three compliance coordinators may be 
insufficient (see Table 3). Such was the case with contacts and evaluations violations 
(Bylaw 13.1) where two compliance coordinators was insufficient and universities with 
three or more full-time compliance staff members employed were reported to have major 
recruiting violations in offers and inducements (Bylaw 13.2). These anomalies may exist 
due to the difficulty of monitoring under-the-table payments by boosters, telephone calls 
and evaluations of prospects by coaches, and breadth of the rules interpretations of 
Bylaw 13.1. It was found that employing more athletic compliance staff may decrease 
the frequency of major recruiting violations reported by the NCAA (χ2= 37.672, df=8, 
p<.01). Additional analyses of compliance staff size pursuant to conference affiliation, 
geographic region, and the sanctions of a lack of institutional control or show-cause 
order were conducted.  
 Conference affiliation. Major reported recruiting violations were most likely to 
occur in a BCS conference university with one compliance coordinator (χ2= 11.354, 
df=2, p<.01). The Big East was found to have the most major recruiting violations 
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reported with only one compliance staff member employed at the time of the infraction. 
In all BCS affiliated conference universities, the frequency of reported major recruiting 
violations decreased when three or more compliance staff members were employed. The 
impact of conference affiliation was also manifest in Non-BCS programs, where 
approximately 75% of Non-BCS recruiting violations occurred when a university 
employed only one compliance coordinator. The NCAA is least likely to report a major 
recruiting infraction when there are three or more compliance coordinators on staff, 
particularly in Non-BCS affiliated programs where less than 1% of the major recruiting 
violations occurred with a staff of three or more compliance coordinators. Therefore, it is 
recommended that both BCS and Non-BCS affiliated conference universities should 
employ three or more compliance staff members to curtail future reported major 
recruiting violations.  
 Geographic region. Universities located in the geographic regions of the South 
and Midwest were more prone to be reported for major recruiting violations while 
employing only one compliance staff member (χ2= 38.330, df=8, p<.01). In all 
geographic regions except the Southwest, incidents of reported major recruiting 
violations decreased when two or more compliance staff were employed at the time of 
the violation. Unlike the other geographic regions, universities in the Southwest were 
found to have the same frequency of reported major recruiting violations with one or two 
staff members.  Athletic programs in the Northeast and West were most likely not to 
have any major violations when a university employs three or more staff. All geographic 
regions had decreased reported major recruiting violations when three or more 
 36
compliance staff members were employed during the course of a major infraction. Thus, 
it is recommended that universities in all geographic regions hire at least two compliance 
staff members and in the Southwest region at least three compliance staff members in 
order to curtail future major reported recruiting violations. 
Lack of institutional control. The NCAA Committee on Infractions found that 
insufficient policies and procedures were in place to prevent recruiting violations from 
occurring leading to  a lack of institutional control sanction in over 43% of all 
universities cited for major recruiting infractions. In particular, universities that were 
found in violation of Bylaws 13.1 and 13.2 were more likely to also be cited for lack of 
institutional control (χ2= 18.073, df=9, p<.05). Over 50% of the lack of institutional 
control sanctions cases involved violations of Bylaws 13.1 and 13.2, suggesting that the 
NCAA Committee on Infractions cartel agreements favor to more harshly sanction 
universities for violations of impermissible contacts, evaluations, offers, and 
inducements.  
It was also found that the size of a compliance staff was significantly correlated 
to a university receiving a lack of institutional control sanction (χ2= 5.987, df=2, p<.05). 
Universities with one or two full-time compliance staff members were found to be cited 
more frequently for a lack of institutional control. This may seem logical because the 
more individuals dedicated to producing and monitoring university policies and 
procedures may curtail future violations of recruiting regulations. Moreover, 
approximately 80% of universities cited for a lack of institutional control were from a 
BCS affiliated conference and approximately 60% of these universities were located in 
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either the South or the Midwest (see Table 4). Universities with conference affiliation in 
the Big East, Big Ten, and Big 12 Conferences (χ2= 23.980, df=10, p<.01) and revenue 
sports (χ2= 1.103, df=1, p<.05) were more likely to be cited for a lack of institutional 
control.  
A dichotomy between individual show-cause order and organizational lack of 
institutional control sanctions were found in this study. When a lack of institutional 
control violation was given to a university, most individuals (i.e. coaches or staff) 
involved in the violation were not sanctioned with a show-cause order (χ2= .986, df=1, 
p<.05). This finding is particularly pertinent, as it insinuates that athletic compliance is a 
balance between institutional control over athletics programs and individual morality of 
following the rules. If, for instance, institutional policies and procedures are lacking at a 
university and a coach violates a recruiting rule, then it is more likely that the university 
will be sanctioned for lack of institutional control than a show-cause order. 
Show-cause order. Institutional characteristics of where university coaches and 
staff are employed during a reported major recruiting infraction that resulted in a show-
cause order exist. Most show-cause order sanctions in recruiting were given to university 
coaches or staff members that were reported to have impermissibly offered inducements 
in violation of Bylaw 13.2. Not only is the show-cause order the most serious sanction 
given to individual university coaches and staff by the NCAA, it also supports that 
Bylaw 13.2 is considered the most severe of the NCAA recruiting regulations that an 
individual may violate. Also, over 70% of show-cause orders issued involved a BCS 
conference affiliated university with the Big Ten and SEC leading the way (see Table 4).  
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Table 4 
Show-Cause Order and Lack of Institutional Control in Reported NCAA Major 
Recruiting Violations 
Show Cause Order 
%  with Show-
Cause 
% with Lack of 
Institutional Control 
Conference Affiliation  
BCS Affiliation 73.77 79.55 
Big Ten 22.95 20.45 
SEC 19.67 18.18 
Big East 8.20 9.09 
Big 12 8.20 20.45 
ACC 8.20 4.55 
PAC 10 6.56 6.82 
Non-BCS Affiliation 26.23 20.45 
Conf. USA 6.56 2.27 
WAC 6.56 6.82 
Mtn. West 4.92 6.82 
Sun Belt 4.92 2.27 
MAC 3.28 2.27 
Geographic Region  
South 34.43 29.55 
Southwest 26.23 20.45 
Midwest 24.59 29.55 
West 9.84 18.18 
Northeast 






Revenue Sport 65.69 72.22 







Over 80% of these show-cause orders were issued to universities located in the South, 
Southwest, and Midwest in respective order of frequency. Furthermore, the staff or 
coaches in the revenue sports of football and men’s basketball account for over 65% of 
all show-cause order penalties. These individual sanctions were found to most likely to 
occur when a university only employed a single compliance coordinator to monitor, 
educate, and manage the athletic compliance program (χ2= 9.891, df=2, p<.01). It is 
recommended that universities seeking to eliminate show-cause order sanctions from 
reported major recruiting infractions should employ at least two full-time compliance 
staff members. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
This study examined the reported violations of NCAA recruiting regulations. 
Undoubtedly, there are violations of recruiting rules that are not reported to the NCAA, 
which are not included in the analysis of this work. Future research should examine the 
prevalence of unreported recruiting violations in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletic 
programs, the types and severity of the unreported recruiting violations occurring, and 
the individual and institutional factors that influence the occurrence of unreported 
NCAA recruiting violations. Also, obtaining institutional information on secondary 
recruiting violations would further elucidate the institutional characteristics of self-
reported recruiting violations and the future research on factors that establish a 
compliant culture in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletic programs. This analysis may be 
extended to institutions in NCAA Division I (FCS and I-AAA), Division II, and Division 
III. By combining the institutional findings of reported and unreported NCAA recruiting 
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violations, athletic administrators may be provided with information to focus 
monitoring, educational, and overall compliance efforts in particular facets of the 
recruiting process.  
Implications and Conclusion  
The NCAA rules enforcement program functions like a classic economic cartel 
where the agreement of appropriate actions of NCAA member institutions leads to 
established sanctions that are essential to enforce rules compliance in the recruiting 
process. By mandating Bylaw 13, the NCAA seeks to prevent undue recruiting 
advantage for some universities and established various types of recruiting violations 
varying in severity. This study found three groupings for the severity of reported major 
recruiting violations in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics programs. The highest level of 
severity in recruiting was found in offers and inducements (Bylaw 13.2) and repeated 
violations of contacts and evaluations rules (Bylaw 13.1). Most lack of institutional 
control sanctions against universities and show-cause order sanctions against individual 
staff members were given when the recruiting violation involved impermissible offers 
and inducements of Bylaw 13.2. NCAA conferences and member institutions have 
sought to ease the monitoring burdens and multiple inadvertent secondary violations of 
Bylaw 13.1 through Proposal Number 2009-32, but this effect on the frequency of Bylaw 
13.1 major infractions has yet to be determined. Thus, efforts are being made to alter the 
complexity Bylaw 13.1 and the institutional responsibility for individual efforts to 
violate Bylaw 13.2.  
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Although the second level may also be considered a major infraction, rules 
violations of transportation (Bylaw 13.5), official visits (Bylaw 13.6), and tryouts (Bylaw 
13.11) must be violated repeatedly as secondary infractions and coupled with the first 
level (Bylaws 13.1 and 13.2 violations) to become a major infraction. The third level of 
recruiting violations severity must also be violated repeatedly or coupled with the first 
level of severity to constitute a major infraction reported by the NCAA. This level 
includes reported major violations of: unofficial visits (Bylaw 13.7), entertainment and 
employment of prospects’ coaches (Bylaw 13.8), camps and clinics (Bylaw 13.12), 
precollege expenses (Bylaw 13.15), recruiting materials (Bylaw 13.4), publicity (Bylaw 
13.10), National Letter of Intent/ Financial Aid Program (Bylaw 13.9), and use of 
recruiting funds (Bylaw 13.14). Several institutional characteristics were found to be 
significant contributors as to why particular reported major recruiting violations occur.  
This study found that systemic influences of the NCAA cartel, particularly the 
conference alignment of the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), may elucidate why some 
NCAA Division I (FBS) universities in various conferences, geographic regions, and 
particular NCAA sponsored sports were more susceptible to certain types of reported 
NCAA recruiting violations. The NCAA may be more likely to report major recruiting 
violations in universities that: a) are affiliated with a BCS conference, b) are located in 
the South or Midwest, c) have only one athletic compliance staff member working full-
time on campus, and d) are seeking to gain revenues through men’s basketball and 
football. Violations of Bylaws 13.1 and 13.2, which may be more likely to lead to a lack 
of institutional control sanction, were found to occur in men’s basketball or football 
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programs that employ only one or two compliance staff and have BCS  conference 
affiliation in the Big Ten, Big 12, or SEC. On the other hand, Non-BCS conference 
affiliated universities along with BCS conferences Pac 10 and ACC, were found to be 
less likely to have been reported for major violations of Bylaws 13.1 and 13.2. 
The size of an athletics compliance staff on a NCAA Division I (FBS) member 
institution’s campus may correlate to certain types of recruiting violations being reported 
by the NCAA. By employing more athletic compliance staff, a university may decrease 
the frequency of major recruiting violations. On the BCS level, this may be particularly 
pertinent in curtailing major recruiting violations that lead to lack of institutional control 
sanctions. On the Non-BCS level, almost all reported major recruiting violations may be 
curtailed through a staff size of three or more. Furthermore, the likelihood of a show-
cause order may also be lessened by increasing the athletic compliance staff size at a 
university. Thus, universities and athletic administrators may lessen the likelihood of 
reported major recruiting violations, particularly violations of Bylaws 13.1 and 13.2 that 
may lead to greater institutional sanctions, by investing institutional resources in 
athletics compliance personnel.  
The regulation of NCAA recruiting rules rests heavily upon the education and 
monitoring efforts of athletic compliance staff members. This study found that the size 
of an athletics compliance staff has a significant impact upon the frequency of reported 
major recruiting violations, especially violations of Bylaws 13.1 and 13.2, in NCAA 
Division I (FBS) athletics programs. Therefore, if NCAA Division I (FBS) member 
institutions seek to curtail future reported major recruiting violations, employing at least 
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three capable, full-time compliance staff members may an excellent compliment to other 
athletic compliance systems such as rules education and monitoring efforts. By so doing, 
universities may be able to meet the demands of the NCAA cartel agreements on 
























A TYPOLOGY OF UNDISCLOSED RECRUITING VIOLATIONS IN NCAA 
DIVISION I (FBS) ATHLETIC PROGRAMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
Introduction 
 In 2001, an assistant high school coach notified several universities in the 
Southeastern conference (SEC) that a highly regarded football recruit would play for 
their university at the cost of $200,000 in under-the-table payments (Fish, 2005). Later, 
coaches from Auburn, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Memphis, Michigan 
State, Mississippi, and Tennessee stated that they were continually solicited to increase 
their payments to the prospective student-athlete without the knowledge of the NCAA. 
This process continued until Coach Fulmer from Tennessee notified the NCAA and FBI 
of the under-the-table payments from rival Alabama to the prospect (Fish, 2005). By 
2002, the NCAA completed its investigation and sanctioned Alabama for a major 
recruiting violation. In the public infractions report the NCAA found that Alabama 
harbored an “engrained culture of non-compliance”, and stated: 
[R]ogue athletics representatives [boosters] demonstrate a profound and 
worrisome immaturity [and] even if sincere, their claimed motivation for 
cheating -- helping a university to recruit blue-chip athletes – betrays a lack of 
integrity and a "win-at-all-costs" attitude that undermines and cheapens athletics 
competition and corrupts the ethics and maturation process of the young people 
they claim to be ‘helping’ (LSDBi, 2002). 
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Approximately three years after the major recruiting violation was reported by the 
NCAA, Alabama booster Logan Young and high school coaches Lynn Lang and Milton 
Kirk were convicted for “conspiracy to commit racketeering” according to Tennessee 
state bribery laws, “crossing state lines to commit racketeering, and arranging bank 
withdrawals to cover up a crime” (Schlabach, 2005). Although the University of 
Alabama could have claimed that recruiting violations were not occurring prior to being 
turned in by a rival football coach, the high school coaches involved in the violations 
claimed that this behavior had been occurring for several years without preventative 
action from the institution or NCAA. Furthermore, this behavior was not singular to 
Alabama. Such organizational deviance led to multiple undisclosed recruiting violations 
occurring without the knowledge of the NCAA until the rogue crimes were brought to 
light and reported by the NCAA and FBI.  
There is an assumption that NCAA violations are not occurring at universities 
that have not been reported by the NCAA as having committed an infraction. Because 
recruiting talented athletes is critical to the success of a NCAA Division I Football Bowl 
Subdivision (FBS) athletics program (Cunningham &Dixon, 2003; O’Neil, 2008; 
Chelladurai & Reimer, 1997), universities and individuals therein seek to creatively lure 
prospective student-athletes into competing for their teams (Dumond, Lynch, & Platania, 
2008). In response to this recruiting competition, the NCAA has established guidelines 
to control actions of university staff, coaches, and prospective student-athletes during the 
recruiting process. Meyer and Rowan (1988) explained that in formal organizational 
structures, like the NCAA, social purposes are identified as technical processes, 
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rationalized to be crucial in purpose, and then enforced by strict mandated policies. This 
process of legitimizing is known as the myth of rationality (Meyer & Rowan, 1988). 
Through this framework, the prevalent belief that recruiting violations are not occurring 
unless reported as NCAA violations has been rationalized. Next, NCAA recruiting rules 
have become highly institutionalized to the point where the policies become seemingly 
legal in power and extend beyond the control of individuals within the university (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1988). This institutionalization leads individuals to believe that recruiting 
actions cannot be changed within the organization and, much like Alabama, are coerced 
by the enforcement of NCAA rules to incite behavioral change. Despite this prevalent 
belief, undisclosed recruiting violations may occur without the knowledge of the NCAA.   
 Utilizing the myth of rationality as a framework, this largely exploratory study 
examines the nature of undisclosed NCAA recruiting violations. For this purpose, this 
study will investigate the prevalence of unreported recruiting violations and the 
institutional and individual factors that drive these ethical lapses (Kelley & Chiang, 
2008) that occur within NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institutions. 
First, extant literature pertaining to neoinstitutionalism is introduced and used as a frame 
to explain NCAA recruiting violations. This study draws upon the recruiting experiences 
of over one thousand current student-athletes in order to determine significant factors of 
unreported recruiting violations, outlined in the findings and implications sections. It is 
the desire of the researchers not only to build upon previous recruiting research, but to 
provide practical information to athletic administrators by identifying typological 
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The formal organizational structure of the NCAA utilizes mandated recruiting 
policies in order to legitimize social purposes and promulgate universal rules 
compliance. The NCAA  is comprised of hundreds of educational organizations that 
direct resources to achieve prevailing ideals of ethical sportsmanship, but only monitor 
the outcomes of these allocations sufficiently enough to instill confidence outward 
confidence in its enforcement capabilities (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). These prevailing 
ideals become institutionalized through ritual classification of NCAA violations, thus 
giving assumptive meaning to the enterprise of NCAA rules enforcement (Goffman, 
1967; Meyer & Rowan, 1978). In a similar vein, Galaskiewcz (1991) found that through 
constant efforts to institutionalize meanings and ideals (like NCAA rules) within an 
organization are effective in changing organizational behavior. Yet, isomorphic 
pressures in these formal organizations advance the legitimacy, perceived strength, 
universality of organizational action, and prestige of institutional rituals (Hess, 1999; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) to seemingly avoid violations of organizational mandates, 
particularly in the NCAA (Cunningham & Avery, 2001). Thus, formal structures of 
many NCAA institutions may not reflect the demands of compliance with NCAA 
recruiting regulations, but rather is reflective of prevailing myths of the organizational 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1988) that in order to win and generate revenue 
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institutions (or representatives of institutions, like coaches) should covertly violate 
NCAA recruiting mandates (Coakley, 1990; Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Humphreys & 
Ruseski, 2006). The myth of rationality (Meyer and Rowan, 1988) is a critical element 
embedded within the concept of neoinstitutionalism. 
Myth of Rationality 
By implementing recruiting policies into their daily operations attempting to 
prevent precarious predicaments like the Alabama scandal, the NCAA has created a 
quasi-legal aura to impose its will based upon formal organizational structure. These 
regulations function through the underlying assumptions that rules are legal precedence 
and compliance is socially normal in the formal organizational structure (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1988). Particularly in educational formal structures, layers of bureaucracy are 
established in order to create an environment of power and authority that are highly 
institutionalized. Meyer and Rowan (1988) found that these formal structures lead to 
ideas and concepts being rationalized as legitimate structures and adopted as an integral 
part of the institution, or institutionalized. Rationalization and institutionalization lead to 
the two-part myth of rationality that permeates from formal organizational structures. 
These myths are ideas or concepts that are rationalized to be truth, when in reality they 
are constructed by two notable properties.  
In the first property of the myth of rationality, formal organizational structures 
identify social purposes as technical in nature and are rationalized by enforcing these 
purposes through mandate (Meyer and Rowan, 1988). In the realm of athletics, the social 
purposes of intercollegiate athletics must coincide with social norms of the organization 
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(Santomeir, Howard, Piltz, & Romance, 1981). Acts that are “consensually defined as 
deviant by others” (Ermann & Lundman, 1978, p.17-18) serve to reinforce the need to 
adopt institutionalized rules, policies, and procedures to promote social purposes. In 
NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics, the primary beneficiaries of the promotion of these 
social norms are the universities, administrators, coaches and staff, and not student-
athletes (Santomeir et al., 1981). Thus, it is prudent that multiple forms of institutional 
policy instruments are used in order to control outputs and behaviors of individuals 
within the formal organizational structure for the benefactors.  
Alternative Policy Instruments 
According to McDonnell and Elmore, there are general types of policy utilized in 
formal organizational structures each with unique qualities. The first policy instrument is 
mandates, which “are rules governing the action of individuals and agencies” 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 134). NCAA rules and regulations form mandate policy 
instruments, where the expected outcome is universal compliance with the established 
rules of the institution by all individuals within the institution regardless of capacity to 
perform compliant actions (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Mandates use coercion to 
affect performance by targeting disobedient individuals to receive sanctions for non-
compliance (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The second instrument is inducement policy, 
or the transfer of “money to individuals or agencies in return for the production of goods 
or services” (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 136). Unlike mandates, inducements are 
expected to only yield short-term returns through production (McDonnell & Elmore, 
1987), such as an incentive-laden coaching contract for winning conference 
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championships. Third, capacity-building policy instruments are “the transfer of money to 
individuals or agencies for the purpose of investments in future benefits” (McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1987). Capacity-building policy presumes that without the immediate 
investment of resources, future benefits will not be realized in the long-term (McDonnell 
& Elmore, 1987). Fourth, system-changing policies shift official authority among 
individuals within institutions. The intended outcome of system-changing instruments is 
to alter an ineffective system through changing reporting lines, terminating the 
employment of an individual, or even altering the distribution of funds other than 
authority (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). By means of mandated policy instruments, the 
NCAA makes the social purposes in the recruiting process a technical set of rules and 
regulations to be institutionalized by its member institutions. 
Mandates are critical dimensions within the myth of rationality sphere.  
Mandates in the form of codes, rules, and regulations become highly institutionalized, or 
socially accepted in an institution to the point where there is a belief that they are legal, 
and thus goes beyond the power of individuals within an organization (Meyer & Rowan, 
1988). Reactively, athletic administrators, coaches, or boosters violate mandates (i.e. 
evade compliance) in order to meet organizational objectives of winning championships 
(Santomeir et al., 1981). Organizational deviance to a set of mandates may be committed 
by direct involvement or through omission if it occurs within a coach’s administrative 
subunit (Santomeir et al., 1981). In order for the behavior to be considered deviant, the 
dominant coalition (in this case, the NCAA) must be aware of the mandates that are 
institutionalized and either address the behavior with sanctions or ignore the behavior 
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(Santomeir et al., 1981). If deviant organizations are ignored, new managers within the 
organization may be apprenticed to participate in the deviant action and socialized to 
believe that such actions are a social norm (Sage, 1975; Santomeir et al., 1981). Thus, 
organizational deviance may occur with or without the knowledge of the NCAA 
(Santomeir et al., 1981), but individuals within the universities may know that recruiting 
violations are rampant. Isomorphic pressures of NCAA institutions may lead to 
uniformity in rules compliance management (Cunningham & Avery, 2001) and the 
propagation of the rationalized, institutionalized myth of rationality that rules violations 
are not occurring unless reported by the NCAA. The NCAA rules have been legitimized 
as the moniker to determine what athletic departments are deviant organizationally, but 
the formal organizational structure of NCAA rules enforcement may lead to undisclosed 
violations of recruiting mandates.  
NCAA Recruiting Violations 
Prior research suggests the makeup of the NCAA could be leading to 
organizational deviance with respect to intercollegiate athletics rules compliance 
(Santomeir et al., 1981; Sack, 1989; Sack, 1991; Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; Padilla & 
Baumer, 1994). Ethical failures in the university environment transpire in athletics 
departments because stakeholders position personal needs above honesty (Kelley & 
Chang, 2007; Agle & Kelley, 2001; Howe & Moses, 1999). Other researchers claim the 
formal organizational structure of the NCAA acting as a classic economic cartel leads to 
undisclosed violations of NCAA rules (Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992; DeSchriver & 
Stotlar, 1996; Kahn, 2006; Grant, Leady, Zygmont, 2008). Cunningham and Avery 
 52
(2001) found that athletic administrators in the NCAA strategically choose to manage 
their departments in a similar manner to others in the NCAA.  Furthermore, NCAA-
affiliated universities utilize the four types of alternative policy instruments in attempt to 
ensure that behavior coincides with the intended socially accepted outcomes of the 
institution. In the formal organization of the NCAA, mandates are the fundamental 
policy instrument utilized in NCAA recruiting and determine which of the policy 
instruments are permissible. These mandates are instrumental in seeking uniform 
behavior to NCAA rules, according to the functioning of a classic economic cartel 
(Fleisher et al., 1992; DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996; Kahn, 2006; Grant et al., 2008). 
However, NCAA violations are increasing in frequency (Mahony, 1999; Jordan, 
Greenwell, Geist, Pastore, & Mahony, 2004; Clark & Batista, 2009a; Clark & Batista, 
2009b) and, in response, the NCAA Committee on Infractions has decided to increase 
the severity of its sanctions to deter future violations (Wieberg, 2008).  Despite the 
potential for increased sanctions and demanded compliance to mandates, there is 
financial incentive to violate NCAA regulations due to postseason revenue and ticket 
sales in men’s basketball and football (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; Padilla & Baumer, 
1994; Fleisher, Shughart, Tollison, & Goff, 1988). Santomeir et al. (1981) found that the 
reactive nature of NCAA rules enforcement leads to covert actions by coaches, athletic 
administrators, boosters, and prospective student-athletes that occur without the 
knowledge of the NCAA (Coakley, 1990; Sack, 1989; Sack, 1991).  
Violations of NCAA recruiting regulations are occurring with and without the 
knowledge of university administration, athletic administration, and the NCAA.  Sack 
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(1991) surveyed former student-athletes, playing in the NFL, and found that those who 
accepted impermissible cash benefits and inducements are most likely to come from a 
major conference and involve African-American prospects. However, this sample 
represents less than one percent of the student-athlete population in NCAA Division I 
(FBS) athletics (NFL Players Association, 2007).  Also, Sack (1989) found that African-
American student-athletes from a low socio-economic status did not believe it was 
improper to accept impermissible recruiting inducements in violation of NCAA Bylaw 
13.2. Further studies of reported NCAA infractions found that 76.4% of the reported 
NCAA major recruiting infractions in Division I (FBS) are committed by Bowl 
Championship Series (BCS) conference teams with 63% occurring in the geographical 
regions of the South and Midwest (Clark & Batista, 2009a).  Previous research has 
indicated that race, socio-economic status, geographic regions, and conference affiliation 
are correlated with under-the-table recruiting inducements (Sack 1991; Clark & Batista, 
2009a; Clark & Batista, 2009b). While violations seemingly persist, few studies have 
taken a critical look at the current NCAA policy design regarding recruiting.  
Highly institutionalized mandated policy functions optimally in circumstances 
when organizations have full capacity to comply and uniformity of behavior is needed 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987; Meyer & Rowan, 1988). Yet, as McDonnell and Elmore 
suggest, mandates can also trigger negative organizational behavior, such as 
organizational deviance. For instance, some organizations could see greater benefit to 
evading or avoiding compliance to mandates (e.g., long term financial payoffs for the 
institution). For this reason, this study examines the degree to which NCAA Division I 
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(FBS) universities might knowingly or unwittingly commit recruiting violations that go 
undetected by the NCAA and what factors drive the commission of these infractions. 
Research Questions 
 Three research questions emerged from the extant literature to be addressed in 
this study. 
1. How prevalent are unreported recruiting violations in NCAA Division I (FBS) 
athletic programs? 
2. What are the types and severity of the unreported recruiting violations occurring? 




Approximately 7,200 current student-athletes from each of the 11 Division I 
(FBS) conferences and over 16 sports were contacted through electronic mail for this 
study. The technique of criterion based (Kerlinger, 1986) stratified (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 
2007) sampling procedure was used to select subgroups representative of the population 
of student-athletes in NCAA Division I (FBS) in terms of geographic location, 
conference affiliation, and sport. Over 1,700 student-athletes responded to the survey, 
with 1,588 workable surveys utilized in this study, yielding over a 22% response rate. 
The respondents consisted of approximately 54% females and 46% males with 61% of 
the student-athletes participating in athletics for a BCS conference affiliated university. 
Most of the athletes (76.4%) were starters or played the majority of each competition for 
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their respective teams and received a scholarship from the recruiting process. White, 
non-Hispanic student-athletes comprised the majority of participants (64.4%) and 
African American student-athletes were the second highest participant percentage 
(23.7%). Participants were from various geographic regions of the United States, with 
the geographic affiliations being evenly disbursed at approximately 20% in the South, 
West, Southwest, Midwest, and Northeast.  
The survey was sent to student-athletes in three intervals during a three-week 
span. The respondents to the first interval would not be allowed access to take the survey 
a second time. This process was repeated for the second interval for student-athletes that 
responded to the first or second intervals.  The third interval data was isolated in order to 
address non-response bias pursuant to the findings of Miller and Smith (1983). By 
comparing early to late respondents, similar statistical significance was found and is thus 
representative of entire population sampled and suggests considerable internal validity 
(Miller & Smith, 1983; Turner & Jordan, 2009). The student-athlete e-mail addresses 
were obtained individually through public records located on each institution’s website 
student directory. Universities without public access to student-athlete e-mail addresses 
were omitted, thereby avoiding issues of private student information being divulged. If 
multiple students had the same name as the student-athlete, the student-athlete was 
omitted from the database to ensure the reliability of the data. Where public access to 





The survey instrument asked the student-athletes a series of questions regarding 
their recruitment prior to attending college which was designed from the recruiting rules 
in Bylaw 13 of the NCAA 2008-2009 Division I Manual. In order to protect anonymity 
and encourage reliable data, student-athletes were not directly asked if they had 
committed recruiting violations. Rather, each student-athlete indicated when certain 
recruiting events transpired while they were in high school and whether or not recruiting 
enticements occurred during the recruiting process. The answers to each event or activity 
were analyzed by the time periods mandated by the NCAA rules to be permissible. 
Responses that occurred outside of the permissible range of the NCAA were coded into 
dichotomous categorical variables as a violation or not a violation. This questioning 
format in the survey provided consistent measures for participants, thus providing 
reliable data for analysis (Fowler, 1993). Participants were not asked to disclose their 
names, the name of their university, or other information that could directly link the 
individual to any particular violation that could jeopardize their NCAA eligibility.  
Data Analysis 
Dependant variables. Multiple facets of recruiting contacts and impermissible 
inducements were integrated into the survey. Student-athletes were asked when a coach 
first contacted them by telephone, e-mail, text message, or letter and if a coach had 
contacted them by telephone multiple times per week. If the student-athlete indicated 
that a telephone contact or letter contact occurred in their sophomore year or earlier, 
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were telephoned more than once per week, and/or were contacted by text message, these 
answers constituted a violation of Bylaw 13.1.3.1 or 13.4.1.2.  
Cronbach’s alpha levels for measures of contacts and evaluations were reliable at 
the .741 level. This process was repeated for impermissible inducement recruiting 
violations. Student-athletes were asked if they or a family member had received cash, 
loans, cars, a house, memorabilia (i.e. hats, clothing, bookstore items), or a job from a 
coach, booster, or staff member at a university that was recruiting them.  If the student-
athlete indicated that he or she had received such inducements, this was entered into a 
database as a Bylaw 13.2.1.1 violation. Cronbach’s alpha levels for reliability measures 
of offers and inducements were reliable at the .825 level. 
Academic fraud during recruitment and official visit recruiting activities were 
also addressed in the survey. Student-athletes indicated whether or not they received 
assistance to complete online courses or had someone else take their ACT or SAT 
examinations in order to meet initial eligibility requirements (Bylaw 14.02.10.1) and 
make official on campus visits (Bylaw 13.6.3). An indication that there was 
impermissible assistance provided is academic fraud and considered unethical conduct 
pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 10.1. Current student-athletes were asked if any of the 
following recruiting activities occurred: whether or not special accommodations (e.g. 
hotel suites, jacuzzis, special signage in the room or hotel for the prospect) were given 
during an official visit in violation of Bylaw 13.6.6, if student-athletes were 
impermissibly forced to conduct a workout during their visit to show the coaches their 
athletic abilities (Bylaw 13.11), whether or not student-athletes were given excessive 
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entertainment money in cash over the value of $30 per prospect in violation of several 
entertainment issues in Bylaw 13.6.7, and if a scholarship was impermissibly offered to a 
prospect while attending a summer camp or clinic (Bylaw 13.12.1.3). Furthermore, 
student-athletes were questioned as to whether or not they consumed alcohol or engaged 
in any sexual activity (e.g. consensual sex with students, adult entertainment, and/or 
strippers) while on an official visit.  Although these institutional violations are not 
explicitly stated in Bylaw 13.6.1, these actions do constitute violations of institutional 
policies, underage drinking state laws, and possibly constitutional issues of sexual 
harassment or sex crimes. Cronbach’s alpha levels for reliability measures of academic 
fraud, official and unofficial visits, and camps and clinics were somewhat reliable at the 
.541 level. 
Independent variables. The responses of the student-athletes were analyzed by 
creating seven categorical variables, which included individual and institutional 
demographic data from the student-athletes. The categorical variables were tested for 
interaction based upon previous research. First, the conference affiliation of the 
university and prospective student-athlete were determined by the current construct of 
the NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision. These conferences were further 
divided into Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conference affiliation (including the 
ACC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, Pac 10, and SEC) and Non-BCS conferences (including 
Conference USA, Mid-American Conference, Mountain West, Sun Belt, and WAC). 
These conference affiliations were found to be statistically significant factors in major 
reported recruiting violations (Clark & Batista, 2009a). Second, geographical regions, 
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established by the United States Department of State and its Diplomatic Embassies 
(2007), were found to be statistically significant factors in reported recruiting violations 
(Clark & Batista, 2009a). These regions include the South, Mid-Atlantic, New England, 
Midwest, Southwest, and West. The third and fourth variables included the sex and sport 
of prospects demographics utilized in Clark and Batista (2009b). Fifth, racial 
demographics of prospects pursuant to Sack (1991) were collected and condensed into 
the dichotomous variable of white and minority (including African American, 
Hispanic/Latino, Asian American, Polynesian/Hawaiian, and Other). Sixth, the socio-
economic status findings of Sack (1991) were utilized to collect financial data of the 
prospects. This data eventually created a dichotomous variable of above or below the 
national average family income of $50,244 in 2007 from the United States Census 
(2007). The final variable included the aforementioned dependant variables, or 
categories of recruiting violations established by recruiting mandates in NCAA Bylaw 13.  
Agresti (2002) suggests the use of hierarchical loglinear regression, which 
utilizes backward elimination of the interactions of multiple categorical variables to 
assess the appropriate model fit and which interactions between the seven categorical 
variables are statistically significant. The analysis met the assumptions of loglinear 
analysis where each independent variable cell must have an expected frequency greater 
than one and 20% of the cells may have less than 5 (Field, 2009). In this model, the 
hierarchical tests determined that the observed and expected frequencies predicted by the 
model were not significantly different from the data. From this analysis, multiple 
statistically significant interactions were found. 
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Findings 
Scope of Unreported Violations 
Unreported recruiting violations are occurring without disclosure to the NCAA, 
but the severity of the type of violation determines its prevalence. The frequency of these 
violations also depends upon the severity of the violation. Slightly over half of the 
sampled student-athletes were not involved in a recruiting violation. However, certain 
types of recruiting violations were considerably more prevalent than others.  The most 
prevalent infractions occurred under the contacts and evaluation Bylaw 13.1, including 
the use of text messaging to contact prospects from Bylaw 13.4.2. Almost half of the 
sampled student-athletes received mail correspondence prior to the permissible time 
period, which could be construed as a minor (Level II) secondary violation (NCAA, 
2009b). Prospects contacted by text message and receiving more than one phone call per 
week or being called by coaches in their Freshman and Sophomore years in high school 
occurred quite frequently. Because contacting a prospect is crucial to the development of 
relationships in the recruiting process, these latter two contact violations have been the 
focal areas of major infractions cases.  Contacting prospects by telephone, text 
messaging, and letters impermissibly is rampant (see Table 5). 
 Offers and inducements recruiting violations are more severe (NCAA, 2009a), 
but not as prevalent as contacts violations with one glaring exception.  Slightly over one-
fourth of sampled student-athletes indicated that they stayed in overtly expensive hotel 
suites with personalized décor and gifts in the rooms during an official or unofficial visit 
despite Bylaws 13.6.7.9 and 13.7.3. However, student-athletes that indicated that they  
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Table 5 
Unreported Recruiting Violations Frequencies 
 




Type of Policy 
Instrument 
Letters sent too early 49.7 Secondary (LII) Capacity-
Building 













funds on official visit 




Alcohol Inducement 11 Major Inducement 
Scholarship offer during camp 7.7 Secondary (LI) System-
Changing 




Cash inducement 4.1 Major Inducement 
Sexual activity inducement 2.9 Major + legal 
issues 
Inducement 
Car inducement 1.6 Major Inducement 
Loan inducement 1.6 Major Inducement 
Academic Fraud on ACT or SAT 1.4 Major System-
Changing 
 
Major= Causes a significant recruiting advantage 
LI= Level I Secondary Violation, causes an inadvertent recruiting advantage and may 
involve loss of eligibility for student-athletes 
LII= Level II Secondary Violation, causes an inadvertent recruiting advantage and does 
not involve the loss of eligibility for student-athletes 








had received cash, gifts, memorabilia, cars, or other inducements occurred in less than 
five percent of the cases.  Not surprisingly, these violations are also considered by the 
NCAA to be some of the most severe in NCAA athletics. Offers and inducements 
violations of Bylaw 13.2 are the traditional under-the-table payments that were addressed 
by Sack (1991), but are not as widespread as previously reported. 
Typology of Undisclosed Recruiting Violations 
 Seven categories of unreported recruiting infractions emerged as statistically 
significant from the analysis. Each category includes multiple interactions of 
institutional factors of organizational deviance and/or individual characteristics of 
prospects involved with undisclosed recruiting violations. It is important to note that 
several individual factors are greatly influenced by organizational deviance because the 
rules violations occurred based upon coaches instigating the recruiting violations. 
Evidence of organizational deviance is present through undisclosed recruiting violations 
that utilize alternative policy instruments (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). 
 Contacts and evaluations violations. There were three significant interactions 
with unreported violations of NCAA recruiting contacts and text messaging bylaws. The 
significant combination of letter violations, text messaging violations, and telephone call 
violations involved female prospects with a family income above the national average of 
$50,233 (χ2= 6.777, df=1, p<.01). This significant interaction supports the establishment 
of a text message ban by the NCAA in order to curtail text messaging costs to highly 
recruited revenue sports prospects (Hosick, 2007).  However, this has not curtailed the 
continued violations by female prospects that are able to afford text messaging plans. 
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Second, a significant interaction was found between phone and letter violations 
committed by coaches in football or men’s basketball with a BCS conference affiliation 
(especially in the Big 10 Conference) involving prospects with an above average family 
income (χ2= 7.898, df=1, p<.01). Third, letter violations by coaches from BCS 
conference universities involving female prospects with above average family incomes 
was another statistically significant unreported recruiting violation (χ2= 7.97, df=3, 
p<.05).  
Academic fraud. Two statistically significant interactions of unreported NCAA 
violations of academic fraud in recruiting emerged. The impermissible assistance of a 
coach or staff member altering an ACT or SAT score in a university men’s basketball or 
football program with BCS conference affiliation, particularly the Southeastern 
Conference or SEC (χ2= 8.969, df=1, p<.01) was the first significant interaction. Another 
three-way interaction emerged with impermissible assistance on the SAT or ACT with 
minority (not white) prospects that play football or men’s basketball (χ2= 11.521, df=3, 
p<.01).  
Tryouts violations. Two-way interactions of unreported violations of prospective 
student-athletes being coerced to conduct a workout or tryout to display physical skill on 
an official campus visit emerged. Organizational deviance was found significant 
between universities with BCS conference affiliation and official visits tryouts violations 
(χ2= 4.692, df=1, p<.05). Tryouts violations also significantly involved white 
prospective student-athletes (χ2= 15.136, df=3, p<.01).  
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 Offers and inducements. The first series of offers and inducement violations of 
Bylaw 13.2.1.1 directly measured statistical significance of factors that influence under-
the-table payments, previously investigated by Sack (1991). Prospects receiving cash 
and impermissible loans from boosters or institutional staff members of men’s basketball 
or football and were from a BCS affiliated conference university (χ2= 12.823, df=1, 
p<.001). Other factors of cash inducement interactions included minority prospects that 
play football or men’s basketball (χ2= 14.583, df=3, p<.01). Football and men’s 
basketball programs at universities from the Southern region of the United States 
(Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, or West Virginia) were also significant 
violators of cash inducement recruiting rules in Bylaw 13.2.1.1 (χ2= 40.554, df=15, 
p<.001). With statistical significance in both BCS affiliation and geographic region of 
the South, university membership in the SEC emerged as a significant factor (χ2= 
12.823, df=1, p<.001) for the violation of NCAA recruiting offers and inducement 
regulations. 
 Additional inducement interactions of gifts surfaced as significant (see Table 6). 
If prospect was given an automobile as an inducement, he would most likely play 
football or men’s basketball (χ2= 4.580, df=1, p<.05). The use of memorabilia, including 
university apparel, as an inducement involved prospects from non-revenue sports 
particularly women’s track and field (χ2= 6.930, df=1, p<.01).  
 Official visits. When the interest of a prospect and coach is mutual, the prospect 
will visit the university at the expense of the athletic program known as an official visit.  
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Table 6 
Typology of Unreported NCAA Recruiting Violations 
 
Recruiting Violation Type 




















Hotel inducement on Official 
Visit 




funds on official visit 


















Tryouts on official visits System-Changing BCS Conference White 
 












Car inducement Inducement Revenue Sport  
 









Memorabilia inducement Inducement Non-revenue  
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The expenses that the university can spend on prospects for entertainment purposes are 
limited in monetary value. Impermissible entertainment expenses and the impermissible 
decoration of hotel rooms led to three significant interactions. Overspending on 
entertainment during an official visit for minority prospects that play football or men’s 
basketball are most likely to occur at BCS conference affiliated universities (χ2= 10.056, 
df=3, p<.05). However, impermissible entertainment expenses were also most likely to 
be given to female prospects from a low-socio economic family by a university with 
BCS conference affiliation (χ2= 3.965, df=1, p<.05). In contrast to impermissible official 
visits expenses, hotel inducements were most likely given to white female prospects that 
participate in non-revenue sports (χ2= 10.658, df=3, p<.05). 
 Camps and clinics. Although the NCAA mandates that the purpose of sport 
camps and clinics offered by university athletic programs is “designed to improve 
overall skills and general knowledge in the sport” (NCAA Bylaw 13.12.1.1.2), camps and 
clinics have become a covert means of coaches recruiting prospects (Feldman, 2007). 
The impermissible offer of a scholarship to prospects at a institutional sport camp or 
clinic furnished three, three-way interactions of statistical significance. The first 
interaction involves the scholarship offer at a camp or clinic to a male prospect by a BCS 
conference affiliated institution, particularly from the Big 12 and Pac 10 conferences 
(χ2= 9.002, df=1, p<.01). Furthermore, football and men’s basketball programs with 
BCS conference affiliation offering scholarships at camps was also significant (χ2= 
10.363, df=1, p<.001). Third, male prospects with below average family income were 
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more likely to receive an impermissible scholarship offer at a camp (χ2= 4.989, df=1, 
p<.05).  
 Institutional violations of alcohol and sex inducements. The mandates of the 
NCAA do not specifically prohibit the underage consumption of alcohol or the use of 
sex (e.g. strippers, sexual intercourse with current students, adult entertainment, etc.) by 
prospects on official visits, but institutional policies of universities condemn such 
recruiting practices. Furthermore, underage drinking actually violates alcohol 
consumption laws and demonstrates that actual legal issues are not the major concern of 
NCAA recruiting rules. The consumption of alcohol during an official visit was 
significant with prospects whose families had below national average income, white, and 
the prospect played a non-revenue sport (χ2= 8.277, df=3, p<.05). Sex inducements on an 
official visit were utilized by football and men’s basketball at universities that had BCS 
conference affiliation (χ2= 4.215, df=1, p<.05).  
Discussion 
Each of the seven types of unreported recruiting infractions emerged as 
statistically significant from the analysis. The interactions of the variables in each 
unreported recruiting violation type elucidates to a degree why such violations occur. 
Furthermore, the typology of unreported recruiting violations may shed light on which 
prospects might be more likely to be drawn into unethical situations of institutional 
violations of NCAA Bylaw 13 without violations being reported to the NCAA.  
Contacts and evaluations violations. The three significant contacts and 
evaluations interactions display the importance of above average socio-economic status 
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in contacts and evaluations unreported violations. Regardless of whether these violations 
involved male revenue sports, female prospects, or BCS conference affiliation, the 
common significant factor in all three types of contacts and evaluations unreported 
violations targeted prospects with above average family income.  
Recent technological advancements in cellular telephones and text messaging 
may be costly for prospects and their families. The NCAA text message ban contained in 
Bylaw 13.4.1.2 was created to alleviate the financial burden placed upon the prospect.  
However, if it is not a financial burden to the prospect, evidently text messaging and 
phone calls violations persist. What appears to be the result of a capacity-building policy 
instrument, the investment of immediate technological resources by coaches in contacts 
and evaluations seemed to have led to greater incidences of unreported violations. 
However, due to the lack of clear guidance and explicit limitations, which a mandate 
would offer, confusion and ambiguity are caused leading to greater variability in 
behavior.     
Academic fraud. Academic fraud is a serious charge that is typically found in 
major infractions cases, when discovered by the NCAA. It is important to note that 
academic fraud of test scores required to fulfill initial eligibility requirements is most 
likely to involve minority prospects in the revenue sports of men’s basketball and 
football (χ2= 11.521, df=3, p<.01) at major BCS conference schools (χ2= 8.969, df=1, 
p<.01), particularly the SEC. Thus, some revenue sports coaches at BCS conference 
schools do not value the testing requirements mandated for prospects to meet initial 
eligibility standards of the NCAA. Furthermore, they target minority prospects under the 
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assumption that either the prospects are not capable of successfully passing the 
standardized tests, or simply place their athletic abilities above the academic welfare of 
the prospect. Thus, coaches seek to subvert the academic system through an informal 
system-changing policy in providing impermissible testing assistance.  
Tryouts violations. In tryouts unreported violations, coaches in BCS affiliated 
conferences (especially the Big Ten) question the athletic talent of White prospects. This 
contrast between questioning the academic abilities of minority prospects and the 
athletic ability of White prospects promulgates stereotypes of minority superiority in 
athletics and white intelligence. Although questioning the talent of prospects is common 
in the recruiting process, a significant number of coaches utilize system-changing policy 
instruments by altering the process of evaluating talent by forcing White prospects to 
conduct a tryout during an official visit. 
Offers and inducements. The contrast between the cost of inducements between 
revenue sports and non-revenue sports is astounding. While men’s football and 
basketball prospects are more likely to be offered cash, loans, and cars, non-revenue 
sports prospects receive less expensive inducements such as memorabilia. Applying 
McDonnell and Elmore (1987), inducement policies are utilized by boosters and/or 
university coaching staff members to assert the production of goods and services in 
football or men’s basketball is valued more than in non-revenue sports. Furthermore, 
revenue sports (χ2= 14.583, df=3, p<.01) are a key factor in cash inducement (χ2= 
12.823, df=1, p<.001) and car inducement violations (χ2= 4.580, df=1, p<.05), where 
prospects that are not White (χ2= 14.583, df=3, p<.01) are more likely to be offered cash 
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inducements and impermissible loans and White student-athletes were not significantly 
offered inducements. Organizational factors of inducement policy in Division I (FBS) 
recruiting revealed that universities with BCS conference affiliation are more likely to be 
involved in cash inducements and impermissible loans to prospective student-athletes, 
particularly in the geographic region of the South. This finding is particularly interesting 
to note as ESPN recently agreed to the broadcast rights of the SEC valuing over $200 
million (ESPN, 2009). The heightened publicity and financial backing in revenue sports 
located in the South serve to agitate Bylaw 13.2 offers and inducements violations. On 
the other hand, the use of memorabilia, including university apparel, as an inducement 
involved prospects from non-revenue sports particularly women’s track and field (χ2= 
6.930, df=1, p<.01). Therefore, coaches and institutions utilize lower costing 
impermissible inducement policies for non-revenue sports because the overall value of 
the sports are perceived as less influential. 
Official visits. The quality of entertainment on a recruiting visit may alter the 
decision of a prospect. Overspending for entertainment on official recruiting visits is a 
counterbalance by some coaches to address this concern. Thus, impermissible 
entertainment inducements are geared toward minority prospects in major college 
football or men’s basketball programs or low socio-economic female prospects at a BCS 
conference affiliated institution. The desire to obtain a top recruit in a revenue sport or 
female prospect that may be awestruck by lavish entertainment could explain why 
coaches may covertly violate entertainment spending limitations. However, inducements 
where the decoration of a hotel room targeted prospects that are female, White, and play 
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non-revenue sports. Conjecturing that hotel inducements are perceived to be appreciated 
more by White prospects and entertainment inducements are more appreciated by 
prospects that are not White. Both entertainment expense violations and hotel violations 
on official visits represent capacity-building policy instruments that offer inducements 
for the promise of future production as a student-athlete to a prospect. 
Camps and clinics. Statistical significance indicates that undisclosed, 
impermissible scholarship offers are most likely to occur at a camp or clinic if the 
prospect comes from a low-income family, plays football or men’s basketball, and the 
institution offering is most likely to have BCS conference affiliation. Camps and clinics 
are not for the purpose of recruiting (Bylaw 13.12). Coaches, however, may permissibly 
offer scholarships to prospects after the conclusion of the camp or clinic, but not during 
the camp or clinic. The findings of this study indicate that BCS affiliated revenue sport 
coaches (especially in the Big 12 and Pac 10) routinely offer scholarships to prospects 
during camps and clinics. This covert action alters the mandated scholarship offer 
limitations of the NCAA where prospects receive capacity-building policy instruments.   
Institutional violations of alcohol and sex inducements. Big-time college football 
and basketball programs were more likely to use sexual inducements to entice prospects 
to commit to their university athletic program. As such, it is presumed that revenue 
sports prospects are more likely to be enticed to play for a university that offers 
opportunities for sexual encounters from college co-eds or adult entertainment. This 
significant interaction may also lead to future studies of the perceived sexual dominance 
of revenue sports athletes. On the other hand, alcohol inducements were significantly 
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used to lure low-income, White, non-revenue sport athletes to attend a university. 
Although traditional inducement policies utilize money as the medium of exchange, 
organizational deviance through inducement policies by BCS conference affiliated 
institutions excite big-time revenue sports recruits through sex and lower profile, white, 
non-revenue prospects through alcohol. 
Implications 
 The formal organization of NCAA Division I (FBS) institutions use various 
forms of alternative policy instruments to violate NCAA recruiting mandate policy. This 
has led to undisclosed recruiting violations occurring without the knowledge of the 
NCAA and its member institutions. Nevertheless, the NCAA continues to mandate that 
athletic administrators, especially athletic compliance staff, to monitor, educate, and 
seek to prevent recruiting violations from occurring within their respective athletic 
programs. Despite these efforts for rules compliance, organizational deviance to NCAA 
recruiting regulations resumes. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) state that mandates as 
policy types function optimally in circumstances when organizations have full capacity 
to comply and uniformity of behavior is needed. Yet, organizational characteristics from 
the undisclosed recruiting violations typology indicate that there are areas where 
increased compliance resources may be needed and where policy development could be 
enhanced by the NCAA. Chief among these organizational characteristics, this study 
confirms that BCS conference affiliation is a significant factor in most undisclosed 
recruiting violations, similar to reported major recruiting violations found by Clark and 
Batista (2009a). Further, it is pertinent to understand the characteristics of alternative 
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policy instruments utilized in undisclosed recruiting violations to determine effective 
NCAA enforcement that may deter future recruiting violations. 
In terms of capacity-building policy, undisclosed recruiting violations transpired 
more frequently, but were less severe than other alternative policy instruments. The 
purpose of capacity-building policy is to invest resources for the purpose of future 
human capital (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Investing the costs of sending multiple 
hard copy letters, text messages, telephone calls, and the costs of hotel suites or 
entertainment funds are specifically to lure the prospect to eventually sign with the 
university. Capacity-building policies were mostly used by BCS conference affiliated 
men’s basketball and football programs targeting racial minority prospects. Affluent 
female prospects were also targets of capacity-building policy resulting in undisclosed 
violations by non-revenue BCS affiliated universities, with the exception of less affluent 
female prospects in impermissible entertainment monies on official visits. According to 
Dumond et al. (2008), these recruiting mediums were not significant factors for recruits 
choosing a university. Thus, capacity-building policies in recruiting have a distant or 
ambiguous effect on intercollegiate athletics recruiting. Furthermore, capacity-building 
policies that result in undisclosed violations transpired more frequently, particularly 
contacts violations by phone, letter, and text message. These violation types are, for the 
most part, considered Level II secondary infractions—the lowest severity of a recruiting 
violation stipulated by the NCAA (NCAA, 2009). With the low-risk, low-reward nature 
of undisclosed recruiting violations utilizing capacity-building policy, organizational 
deviance may occur due to lack of knowledge regarding, complexity of, or blatant 
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disregard of NCAA Bylaws 13.1, 13.6, and 13.4 mandates by recruiters. In order to 
determine the actual knowledge of individuals recruiting for the universities, the NCAA 
mandates that coaches must successfully complete a recruiting examination. However, 
Jubenville, Goss, and Wright (2009) found that the current construct of the NCAA 
recruiting examination does not prevent reported recruiting violations. Suggesting that 
coaches may be cognizant of the recruiting rules, but because of the isomorphic 
pressures of widespread violation of the mandates organizational deviance and contacts 
violations continue. 
Undisclosed recruiting violations that attempted to subvert the rules through 
quasi system-changing policy instruments are less frequent in occurrence, yet more 
severe than capacity-building. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) found that system-
changing policies function under the rationale that increased efficiency may enhance 
production. BCS conference affiliation was a significant factor in all system-changing 
undisclosed recruiting violations. These violations were directed toward racial minority 
football or men’s basketball players, with the exception of forcing white prospects to 
prove their elite talent on an official visit. Efficiency of needing a certain test score for 
meeting initial eligibility requirements, cutting down on future evaluations of prospects, 
or having to travel to extend a scholarship offer in-person are all outcomes of these 
system-changing actions. NCAA mandates regarding academic fraud are noted as among 
the most severe, by specifically delineating this action as unethical pursuant to Bylaw 
10.1 (h) alongside other unethical issues such as utilizing banned drugs. Although 
scholarship offers at camps and tryouts on official visits are not listed as unethical in 
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Bylaw 10.1, the NCAA does list these violations as more serious Level I secondary 
institutional infractions that could combine to form a major infraction (NCAA, 2009).  
Although academic fraud is one of the most severe violations, not all system-changing 
undisclosed violations are as severe as inducement policy. 
In the area of policy inducements, some of the most severe violations of NCAA 
mandates transpire, but occur less frequently. This form of undisclosed recruiting 
violation displays a disturbing dichotomous trend of racial implications and importance 
of revenue sports. BCS conference affiliation in men’s basketball and football programs 
located in the Southern geographic region of the United States targeting racial minority 
prospects indicates that racism abounds in the offering of inducements. On the other 
hand, White or non-revenue sports prospects were offered inducements of alcohol or 
memorabilia as opposed to cold-hard cash, cars, strippers, or loans to family members. 
These undisclosed inducement violations are also considered unethical and rank among 
the most severe of NCAA violations (Bylaw 10.1 (c)). While inducement violations 
occur less frequently than all other violations, but academic fraud, organizations target 
prospects based upon the value of financial return which can be produced by an 
inducement policy. As such, racial minority prospects in big-time college football or 
basketball programs are objectified by inducement policy organizational deviance 
through undisclosed recruiting violations. Whereas, the financial return of non-revenue 
prospects leads to inducements of alcohol and memorabilia that are minimal in cost 
comparative to under-the-table payments. This study confirms that recruiting 
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inducements follow the findings of Sack (1991), but occur less frequently than 
previously reported. 
To facilitate the curtailing of future recruiting violations, this study has identified 
what organizational deviance of recruiting mandates is occurring and not necessarily 
being reported by the NCAA. Fleisher et al. (1988) found that increased sanctions 
reduced the frequency of NCAA violations. However, this may not necessarily reduce 
the total number of undisclosed recruiting violations. If increased sanctions are to be 
enforced, the NCAA must increase sanctions tactically in the policy instruments that 
involve more severe violations. Therefore, increased sanctions should focus upon 
inducement policy instruments and the system-changing instrument of academic fraud. 
Because the NCAA does not create law and cannot punish prospects and coaches by law, 
the NCAA must utilize the power of exclusion to deter individuals from violating NCAA 
recruiting mandates.  This may be accomplished through loss of eligibility (for 
prospects), the use of the show-cause order (for coaches), game or season suspensions 
(for prospects and coaches), and restricting revenue streams of post-season competition 
or television appearances (for institutions). Clearly, the current enforcement efforts of 
the NCAA are not curtailing undisclosed recruiting violations. The University of 
Memphis sanctioned for a major recruiting infraction involving inducements and 
academic fraud, and unethical conduct. The seriousness of these violations led to 
Memphis being forced to vacate all victories during a successful men’s basketball season 
trip to the Final Four, raising the question of the effectiveness of these sanctions, 
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The penalty is basically to tell us it never happened. I was there [at the Final 
Four]. I saw it. So did 43,257 other people in San Antonio and millions more on 
television. The NCAA can mandate a whole lot of things with that gigantic 
rulebook. It cannot…control minds (O’Neil, 2009). 
In another academic fraud case, the NCAA ruled that Florida State must vacate all wins 
from its football program in 2008 leaving Coach Bobby Bowden further from being the 
all-time most-winning football coach. Furthermore, the NCAA did not find the 
involvement of any coaches in the infraction (ESPN, 2009). Legendary coach Joe 
Paterno criticized the NCAA’s enforcement by stating,  
The NCAA is going to do what it's going to do, but I would hope they would not 
take away 10 or 12 wins away from him. I don't think that's fair. He coached the 
team he had; they played against people, and they won. They ought to be wins 
for them (ESPN, 2009). 
Similar ineffective enforcement by the NCAA was used against Michigan when a major 
recruiting infraction occurred during the “Fab Four” Era. Effective enforcement would 
prevent prospects from playing after committing a recruiting violation. It would prevent 
clandestine coaches from being able to coach in multiple games by suspension or a 
show-cause order for offering inducements or opportunity for academic fraud. It would 
penalize institutions that harbor organizational deviance by utilizing inducement policy 
instruments to violate NCAA mandates. While increased sanctions may be needed to 
curtail future undisclosed recruiting violations (Fleisher et al., 1988), it would be more 
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appropriate to increase sanctions against prospects, coaches, and organizations utilizing 
inducement policy instruments to violate NCAA recruiting mandates. 
Limitations 
 Much like any study, this work has its limitations. First and foremost, the nature 
and sensitivity of disclosing recruiting infractions poses a serious threat to the reliability 
of the data. The data collection process ensured the protection of the anonymity of the 
participants and the measurement instrument focused upon the recruiting experience as 
opposed to overtly asking for confessions of recruiting infractions. However, not all 
student-athletes in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics were sampled in this study. While a 
criterion based, stratified sample was sought, the convenience of finding reliable and 
functional electronic mail addresses limited the complete sample the authors would have 
preferred to obtain. Also, the use of electronic survey has both its strengths and 
weaknesses. Electronic survey provided the opportunity to conduct this research with 
thousands of participants, but also may have eliminated some participants that would 
dismiss opening electronic mail from individuals with whom they are not acquainted. 
 Future research should obtain similar information from coaches and boosters that 
offer inducements to prospects. By obtaining this information, it could benefit athletic 
administrators to be able to understand attitudes and behavior of coaches that could lead 
to recruiting violations. Furthermore, it could assist athletic administrators in the hiring 
of coaches that comply with NCAA recruiting mandates. Additionally, future research 
should explore alternative methods to investigating the complexity of policy systems 
similar in scope to the NCAA. Based on the findings of this research, specific policies 
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layered underneath a larger policy framework yielded varying characteristics and 
outcomes. Minimal research has been devoted to examining the interaction of various 
policy types and their effectiveness in varying policy contexts. 
Conclusion 
 Despite the mythical belief that the only recruiting violations that are occurring 
are found by the NCAA, this study found that there are undisclosed recruiting violations 
transpiring in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics. The results of this analysis identify 
patterns of ethical lapses that occur during the recruiting process of many sports, which 
are not reported or found by the NCAA.  Such violations suggest that the current 
construct of the Bowl Championship Series conference affiliation may be the most 
significant indicator of institutions committing more recruiting violations than Non-BCS 
conference universities. Undisclosed recruiting violations formulated a statistically 
significant typology consisting of seven categories.  These types of violations were 
committed through violations of alternative policy instruments (McDonnell and Elmore, 
1987). The most severe undisclosed recruiting violations, offers and inducements, 
exploted inducement policy instruments to violate NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1.1 and also 
occurred the least frequently as a typology. On the other hand, capacity-building policy 
transpired the most frequently and was utilized in contacts and evaluations, camps and 
clinics, and official visits undisclosed recruiting violations. System-changing alternative 
policy instruments were integral in undisclosed violations of tryouts, camps and clinics, 
and academic fraud. The typologies of academic fraud and offers and inducements are 
considered the most severe recruiting violations and are categorized by mandate as 
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unethical conduct pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 10.1. If NCAA Division I (FBS) athletic 
administrators seek to curtail future recruiting violations, they should focus monitoring 
efforts and resources in curtailing undisclosed violations of inducement policy 
instruments and the system-changing policy of academic fraud. Furthermore, the myth of 
rationality may continue to propagate unless NCAA enforcement equitably penalizes 






















UNIVERSITY PRESTIGE AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS RECRUITING: 
A CASE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS OF NCAA 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL 
 Intercollegiate athletics is at a crossroads where standards of higher education, 
big-time business costs and revenue, passionate fans and donors, and ethical practices of 
NCAA rules compliance collide. In many cases, the ideals from one facet may contradict 
the values of another. Instrumental to the success of an athletics program is ability of a 
university to recruit highly gifted prospective student-athletes (Cunningham & Dixon, 
2003; Chelladurai & Reemer, 1997). The financial impact of talented recruits may 
generate up to $1 million in annual revenues in men’s basketball (Brown, 1994) and 
$500,000 in football (Brown, 2001). As such, recruiting has become a measure of 
success for coaches (Cunningham & Dixon, 2003) and the “lifeblood of [an athletics] 
program” (O’Neil, 2008). It is no surprise that recruiting advantage is foundational to the 
definition of an NCAA violation (NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.1) and that violations of NCAA 
recruiting rules are the most prevalent form of NCAA infraction (Clark & Batista, 
2009a). This study utilizes an instrumental case study of a major Division I Football 
Bowl Subdivision (FBS) university to advance the understanding of institutional control 
over NCAA rules compliance programs, the economic climate that may challenge 
institutional control, and seek to establish guidelines as to how future recruiting 
violations may be curtailed. 
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  This work progresses by reviewing the extant literature of the institutional and 
economic research of the NCAA. The multilevel theory used to conceptually frame this 
study is then introduced, providing the structure to the methodology employed in this 
study. Next, the methodological process of this instrumental case study design is further 
elucidated leading to the findings, discussion and conclusion of this research. 
Literature Review 
Corruption in intercollegiate athletics can lead to financial, institutional, and 
academic harm that may jeopardize the reputation of a university and its constituents 
(Grimes & Chressanthis, 1994; Hughes & Shank, 2008; Kihl, Richardson, & Campisi, 
2008; Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002). Many ethical failures in the university 
environment transpire in athletics departments because stakeholders position personal 
needs above honesty (Kelley & Chang, 2007; Agle & Kelley, 2001; Howe & Moses, 
1999). The repercussions of such failures may lead to increased financial sanctions by 
the NCAA (Winfree & McCluskey, 2008; Wieberg, 2008) and a decline in donor 
activity to the university found in violation of NCAA rules (Rhoads & Gerking, 2000). 
Nevertheless, NCAA violations are increasing in frequency (Mahony, Fink, & Pastore, 
1999; Jordan, Greenwell, Geist, Pastore, & Mahony, 2004; Clark & Batista, 2009a) and 
the NCAA Committee on Infractions has reactively decided to increase the severity of its 
sanctions to deter future violations (Wieberg, 2008). Despite the ability of NCAA 
member institutions to reduce the financial impact of NCAA sanctions by self-sanctions 
and enforcement (Winfree & MCluskey, 2008), there is greater financial incentive to 
violate NCAA rules because the violations may lead to increased winning percentage, 
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ticket sales, and postseason revenues (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; Padilla & Baumer, 
1994; Fleisher, Shughart, Tollison, & Goff, 1988). Therefore, some problematic 
financial benefits may exist for rules violators, necessitating an understanding of the 
economic principles that drive intercollegiate athletics. 
Economic Principles of NCAA Athletics 
The NCAA is an example of a classic economic cartel (Fleisher, Goff, & 
Tollison, 1992; Kahn, 2006; Grant, Leady, Zygmont, 2008; DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996) 
whose member institutions function economically as higher education institutions found 
in Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue (1980). A cartel is an economic collusion where 
firms in the marketplace cooperate to control production and sales in order to maximize 
profits (Kahn, 2006; Grant et al., 2008). The three challenges presented to an economic 
collusion are: a) agreement on the appropriate actions of the group, b) preventing 
cheating, and c) controlling entry into the group (Grant et al., 2008). The main 
assumption of the cartel theory is that NCAA member institutions are profitable, which 
only 5% of all Division I institutions have accomplished from 2004 to 2008 (Kelderman, 
2008). Therefore, the NCAA does not act as a true economic cartel seeking to restrict 
competition and maximize profits (Kahn, 2006) because the focus is upon revenue 
generation. This aspect is foundational to Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue, where 
institutions of higher education will expend all its revenues in pursuit of the dominant 
goals of educational excellence, prestige, and influence (Bowen, 1980). Thus, each 
institution of higher education raises all the money it can in order to spend all it raises 
with the cumulative effect being increased fiscal inefficiency (Bowen, 1980). While 
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business cartels seek to maximize profits (Fleisher et al., 1992; Kahn, 2006; Grant et al., 
2008), institutions of higher education seek to obtain prestige through increasing 
revenues in order to spend it all (Bowen, 1980). This explains why NCAA universities 
will expend exorbitant revenues upon lavish athletic facilities in order to win 
championships. Therefore, NCAA member institutions are fixed in a divergent path 
between cartel behaviors of maximizing profits and pursuing institutional prestige of 
winning championships by spending all of the money that it raises. Therefore, a tenuous 
relationship between intercollegiate athletics’ pursuit of championships and the 
educational institution’s pursuit of academic prestige collide on each campus of NCAA 
member institutions. 
The Principle of Institutional Control  
The integrity and prestige of the University also rests upon the institutional 
control of its athletic compliance program. Every NCAA institution is subject to the 
rules established by the NCAA and its member institutions. Chief among these rules is 
the principle of institutional control, which refers to the administrative control that 
university administration has to prevent the violation of NCAA regulations. Former 
University of Michigan President, James Duderstadt (2003) stated that “There is no more 
serious accusation in a rules violation investigation by the NCAA Infractions Committee 
concerning intercollegiate athletics than a conclusion that the university has lost 
‘institutional control’ of its athletic program” (p.231). Institutional control is a process, a 
system, and a set of values and expectations within an institution to assure that rules 
violations are prevented before they occur (Duderstadt, 2003). It is a proactive process of 
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prevention, rather than a reactive response to occurrences. Furthermore, the NCAA 
mandates that the university president “has ultimate responsibility and final authority for 
the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics program” (NCAA Bylaw 6.1.1), which 
includes budgetary and fiscal control, as well as responsibility to control the actions all 
staff, coaches, student-athletes, and boosters (NCAA Bylaw 2.1.2). Members of the 
institution’s faculty may also assert institutional control (NCAA Bylaw 6.01), particularly 
through a selected member known as the faculty athletic representative (NCAA Bylaw 
6.1.3). Institutional control is regulated through various forms of alternative policy 
instruments. 
Institutional control utilizes some of the four types of alternative policy 
instruments, which are the mechanisms that transform substantive policy goals into 
practical application by attempting to ensure that behavior coincides with the intended 
outcomes of the institution (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Alternative policy instruments 
include mandates, inducements, capacity-building, and system- changing (McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1987). First, mandates “are rules governing the action of individuals and 
agencies” (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 134). NCAA rules are forms of mandate 
policy instruments, where the expected outcome universal compliance with NCAA rules 
by all individuals responsible under institutional control (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). 
Second, inducements are the transfer of “money to individuals or agencies in return for 
the production of goods or services” (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 136). The expected 
effect of inducements is short-term returns through production (McDonnell & Elmore, 
1987), such as an institution’s contractual financial incentives for coaches winning 
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conference championships. Third, capacity-building policy instruments are “the transfer 
of money to individuals or agencies for the purpose of investments in future benefits” 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Capacity-building policy presumes that without the 
immediate investment of resources, such as universities building the state-of-the-art 
facilities, future benefits will not be realized in the long-term (McDonnell & Elmore, 
1987). Fourth, system-changing policies shift official authority among individuals within 
institutions. The intended outcome of system-changing instruments is to alter an 
ineffective system through changing reporting lines, terminating the employment of an 
individual, or even altering the distribution of funds other than authority (McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1987). Mandated educational policy is critical to the enforcement of NCAA 
recruiting rules.  
One of the greatest threats to institutional control in Division I (FBS) institutions 
is the violation of NCAA recruiting rules. Over 70% of all reported NCAA major 
violations in Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) were related to the recruitment 
of prospective student-athletes (Clark & Batista, 2009a). In fact, the definition of a 
violation and the categorization of its severity pertain to recruiting. Secondary violations 
(less severe) is an inadvertent action that “provides a recruiting advantage” (NCAA 
Bylaw 19.02.2.1), whereas major violations (severe) provide a “significant recruiting 
advantage” (NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.2). Consequently, recruiting violations are 
underpinning ethical lapses in intercollegiate athletics because recruiting is the method 
of controlling inputs into the university (Fleisher et al., 1992; DeSchriver & Stotlar, 
1996; Kahn, 2006; Grant et al., 2008). Couple these lapses with the financial 
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contradiction that there is financial incentive to violate NCAA rules (Humphreys & 
Ruseski, 2006; Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Fleisher et al., 1988), the institutional system 
and dynamics that influence this behavior must be understood to prevent future 
recruiting violations. The purpose of this study is to examine the institutional and 
individual factors that lead to institutional control pertaining to recruiting mandates at a 
NCAA Bowl Championship Series (BCS) affiliated conference institution of higher 
education. 
Conceptual Framework 
Because organizations are faced with various levels of authority that influence 
action, advocate the use of multilevel theoretical analysis for a complete institutional 
analysis from various perspectives (Klein & Kozloski, 2000; Cohen, Moffitt, & Goldin, 
2007). Multilevel theory specifies the relationships that exist among various levels of an 
organization, which may come from a top-down perspective, meso-level, or bottom-up 
perspective. With the intent to capture the full extent of the multilevel approaches, 
interviews were conducted with key figures of BCS University and athletic department. 
The top-down perspective asserts that the policies and procedures of an organization can 
shape the actions of individuals within the organization (Kanter, 1977). Thus, the 
University President was interviewed with the purpose of explicating the attitudes, 
policies, procedures, and relationships among the university administration and athletics. 
The Athletic Director (AD) was also interviewed in order to understand the issues of 
greatest concern, policies, procedures, and attitudes within the athletic department as a 
whole and specifically issues of athletic compliance. Also, the Faculty Athletic 
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Representative (FAR) was interviewed to elucidate the faculty perspectives and 
expectations on the athletic department. These three interviews represent the top-down 
view from the institutional administrative standpoints, as policies and procedures as well 
as the burden of institutional control that rest heavily upon the University President, 
FAR, and AD. 
From the bottom-up perspective, individuals within the organization can 
influence the policies and procedures of the organization (Kanter, 1977). Klein and 
Kozloski (2000) found that, in order to capture the entire scope of the organization, both 
the top-down and bottom-up processes should be presented. Therefore, the bottom-up 
approach was addressed by interviewing two coaches and a booster from BCS 
University, as they enact recruiting policies and procedures from the NCAA and 
institution. The coaches were selected from the men’s football and basketball teams, as 
these sports represent the most likely to commit major recruiting infractions (Clark & 
Batista, 2009b) and a representative of athletics interest, or booster, of the respective 
institution was interviewed with the purpose of understanding the assortment of 
expectations placed upon the athletic department in conjunction with financial donations 
to the athletic department. This perspective utilizes the bottom-up approach to examine 
the influence a booster can have on the athletic department and university as a whole and 
the actions, feelings, and pressures of recruiting on coaches.  
Lastly, individuals within an organization that are caught between the top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives form the meso-level perspective (Kanter, 1977).  The meso-
level provides a unique relationship where policies and procedures may be shaped by 
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individuals within an organization, but also asserts that policies can shape the actions of 
individuals (Kanter, 1977). As such, the Director of Athletic Compliance was 
interviewed in order to understand the specific implementation of institutional policies 
and procedures, directives from the University President and AD, collaboration with the 
FAR, and successful strategies implemented to prevent recruiting violations. This 
interview and other data collected represent the meso-level, or the individual caught in 
the middle of the top-down and bottom-up perspectives, of intercollegiate athletics at 
BCS University. This study utilizes the multilevel theoretical approach through 
qualitative analysis of individuals from the top-down administration, meso-level 
administration, and bottom-up levels of coaches and boosters in a Division I (FBS) BCS-
affiliated University.  The methodology used to carry out this study will be discussed 
next with a particular focus on the research design, setting, and data collection and 
analysis procedures.   
Research Methodology 
This study utilized an instrumental case study design in order to address the 
issues of how institutional control is practiced and why institutions assert this control. In 
particular, Stake (1995) focused on a qualitative concentration on a case, and discussed 
how researchers are engaged in an instrumental case study if a particular case is 
examined with the major goal of providing insight into some important, broader issue 
(e.g., institutional control in big-time college sport). To be sure, the particular case under 
study is analyzed in depth, but the ultimate goal is to pursue the broader, external issue 
at hand.  In this regard, the particular case could be viewed as typical of other cases or 
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not; but again, the goal is to utilize the study of the case as a tool for gleaning insight 
into the bigger issue.  Therefore, in our qualitative case study research, we sought to  
explore the relationships and actions that assert institutional control in one big-time 
college athletic department; the ultimate goal was to understand the administrative and 
economic factors that might affect how big-time college sport programs approach and 
deal with the issue of institutional control.  
Pursuant to the construct of institutional authority mandated by the NCAA, a 
purposive sample of individuals was selected at one NCAA Division I (FBS) BCS-
conference affiliated university. This particular institution was selected because the 
University administration altered its own reputation from a checkered past of multiple 
major recruiting violations to an ethical and compliant institution. Additionally, the 
institution is a large, public university with BCS-conference affiliation and is located in 
the Southern region of the United States, which is known for being the most likely to 
commit a reported NCAA major recruiting infraction (Clark & Batista, 2009a).  In order 
to protect the identities of the informants, each individual will be referred to throughout 
this work by position title and the University will be given the pseudonym BCS 
University.   
Data Collection 
Data were collected through semi-structured interview methods, sample 
itineraries of on-campus recruiting visits, and official institutional recruiting documents 
and mission statements. By including multiple sources of data, this work utilizes 
triangulation in order to present multiple university perspectives for multilevel 
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theoretical analysis (Mathison, 1988). The informants were contacted and interviewed 
in-person for approximately 45 minutes in the privacy of their occupational office space. 
Prior to the interviews, the informants were given a consent form discussing the 
purposes of this research, consent to be audio recorded, and an assurance that their 
names would not be used in this study. As such, the informants will be identified only by 
the title of their role in intercollegiate athletics. The interview was semi-structured so 
that certain questions and topics would be discussed, but the course of the interview 
could be altered in order to explore pertinent areas of discussion that may not have 
originally been a part of the questioning format. This interview structure is a blend of 
formal and informal conversation, but the environment of the interviews in the 
informants’ office led to a professional demeanor among all informants. 
Data Analysis 
The process of analyzing the data collected followed the grounded theory data 
analysis process utilized by Harry, Sturges, and Klingner (2005). Grounded theory 
analysis in qualitative research inductively leads to hypotheses or explanations of the 
data, rather than the positivist perspective of beginning research with hypotheses (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967; Merriam, 2009). After concluding each interview, the audio recording 
was transcribed. The transcriptions of each interview and other institutional documents 
were analyzed and labeled into open codes (Harry et al., 2005), which are descriptive 
words or phrases written in the columns of the transcripts and/or documents in order to 
identify issues that were repeated or emphasized throughout the interview. These 
repeated open codes developed into conceptual categories (Harry et al., 2005), or issues 
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of greatest concern regarding issues within the athletic department. In order to check for 
consistency of these codes and categories, the audio recordings and transcripts were 
reviewed multiple times to enhance the reliability of these codes and categories (Harry et 
al., 2005). The categories emerged into themes embedded in the conceptual categories of 
the interviews (Harry et al., 2005). The interrelation between themes was examined by 
comparing and contrasting the conceptual categories from the top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives for related themes. Utilizing this multilevel analysis, the themes were tested 
for interrelation (Harry et al., 2005) and central findings emerged from the interrelated 
themes. 
Findings 
 The University mission of academic excellence and integrity collide with the 
systemic and economic pressures to win championships at BCS University. While the 
systemic influences create a contentious relationship between the financial benefits of 
championship caliber prestige at a major NCAA intercollegiate athletics and compliance 
with NCAA regulations, BCS University seeks to reconcile these competing forces for 
the sake of reputation. On one hand, BCS University historically attempted to obtain 
institutional prestige by winning conference championships “at-all-costs,” but after 
receiving NCAA sanctions for major recruiting violations and lack of institutional 
control, the institutional mantra is to ‘Win championships the right way’. The added 
moniker “the right way” is crucial to the notion of institutional integrity found to support 
Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue (1980).  
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BCS University and its athletic department are willing to expend all of its 
generated revenues in order to obtain institutional prestige. This economic behavior 
follows Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue, which leads to fiscal inefficiency and has 
been found to be the economic habits of higher education administration. Nevertheless, 
this study found that Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue not only applies to intercollegiate 
athletics spending, but also has a direct effect upon the principles of institutional control 
at BCS University. Therefore, a complex set of systemic influences shape institutional 
prestige through two means. First, financial spending to obtain institutional prestige 
through winning occurs by inducement policy instruments, where alumni donate money 
to increase productivity (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Second, NCAA rules are 
enforced to determine what institutions are “winning the right way” or winning 
championships without violating rules as established by mandated recruiting policy 
instruments (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Both of these systemic influences collide in 
the context of the entire higher education community because inducement policies breed 
expectations and behavior that may violate NCAA rules and mandate policy does not 
necessarily lead to universal compliance (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). In order to 
understand the systemic influences of this dichotomy between institutional control and 
economic saliency, the findings of this study include the institutional notions of prestige, 
economic and isomorphic pressures of BCS University institutional control, institutional 
practices in recruiting to support the mission of the institution, and means by which 




The foundational issue of concern at BCS University is prestige. Institutional 
prestige for the entire University may be manifest in the form of academic notoriety in 
specific areas of study (i.e. medicine, law, liberal arts, etc.), multicultural or diversity 
initiatives, religious values infused in academic prowess, and many more. The goal of 
prestige at BCS University was “to provide the highest quality undergraduate and 
graduate programs that instill core values of intellect, unity, character, service, and 
honor.” Additionally, the University President stated that traditions of “excellence stem 
from a great sense of pride in who we are and in what [the University] believes."  The 
FAR added that “our faculty seeks to provide the highest quality education and research 
possible…we want to be the best at what we do.” This perception of prestige on the 
University institutional level is not the only standard on the BCS University campus.  
A positive reputation in NCAA Division I (FBS) institutions is determined by the 
frequency of winning championships. The BCS AD described the pursuit of 
championships as not only athletically related, but as the standard of excellence in 
athletic administration as “we plan on winning in everything that we do here.”  From the 
bottom-up perspective, a BCS University basketball coach confirmed this sentiment by 
saying that “our goal at the beginning of the season is to win the conference 
championship and national championship…if you aren’t here to win, why else would 
you be here?”  A University football coach confirmed this perspective saying that “we 
must win in order to make [BCS University], alumni, students, faculty, and fans proud of 
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there is reliance upon winning percentage as a measurement of success and a benchmark 
of institutional prestige nationally. Furthermore, it is the goal of the athletic department 
to win and has become the benchmark for measuring success. The AD emphasized the 
crucial nature of a winning tradition, 
You’re not in this business if you want to lose. I’m here to make this program 
relevant again, or else I will not be employed! 
As championships are won, a reputation of winning permeates throughout the campus 
and country by the national media. The University President explained the vibrant 
feeling of success that spreads across the campus when its athletic teams are winning 
championships. “When [the University] is winning, life just seems a little better around 
here.”  This fervor of uniting a campus and community through pride in athletic teams 
aligns with the mission of the core values of the University (see Figure 1).  
Furthermore, a perennial powerhouse athletic program may provide increased 
visibility of the University. In fact, the athletic department is the most visible portion of 
BCS University, according to its President. “If the University is a house, the athletics 
department is the front porch…it’s the most visible part of this campus because it’s the 
first thing you see.” As such, BCS University has a vested interest in how the athletic 
department portrays the values of the institution. The President explains that this can be 
done through the use of the media,  
If you add up the costs for television commercials promoting our University 
when a football game is on TV, you can understand why athletics can promote 
the integrity of our institution by means we couldn’t otherwise afford. 
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Through this financial interest, the BCS University establishes a reciprocated, financially 
binding relationship with the athletic department to “do what it takes to be the best in the 
nation,” according to the AD. While this visibility may seem beneficial during fortuitous 
times, but most athletic departments do not always win championships. This reality may 
lead to an ethical dilemma that can jeopardize the harmony that exists between 
institutional and athletic prestige. 
Economic Climate 
 The pressure to establish and maintain the prestige of winning championships is 
exacerbated by the economic climate at BCS University. Following Bowen’s Cost 
Theory of Revenue (1980), BCS University seeks to maximize its revenue sources 
through an integrated marketing approach. However, the AD stated that ticket sales in 
“football and men’s basketball generate virtually all our revenue to pay for sports,” 
therefore, ticket sales generate revenue to be expended for operational costs of all BCS 
University sports. However, the notion of establishing prestige through winning 
championships directly affects this major revenue stream of BCS University because, 
AD stated, “winning certainly solves all [financial] problems.” Thus, BCS University is 
willing to “make a coaching change at any time we need to in order to meet our goals of 
winning championships.”  This endeavor can cost millions of dollars. Because 
dependence upon winning percentage is fallible, BCS University athletics utilizes an 
integrated marketing approach that engages corporate entities, as well as generating 
revenue from alumni donor support. The AD stated that BCS University’s “integrated 
marketing approach maximizes our opportunities for corporate engagement to generate 
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revenue…..[and] our standard of winning everything that we do raises the expectations 
of our boosters  as they provide additional sources of revenue generation.” The purpose 
of generating this revenue is to “build the best, state-of-the-art facilities” because “we 
will do what it takes to have the best facilities in the nation here,” according to the AD. 
A key component of this endeavor is the financial assistance of boosters. Boosters are 
“crucial to the development of facilities and our capital campaign efforts to build the 
best facilities in the nation” (AD) because they provide the additional revenue to be 
expended that was not gained by ticket sales in men’s basketball and football games. By 
boosters providing an inducement policy instrument to BCS University, have an 
expectation that their donations will bring results. One BCS booster stated, “I spend a lot 
of money to support my [BCS University], so they better win!” Yet, building state-of-
the-art facilities has not necessarily translated into championships and the use of 
capacity-building policy instruments by the AD has led to fiscal inefficiency and some 
criticism from the University pursuant to Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue. 
 It is the belief of BCS University administration and faculty that the athletic 
department should be financially self-sufficient. The FAR explained this expectation that 
“athletics should not rely financially upon the university…[and] when it does, some 
resources may be taken away from the educational opportunities of the university.” The 
President confirmed this dilemma, 
There were some things that the athletic department wanted to do, in terms of 
building facilities, which I felt were in conflict with the rest of the institutional 
priorities. 
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The AD avowed that athletics is auxiliary to BCS University, yet interconnected by 
prestige when stating that “I was told by the President that ‘athletics is yours to run,’ so 
we’ve sought to hire the best coaches that will restore the winning culture of [BCS 
University].” Nevertheless, the expectations of financial management for both the AD to 
athletics staff and the President to the AD are quite similar. The President stated that 
“the institution cannot stand behind a financial failure on the athletic department’s 
part…[and that] the athletic department must be willing to put personal assets or the 
assets of the fundraising arm on the line, so that the institution isn’t left to cover the 
overambitious spending of the department.” The AD stated that “if [athletics staff and 
coaches] don’t balance [their] budgets, [they] will not work here anymore.” Despite the 
tension that exists between BCS University administration and athletics, the University 
relies upon the athletic department for national exposure and possible prestige, while the 
athletic department seeks additional revenue sources to expend on facilities and coaching 
contracts. 
 While winning championships has an effect upon the ability to generate revenue 
at BCS University, the status of its prestige is also contingent upon having the resources 
to “win the right way.” The compliance staff at BCS University is responsible to ensure 
that the President meets the demands of institutional control. The Director of 
Compliance stated that the compliance staff acts as “the eyes and ears of the University 
President and administration to make sure that they are not blindsided by some 
unforeseen issue.” Financial resources are needed to provide compliance support at BCS 
University. Admittedly, the Director of Compliance stated that “our electronic 
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monitoring systems for recruiting are not cheap.”  These financial resources are available 
to athletic compliance from both BCS University budgets and the athletic department 
because the Director of Compliance reports directly to the University President while 
supporting the athletic department’s mission of rules compliance. The University 
President stressed the importance of this reporting line,  
If the athletic compliance officer reports to the athletic director there is an 
automatic conflict of interest…because, if you are committed to keeping the 
recruiting rules, you must have some independence for the athletics compliance 
office. And if they don’t have the ability to interact directly with the Chief 
Executive, then you don’t have any power to enforce. 
The AD urged support of the athletics compliance program by stating, “I told our staff 
and coaches that one of the quickest ways to lose your job here is to knowingly break the 
rules.” Furthermore, a relationship of trust has been created between the Director of 
Compliance and the AD. The AD stated that the Director of Compliance is “the best that 
I have ever worked with because he is genuinely supporting our desires to be champions 
the right way.” The Director of Compliance confirmed that “our AD has supported us 
tremendously and has warned the staff of the repercussions for overtly breaking the 
NCAA rules.” Regardless of the support from the President and AD, the Director of 
Compliance cited a financial need that has not been met, “We need an additional 
[compliance officer], but the financial state of the university has prevented us from 
gaining approval to do so.” As such, the Director of Compliance noted that “there’s not 
enough manpower to monitor all these [compliance] efforts, but that seems to be the case 
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in many compliance offices around the country.” Furthermore, to make certain that the 
compliance efforts are not hindered by financial constraints, budgeting meetings are 
regularly held with university administration “to ensure that we have sufficient to 
function” according to the Director of Compliance. The ability of the athletic compliance 
office to function properly is crucial to the preservation of prestige and institutional 
control at BCS University 
Institutional Control  
 Institutional control of the athletics program is correlated to the integrity and 
reputation of the entire University. BCS University President has “ultimate responsibility 
and authority for the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics program” (NCAA Bylaw 
6.1.1). This burden of responsibility is not taken lightly by the University President, 
emphatically stating that this responsibility is “not one that can be delegated to another” 
administrator because institutional control is the “measure of integrity of our athletics 
program.” According to the President, “integrity means that one cannot compromise 
personal interests and values to advance the institution.” Thus, a relationship exists 
wherein individuals within the institution should act in a manner that would not 
jeopardize the character and reputation of the institution. Integrity is also the key 
component in BCS University’s mission. Moreover, integrity is at the root of the 
institutional fabric of academic honor codes and BCS University traditions. Clearly, the 
President believes that the reputation of the institution relies heavily upon the character 
of the individuals at BCS University because “integrity is not negotiable!” Furthermore, 
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integrity in athletics at BCS University is directly correlated to athletic compliance. 
Thus, the President rank ordered the importance of athletic achievements by stating, 
I have told the Athletic Director and all of our coaches that I have three priorities for 
our athletic program: 1) maintaining the integrity of the program and the clean 
reputation of the University; 2) The academic success of our student athletes; and 3) 
Winning. They are all important, but they are important in that order. Compliance 
with the rules is essential—I’d  rather lose everything than compromise the integrity 
of [BCS University] athletics. 
The AD added his support to the President by asserting the need for a compliant 
culture at BCS University. This expectation of compliance was forcefully declared to 
institutional employees that three issues will lead to a coach or staff member being fired, 
these are: “First, you mistreat the student-athletes; second, you mistreat the staff; and 
third, you knowingly and overtly break the NCAA rules.”  Thus, the AD believes that a 
compliant culture is established upon two principles. The first is to have an outstanding 
Director of Athletic Compliance. “Our Director [of Compliance] is the best I have ever 
worked with…because he is support oriented and puts us in a position to win without 
issues of cheating from our coaches or student-athletes.” The second principle is to 
follow this basic rule: 
Don’t do anything for prospective student-athletes (or student-athletes) that you 
wouldn’t do for the entire student population…So if you want to give a car to a 
recruit, then give one to each of the other students on campus!  
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While the second principle may not apply to the academic support services and monetary 
awards that student-athletes receive that are permissible by NCAA mandates in Bylaws 
15 and 16, this principle clearly states that BCS University wants to prevent 
impermissible financial recruiting inducements. This fact is especially important to note 
because BCS University was reprimanded by the NCAA for a major recruiting infraction 
of Bylaw 13.2 due to under-the-table payments from boosters to prospective student-
athletes. Thus, the AD is aware of the past compliance issues that transpired prior to 
being employed at BCS University and seeks to establish a culture of compliance. The 
role of a compliant culture is central in protecting the integrity and reputation of BCS 
University.  
 BCS University President also acknowledged the compliance issues of the past. 
Specifically, the President’s most feared effect of the violation of NCAA rules was the 
perceived loss of integrity and label of being an “Outlaw School.”  The ‘Outlaw’ may 
win games, but with the victories include the caveat that the winning resulted from 
cheating. This perception of scandal “does not enhance the academic reputation of the 
institution.”  Programs that have broken the rules in order to entice players to come to 
campus for the sole purpose of winning championships is at the crux of the dichotomous 
relationship between obtaining athletic prestige and foregoing core values of the 
institution. Once a university is labeled an ‘Outlaw’, the reputation of integrity for the 
entire institution is lost. Therefore, the President declared that “once you lose your 
integrity it is almost impossible to get back.”  The University President mentioned that it 
was almost impossible because “[BCS University] had somewhat of an outlaw 
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reputation for some activities regarding our boosters and recruits.”  It immediately 
became the focal point of the BCS University presidency to dispel this reputation by 
taking forceful and open action against the boosters and coaches that allowed this 
reputation to taint BCS University’s image of integrity. For this reason, individuals 
within the athletic department report directly to the President to protect the integrity of 
the institution. 
One key to success of regaining prestige, according to the BCS University 
President, is that “the President has to be engaged.”  This commitment begins by the 
BCS University President actively establishing clear lines of authority, so that there is no 
conflict of interest with the AD. The University President established this “clear 
relationship” with the athletic department by meeting separately with the Director of 
Compliance and AD shortly after being selected as President. By so doing, the Director 
of Compliance reports issues of institutional control directly to the University President 
and not to the AD and thus avoiding “a direct conflict of interest.” Because the AD’s 
employment depends upon the financial and competitive success of the athletic 
programs, the AD stated that some might overlook rules violations if that means 
additional job security in the form of championships. This conflict of interest also 
isolates the President and Director of Compliance because of the visibility of winning 
games as daily operations of keeping the rules. The President explained this isolation, 
It’s a lonely world to be a President or Compliance Director. Fans aren’t cheering 
for institutional control! 
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From this top-down perspective, the President has the lonesome responsibility to ensure 
that athletics programs do not denigrate the pursuit of institutional prestige. The AD has 
the responsibility to win, but has received and accepted the mandate to win ‘the right 
way’ by supporting institutional control. As such, the President outlined the two-fold the 
priorities at the University: “We’re going to balance the budget and we’re not going to 
have NCAA violations.”  However, the BCS University President’s initiatives rely 
heavily upon the Director of Compliance to enforce the day-to-day operations of 
institutional control. These enforcement responsibilities isolate the Director of 
Compliance on the meso-level, caught between the mandates of the NCAA and 
University President and the bottom-up perspective of coaches and boosters. 
The Rules and Pressure to Win 
 The administration coaches at BCS University have a perfunctory respect for the 
mandated policies of the NCAA, its enforcement, but a sobering realization of the 
impact NCAA recruiting violations can have on reputation. One coach joked that “What 
God did in Ten Rules, the NCAA still hasn’t figured out after 400 pages!” This 
sentiment was reinforced by the University President by stating, “I don’t have time to 
read all 1,500 pages of the NCAA’s gobilty-gook!”  NCAA recruiting rules are 
notorious for scope and breadth, which have become increasingly complicated due to the 
nature of rules creation in the NCAA. The Director of Compliance explained that “the 
rules are in place, as currently constituted, because someone found their way around the 
previous rules.”  In consequence, the NCAA recruiting rules are reactive and fluid in 
nature giving a perception that some of the rules are reactively created with minimal 
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foresight for future implications. The AD stated that the convoluted nature of the rules 
stems from its fluidity, “Yes, the rules are convoluted, but that’s because they change all 
the time!”  This sentiment is also found among University boosters from outside the 
athletic department, as one BCS University booster stated that “I don’t care to know all 
the NCAA rules, but I know that I sure pay a lot for a ticket to watch my team!”  This 
transitory nature of NCAA recruiting rules invites the perspective from the meso-level 
and bottom-up perspectives that violations will occur due to ignorance of ever-changing 
rules and it is just a matter of avoiding major reputation destroying recruiting violations. 
  Notwithstanding the volatility of the rules, the pressure for coaches to win 
remains constant. It becomes increasingly difficult for a coach to win games if the coach 
cannot recruit top talent into the program, as BCS coach stated, “If you can’t recruit, it is 
almost impossible to win!” When a coach is unable to lead the team to victories, a 
change of employment is eminent according to the AD. This is especially true for 
football and men’s basketball, according to the AD, because these sports “pay for the 
operation of the rest of the sports on [BCS University’s] campus.” BCS Coach stated 
that “if you want to win championships in our conference, there is no doubt that you 
need several guys on your team that will eventually go pro.”  This high stakes recruiting 
has led to the belief from coaches that “[The NCAA] may not catch you violating the 
rules, but everyone will for sure catch you losing!”  One such scenario was described by 
BCS Coach. While recruiting at a basketball tournament several years previous, BCS 
Coach noticed what appeared to be another college coach talking to a player by the 
locker rooms in between games. This other college coach seemingly handed the player 
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something, which appeared to be a cash inducement violation of both contacts and 
evaluations rules and inducement rules of NCAA Bylaw 13.1 and 13.2. The coach did not 
report this to the NCAA because he was not certain who the individual represented. BCS 
Coach then stated that “Some coaches are willing to give prospects money and cars, but 
we don’t because we’re in it for the long haul.”  By offering additional benefits for 
attending a university, the coach from the other team might have a better chance at 
successfully recruiting the player though in violation of NCAA rules, but these 
remunerations may not be lasting. 
 Coaches that desire to quickly earn the reputation of a winner may gain a 
heightened level of prestige by violating recruiting rules to get top talent into their 
universities. However, this prestige is fleeting. BCS Coach stated that,  
In my twenty-plus years in this business, I have seen a lot of coaches make it big 
quickly by breaking the recruiting rules. What’s interesting to me is that it always 
seems to catch up with them. After a while, they get caught and nobody wants a 
cheater at your university! 
The systemic pressure of winning championships depends upon the caveat given by 
NCAA mandate and the University President that institutional integrity is not negotiable 
in the long-run. Nevertheless, lapses of institutional integrity in the short-run are a means 
of gaining momentary prestige as a product of inducement policy instruments 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). BCS Coach illustrated the importance of this longevity of 
reputation in terms of college basketball coaching legends. 
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You don’t hear about Coach K and Bobby Knight openly violating the rules!  It’s 
because if you want to have your name alongside these legends, you have to 
consistently win championships the right way! 
Consequently, the moniker of “the right way” being added to traditionally winning 
championships has become a standard requirement for coaches reaching legendary 
status. Therefore, the coaches at BCS University seek to ‘win championships the right 
way’ due to isomorphic pressures to obtain coaching prestige and/or following the 
dictates of personal integrity. Thus, the public perception of whether or not a coach 
follows the NCAA rules can directly influence his or her prestige from the bottom-up 
perspective. 
 While the systemic pressure to win may lead to short term ethical lapses, some 
recruiting rules invoke the opposite effect than the NCAA’s original intent of the 
regulation. BCS Coach explained one such circumstance where the original intent is not 
the outcome of the NCAA legislation. 
If I could change one rule, it would be to get rid of the early signing 
period…There used to be a time where a kid could not get out of the National 
Letter of Intent and sign somewhere else. But, now with coaches leaving jobs as 
much as they do in pursuit of better jobs and money, the early signing period 
only leads to kids getting stuck with a coach that didn’t recruit them or they get 
contacted [impermissibly] by another coach to play somewhere else. I would just 
like to see the early signing period just go away! 
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The original intent of the early signing period was to ease the demands of the recruiting 
process on a prospective student-athlete during their high school senior year (NCAA, 
2007). According to BCS Coach, the early signing period does not take into account the 
issues of coaching changes, which can cause additional demands in time for the prospect 
go through the bureaucratic process of receiving permission from the university to go to 
another because of the coaching change. If this permission is not granted, the prospect 
may transfer to another university as long as he or she does not participate in 
competitions during his or her first year of residence at the university (National Letter of 
Intent, 2009). Another BCS Coach disputed the benefits of the original intent of the text 
messaging ban (Bylaw 13.4.1.2), which the NCAA cited that text messaging was an 
undue burden on the prospective student-athlete (NCAA, 2008).  
I would change the text messaging rule because all it really does is create more 
violations to report. Look, if you can’t text, then you can simply send an e-mail 
that goes directly to a kid’s phone nowadays anyway. So, tell me, what’s the 
difference between allowing unlimited e-mails and unlimited texts? There should 
just be a limit on how many texts you can send a week! 
 From this bottom-up perspective, the original intent of some NCAA rules may result in 
an unintended antithetical outcome. 
Enforcement of the Rules 
 From the meso-level, the Director of Compliance believed that many of the 
sanctions ascribed by the NCAA do not properly balance penalizing the individual rules 
violator or the institution. It is the duty of the Director of Compliance to protect both 
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individuals within the athletic department (i.e. student-athletes, coaches, administrators) 
as well as protect the integrity of the institution. This unique position suggests that there 
needs to be a balance between penalties given when systemic issues in an institution lead 
to rules violations compared to penalties given when individuals overtly violate NCAA 
regulations. Because the enforcement of mandates relies upon coercion (McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1987), the sanctioning process is vital to the success of NCAA rules 
enforcement. The Director of Compliance explained that,  
You want an even playing field… and if [the NCAA] isn’t going to [take away 
eligibility] from the student athlete, the Student Athlete Reinstatement Staff 
needs to make sure that the Enforcement Staff is upping the penalty on the 
institution. We may get a lesser penalty on the institution, and a higher penalty 
on the student-athlete, because the student athlete knew or had an opportunity to 
know…It’s okay to be off a little bit, but both can’t be lower! 
Therefore, the enforcement between individual violations and institutional violations 
should act like the scales of justice (see Figure 2). When a student-athlete or coach 
commits a violation out of their own volition, the sanctions should be lower for the 
institution and higher for the individual. Whereas, if the institution allows violations to 
occur as a part of the culture, the individual that followed institutional policy should be 
penalized less and the institution should receive a more severe sanction. Without this 
balance, the Director of Compliance explained how some universities can claim 
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[Some] schools then say, ‘forget it, we don’t want to educate our [student-
athletes].’  It puts them at a disadvantage if [the school] does rules education and 
if [coaches or athletes] mess up and [violate a rule] or they induced at the house 
of a booster [given under-the-table gifts or money]. Our kids are going to suffer a 
penalty because we taught them the rules, whereas other institutions don’t have 
to [suffer] because their school didn’t teach them anything! 
Much like the adverse effects of the early signing period, if the interests of the institution 
are not being addressed in NCAA rules enforcement, there are benefits of lower 
sanctions by not informing individuals of their compliance responsibilities of 
institutional control. While this balance is troublesome to the enforcement of compliance 
issues on the institutional level, there are other bothersome issues of compliance related 
to individuals of athletics interest. 
 Because the NCAA is not a government entity, or state actor, pursuant to the 
holding in Tarkanian v. NCAA (1987), there are limitations of what the NCAA can do to 
enforce its rules on individuals. The Director of Compliance described the individual 
penalties for both the bottom-up and top-down perspectives when NCAA rules are 
violated, 
…Student-athletes can lose eligibility and not participate. Coaches can be fired 
or given a show-cause order forcing them to appear before a committee to be 
reinstated to coach. The institution can be hit with lack of institutional control or 
a failure to monitor, which may severely taint the image of the University…but 
you can’t do too much to a booster or representative of athletics interest. 
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Boosters are an integral part of the athletic department’s goal to generate revenue. As 
mentioned before, this revenue generation is vital to the financial success of winning 
championships through major donations and ticket sales. The expected effect of the 
booster donating money is short-term returns through production (McDonnell & Elmore, 
1987). One BCS Booster stated that “when I donate thousands of dollars to keep and 
reserve my season tickets and then pay an additional couple thousand dollars for the 
tickets, I expect to see some championship football.”  This aligns with McDonnell and 
Elmore (1987) who found that there is an expectation that the individual or institution 
that received the inducement will produce outcomes consistent with the expectations of 
the financial allocator.  
When championships aren’t being won, some boosters seek to reallocate the 
inducement directly to athletically gifted recruits in violation of NCAA recruiting rules 
(Bylaw 13.2). It is the responsibility of the Director of Compliance to monitor and 
prevent this activity from occurring. However, the Director of Compliance explained 
why enforcement of NCAA rules on boosters is challenging,   
You can’t do too much to a booster…other than say, ‘Hey, you can’t give us 
anymore money’ or ‘you can’t buy season tickets.’  Then, they’ll say, ‘Well, I’ll 
walk up to the ticket booth and buy my ticket’ or ‘that’s fine! I’ll keep my couple 
million dollars.’ 
Although not all boosters intend or will violate NCAA recruiting rules, the inability to 
penalize boosters except through disassociation (not allowing boosters to attend games 
or donate money) poses significant problems. One BCS booster stated,  
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Look, I love to watch my [University] and if my season tickets got taken away, I 
don’t know what I would do!  But, if there is someone out there who really wants 
to do something against the rules, they’ll probably get away with it. 
This possibility has led the Director of Compliance to make special educational efforts to 
the booster clubs throughout the state in order to inform boosters of the repercussions of 
such actions. Moreover, the Director of Compliance mentioned that “this can certainly 
keep you up at night” hoping that boosters will act in a manner that would not jeopardize 
institutional prestige. The University President said “There’s always the threat of a rouge 
booster out there who wants to take winning into his own hands, but we seek to educate 
our alums to maintain the integrity of our institution!” This desire has translated into the 
AD stating, “We ask our donors to contribute to our fundraising group, where they can 
earmark how their money should be spent—this option should reduce the direct payment 
to prospects or student-athletes in our department.” One booster stated, “When I donate, 
I want my money to be used to help student-athletes, but I don’t want to cause any 
problems with the NCAA.” Therefore, a need exists to educate boosters on separating 
how to permissibly donate money to help student-athletes without breaking NCAA rules.  
Curtailing Future Recruiting Violations 
 From the multilevel perspectives of top-down, meso-level, and bottom-up, six 
principles emerged that may assist in curtailing future NCAA recruiting violations. From 
the top-down perspective, the enforcement, interpretation, and complexity of the NCAA 
recruiting rules are at the center of these emergent suggestions of how recruiting 
violations can be prevented on the institutional level. First, the recruiting rules should be 
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simplified in a manner that would require fewer changes. Due to the reactive nature of 
the NCAA recruiting regulations, the rules have become ever-expansive allowing 
individuals and institutions to claim ignorance to the rules in an effort to avoid receiving 
sanctions. For example, Bylaw 13.1.3.1.6 restricts telephone calls initiated by the 
institution to one call per week. However, a coach may e-mail on facebook as many 
times as he or she desires according to Bylaw 13.4.1.2. In other words, the complexity of 
the NCAA rules establish an innate competitive imbalance, as described by the Director 
of Compliance,  
Knowledge is power—not only knowing what you can’t do, but also what you 
can do. Because that may give you some edge out there in the recruiting trail…  
because you know what you can do [to entice a recruit] within the rules. 
This competitive imbalance could be construed by some to be contradictory to the 
NCAA’s principle governing recruiting NCAA Constitution 2.11 which states that 
“Recruiting regulations shall be designed to promote equity among member institutions 
in their recruiting of prospective student-athletes” (NCAA, 2009). While simplifying the 
rules may increase awareness, it may not necessarily level provide competitive balance 
in the understanding of rules compliance. Thus, a competent Director of Compliance 
may be a means of reducing the complexity of the recruiting rules. 
Second, there is a need to universalize NCAA rules interpretations among 
member institutions. While the NCAA currently posts staff and official Association 
interpretations of particular bylaws on the Legislative Services Database for the Internet 
(LSDBi), there remains a gap between the practice of interpretations and what the 
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NCAA disseminates to its member institutions. This gap was evident as BCS Coach 
described a recruiting situation where he wanted to attend an event that the BCS 
University athletic compliance staff told him it was impermissible. Later that week, he 
talked to a coach from another university that attended the event and described that 
several coaches were present at the purported impermissible event. 
We should be able to do the same things that other coaches can do [with the 
blessing of their compliance office] without our compliance office getting in the 
way because of a rules interpretation nobody knows about! 
If the event was impermissible according to a bylaw interpretation at one university, the 
same should theoretically apply to another institution. Nevertheless, this is not always 
the case with rules interpretations at BCS University. From the bottom-up perspective, 
this is an indictment on the compliance staff not helping the coach get an advantage on 
the recruiting trail. On the meso-level, this scenario could alienate the relationship 
between coaches wanting to ask compliance for help in the future and could also force 
the Director of Compliance to become a whistleblower against other programs violating 
the rule. This precarious position, caused by disconnect between selective enactments of 
rules interpretations, only further estranges athletic compliance professionals from the 
athletic department. 
The third suggestion for curtailing future NCAA recruiting violations is for the 
NCAA and the University administration to establish appropriate and balanced 
sanctions or penalties for violations. As previously discussed by the Director of 
Compliance, there should be a balance between institutional and individual sanctions for 
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recruiting infractions (depicted in Table 2). Thus, institutions that do not educate their 
constituents should not receive lower penalties utilizing the excuse of ignorance to the 
rules. This concern was asserted by the Director of Compliance saying, 
Another institution, for example, can’t get the same institutional penalties that we 
get, when their student athletes are getting lower penalties because they didn’t 
educate [them on the rules]. One of them needs to go up if the other one’s 
coming down. That’s kind of the message I’ve given the [NCAA] Student 
Athlete Reinstatement to make sure there is communication about these 
inadequacies in rules enforcement. 
By issuing lower penalties to the individuals and institutions, rules enforcement benefits 
those not administering stringent institutional control through rules education. This 
contradiction is also present as coaches are being rewarded with massive buyout 
payments after being terminated for major recruiting infractions. The BCS Coach said, 
Just look at Kelvin Sampson and his six-hundred or so thousand dollar buyout 
[after being fired for major recruiting violations at Indiana] and tell me that 
universities are more worried about compliance than winning. 
The BCS University President agreed that “this is another thing I wish I…could change 
about college sports, but it’s a reality!”  The institution is forced to pay hundreds of 
thousands to millions in a buyout to the rules-violating coach or pay exorbitant legal fees 
from a wrongful termination lawsuit by a fired coach. The financial benefits of violating 
the rules may exceed the financial benefits of rules compliance, especially if the only 
deterrent for coaches to not violate recruiting rules is longevity and seeking legendary 
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status. Thus, it is suggested that institutions should take great care in drafting coaches’ 
contract and possibly have a built-in liquidated damages clause for NCAA violations. 
BCS President stated “This clause is being built into contracts and that’s why it is such a 
time-intensive endeavor to hire a coach.”  The AD acknowledged, “We cannot hire 
coaches that do not have the best interest of the University in mind, especially, if they 
are going to take advantage of our name, reputation, and finances.”  The Director of 
Compliance added,  
I believe that may be some state laws that prohibit boosters from giving money to 
athletes. While this may not completely stop the activity, it can act as another 
deterrent. 
Therefore, there must be financial and legally binding accountability for individuals 
responsible for rules violations for sanctions to act as a disincentive to future recruiting 
violations. 
The fourth suggestion comes from the meso-level perspective, where compliance 
officers should utilize a service-oriented approach to bridge the gap between the athletic 
department “winning championships” and the University’s mission of integrity by 
“winning championships the right way.”  This service oriented philosophy can unify the 
pursuit of prestige by both the University and athletics. According to the Director of 
Compliance, 
Our AD has mentioned several times that he really appreciates the approach that 
our Compliance office takes as far as trying to find ways to do what the coaches 
want to achieve. Sometimes we can’t do it the way the coaches want to do it, but 
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we can suggest something that helps them maybe achieve what they want to 
achieve. We’ll ask them what they are trying to get out of it, or what are they 
really want to do as an end result. We explain that they can’t influence the 
process through this path, but here’s something you can do that might not be as 
great an influence as buying them that new car, but you certainly can do this, and 
that could help you in the process of influencing this kid’s decision to come to 
the University and it’s perfectly permissible. 
This compliance strategy is not necessarily conducive to establishing a compliance-
coach friendship, but according to BCS Coach it makes the relationship “much more 
functional than I have had at other institutions.”  This functionality leads to coaches 
asking questions and facilitating the institutional control process of rules education and 
monitoring of recruiting actions. 
From the bottom-up level, the fifth and sixth suggestions for preventing 
recruiting infractions emerged. Increasing the requirements for passing recruiting 
certification tests, so that coaches will be held individually responsible for knowing the 
rules is the fifth suggestion for curtailing recruiting improprieties. Each year, coaches 
that have recruiting responsibilities are required to take the recruiting certification exam 
administered by the NCAA. BCS Coach stated that “I’ve been around college basketball 
for a long time and I always seem to miss one or two of the questions on the recruiting 
test.”  This laissez-faire attitude toward the recruiting test score addresses the concern 
the Director of Compliance has about the recruiting test. “[The test] establishes 
accountability and responsibility for that ‘I didn’t know’ excuse for a violation.”  So if 
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coaches are held accountable to a minimum standard of recruiting regulation knowledge 
that is not taken seriously, then the ignorance excuse for a recruiting violation is much 
more likely. This prompted one compliance officer to state “the recruiting test needs a 
serious overhaul!”  The FAR agreed that “there is a serious question of validity to the 
NCAA recruiting exam, as it only addresses a portion of what coaches encounter on the 
recruiting trail.”  Furthermore, “the test should include situations that coaches actually 
face and how to keep the rules when they encounter real-life situations.”  As such, the 
recruiting examination should follow a case study approach where recruiting scenarios 
are presented and coaches must indicate what actions are permissible and impermissible 
to be valid in the eyes of the FAR. In order to counterbalance the ignorance claim some 
coaches may use, the coaches’ recruiting certification exam should increase in rigor, 
functionality, validity, and coaches should be held responsible to know the recruiting 
rules.  
Lastly, there should be financial incentive to keep the rules. The financial 
incentive for rules compliance should not simply be avoiding fines and penalties. If a 
coach is not rewarded for keeping the rules, he or she will only do enough to avoid 
receiving the negative effects of NCAA sanctions.  BCS Coach explained, 
I’m rewarded for how many games we win and whether or not our athletes are 
doing well in the classroom. And even that is subject to how well we do on the 
court.
The lack of reward system for compliant behavior amounts to the difference in 
alternative policy instruments. Where mandates, NCAA rules, use coercion to affect 
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behaviors, inducement policy instruments, or giving resources to receive an intended 
effect, motivate individuals to produce an outcome (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). In 
other words, individuals are currently compelled to follow the rules rather than receiving 
a reward for following the rules. BCS coach stated, “I believe in integrity, but I know 
that there are some coaches that believe in money when it comes to doing what’s right.” 
While one might argue that ethical behavior should not have to be rewarded because it 
should be innate, there is reason to reward compliance with NCAA rules because 
sometimes the benefits of rules violations may exceed compliant behavior. As such, the 
data suggest that individuals should be financially compensated for keeping the rules as 
an incentive to ethical decision making, much like receiving compensation for winning 
bowl games. This may come in the form of a bonus check for three years of major 
violation-free athletics for a coach. Rather than finding new forms of punishment, 
motivation through financial inducement to coaches and administrators could effectively 
motivate individuals to learn and follow NCAA recruiting rules. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the systemic pressure to win championships and maintain 
institutional control become difficult to balance with the added pressure of high stakes 
recruiting that can influence the financial stability of an athletic department. As such, the 
rewards of rules violations may bring the intended goal of obtaining prestige through 
winning championships, but in the long-term, winning championships without violating 
recruiting rules will help the University obtain its goal of prestige. In order to assist 
universities in obtaining this prestige through athletic compliance, six methods of 
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curtailing future recruiting violations emerged. From the top-down perspective, a) the 
recruiting rules should be simplified in a manner that would require fewer changes, b) 
NCAA rules interpretations among member institutions should be universalized in scope 
and application, and c) there should be appropriate and balanced sanctions for recruiting 
violations. From the meso-level perspective, d) compliance officers should utilize a 
service-oriented approach to bridge the gap between the athletics prestige and University 
prestige. From the bottom-up perspective, e) the recruiting certification exam for 
coaches should be altered in order to appropriately increase requirements to hold 
coaches individually responsible for knowing the rules in situational recruiting 
encounters, and f) there should be financial incentive to keep the rules. Although this 
study does not focus upon the generalizability of its findings to all NCAA member 
institutions, the implications may reach beyond the campus at BCS University to other 
similar NCAA member institutions. These findings offer a means by which future 
violations of recruiting rules may be reduced and it may also prevent employment 
termination of individuals or provide the blue print to enhance the reputation of integrity 









WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
REPORTED AND UNREPORTED NCAA RECRUITING VIOLATIONS 
On the NCAA Division I (FBS) level, universities and coaches are under extreme 
pressure to win championships. Simultaneously, universities must maintain the integrity 
and prestige of their institutions through compliance with NCAA recruiting mandates. 
Without either of these components, a university athletics program may be perceived to 
be an “outlaw program” that breaks NCAA rules in order to win championships or 
athletic departments may not be considered prestigious because they do not win 
championships despite a compliant culture. If the NCAA rules are broken and no 
championships are won, the university may suffer irreparable damage to its prestige and 
have nothing to show for it. This work has identified multiple typologies for recruiting 
violations in order to elucidate what factors led to reported and unreported recruiting 
violations, and provide effective methods that universities may implement to protect the 
integrity of their institutions and curtail future recruiting violations. 
In this chapter, the cumulative analysis of the findings in the previous three 
chapters is discussed. It begins with the discussion of how institutional and individual 
characteristics advance the current boundary assumptions regarding the typologies of 
reported and unreported NCAA recruiting violations. Next, the issues of what 
institutional actions may be utilized by universities in order to curtail future NCAA 
recruiting violations and assert institutional control. This work will conclude with 
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unresolved matters regarding recruiting violations including recommendations of what 
systemic legal remedies may be used to curtail future recruiting violations. 
NCAA Recruiting Violations 
The NCAA formal organization functions like a classic economic cartel, where 
member institutions have agreed upon appropriate recruiting actions stipulated in Bylaw 
13 and also expect uniform compliance with these mandates. However, uniform 
compliance is not achieved in NCAA compliance because unreported violations of 
Bylaw 13 are occurring without disclosure to the NCAA. Universities found to 
ineffectively conduct institutional control may be sanctioned for major recruiting 
infractions that may lead to the loss of prestige.. Furthermore, universities function under 
Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue (1980) where all revenues generated are utilized to 
obtain institutional prestige. In Division I (FBS) athletics, winning championships 
without violating NCAA rules will bring the most prestige to the entire university. For 
this purpose, NCAA member universities must understand what violations they are most 
susceptible to, what actions must be taken to instill institutional control and curtail future 
recruiting violations, and what courses of legal action may be taken to protect the 
integrity of their institution. 
Institutional Vulnerability 
 NCAA member institutions may be vulnerable to certain types of recruiting 
violations based upon conference affiliation, geographic region, size of compliance staff, 
and particular sports sponsored by the university. The findings from reported and 
unreported recruiting violations indicate that universities that are affiliated with the BCS 
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are more likely to be involved in recruiting violations than Non-BCS affiliated 
universities. There is a heightened risk for violations of NCAA recruiting regulations 
because BCS affiliated universities are more likely to compete for football and 
basketball national championships.  
Of the most severe reported recruiting violations, the Big Ten and SEC are more 
likely to be involved in violations of Bylaw 13.1 contacts and evaluations limitations, 
and Bylaw 13.2 offers and inducements regulations. Universities located in the 
geographic regions of the South and the Midwest are most likely to be involved with all 
types of major reported recruiting violations, whereas, universities in the South are more 
likely to offer prospects impermissible cash inducements in violation of Bylaw 13.2. 
Institutions that have only one full-time compliance coordinator are vulnerable to 
receiving sanctions for reported major recruiting violations and institutions with one or 
two compliance coordinators are susceptible to be sanctioned for violations of Bylaw 
13.1. Coaches and staff members at BCS affiliated universities are more likely to be 
individually sanctioned with a show-cause order in conjunction with a reported major 
recruiting violation than their Non-BCS counterparts. This is particularly pertinent for 
individuals (e.g. coaches, staff, etc.) involved with football or men’s basketball in the 
South. Finally, revenue sports programs are more likely to be sanctioned for reported 
major recruiting infractions than non-revenue sports.  
In unreported recruiting violations, revenue sports were a significant factor in 
recruiting violations of telephone call limitations (Bylaw 13.1.3), impermissible 
entertainment funds and/or use of sex or adult entertainment on official visits (Bylaw 
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13.6.7.5 & 13.6.1), impermissible academic assistance on an ACT or SAT examination 
(Bylaw 10.1), a scholarship offer during a camp or clinic (Bylaw 13.12.1.3), and 
impermissible inducements of cash, car, or loan to a family member (Bylaw 13.2.1.1). 
Non-revenue sports were a significant factor in unreported violations of impermissible 
text messaging (Bylaw 13.4.1.2), impermissible decoration of hotel rooms on an official 
visit (Bylaw 13.6.6), impermissible inducements of memorabilia (Bylaw 13.2.1.1), and 
impermissible institutional violations of underage drinking of alcohol during an official 
visit.. Therefore, universities should be aware of their institutional vulnerability to 
unreported violations pursuant to conference affiliation, geographic region, size of 
compliance staff, and susceptibility to particular recruiting violations found to be 
involving certain sports offered at the university. Additional insight from the frequency 
and severity of NCAA recruiting violations may explicate areas of change needed in 
particular types of recruiting regulations. 
Contacts and Evaluations 
The frequency of reported and unreported recruiting violations revealed 
vulnerability in the intended effect of contacts and evaluations recruiting mandates in 
Bylaw 13.1. Coaches begin the recruiting process by evaluating talent and contacting 
prospective student-athletes. Not all prospects contacted by coaches will advance to the 
official visit or scholarship offer phase of recruiting. However, the first step in the 
recruiting process involves the limitations mandated in Bylaw 13.1. Not surprisingly, 
among the most frequently occurring major, secondary, and unreported recruiting 
infractions involved Bylaw 13.1. It is evident that the frequency of both reported and 
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unreported recruiting violations of Bylaw 13.1 showed that there may be three 
explanations for violations of this particular mandate.   
First, there may be a blatant disregard of Bylaw 13.1 by coaches in the contacts 
and evaluations phase of the recruiting process. This may be the case for  coaches that 
are seeking to quickly gain a reputation as a winning coach by impermissibly contacting 
prospects before other coaches in order to attract top talent into their universities. In 
men’s basketball recruiting, the response of the NCAA to this trend was to lower the 
technical age of a prospect from ninth grade to seventh grade thereby holding 
universities responsible for limitations of contacts and evaluations of younger prospects. 
Halting the trend of recruiting prospects under the seventh grade level may not be 
successful either, as the former men’s basketball coaches from Kentucky and USC 
received verbal commitments from elementary school aged children.  
Second, the scope of the regulations in Bylaw 13.1 may be too complex for 
coaches. This may lead to an inability or unwillingness to comply with the contacts and 
evaluations mandates, necessitating a deregulation and simplification of Bylaw 13.1. 
Coaches in this work attributed much of their confusion about NCAA rules on the 
fluidity of its legislation. As the rules continue to change annually, the understanding of 
what may or may not be permissible will wane.  
Third, the Bylaw 13.1 contacts and evaluations and Bylaw 13.4 text-messaging 
mandates may conflict with the technological advancements of coaches use to contact 
prospective student-athletes. The original intent of the text-messaging ban in recruiting 
was to minimize the financial burden on prospective student-athletes. This work found 
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that this goal was accomplished, with the effect being that prospects from a home with 
an above the national average income were most likely involved in violations of 
contacts, evaluations, and text-messaging limitations. In order to address the last two 
reactions to Bylaw 13.1, NCAA member institutions in the Pacific 10 Conference have 
put forward Proposal 2009-32 to deregulate telephone contact limitations to prospective 
student-athletes and their families from the permissible one telephone call per week to 
unlimited telephone calls during a contact period. If this proposal is passed in January 
2010, it may be the beginning of the deregulation of other facets of contacts and 
evaluations regulations in Bylaw 13.1. Through deregulation of Bylaw 13.1, much of the 
confusion and fluidity of the NCAA recruiting rules would be minimized. Additionally, 
the heavy burden of monitoring thousands of telephone calls may be reduced for 
athletics compliance staffs nationwide. 
Offers and Inducements 
The most severe reported and unreported recruiting violations involved offers 
and inducements in violation of the Bylaw 13.2 mandates. These violations transpire 
after the contacts phase in an attempt to lure prospects to agree to play for a university. 
Unlike Bylaw 13.1 violations that sift out recruits from hundreds of others to decide 
which ones best fit the needs of the program, violations of Bylaw 13.2 occur in a more 
individual setting where a prospect is  specifically targeted with a gift, cash, or other 
inducement. Reported recruiting violations of Bylaw 13.2 indicate that universities in the 
South and Midwest were most likely to be caught offering an inducement to a prospect. 
Unreported recruiting violations of Bylaw 13.2 indicate that universities in the South 
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were most likely to offer an inducement to a prospect, but not necessarily be caught by 
the NCAA doing so. Other institutional characteristics of reported violations of Bylaw 
13.2 include that football and men’s basketball programs in the SEC, Big Ten, and Big 
12 were most likely to offer inducements to prospects.  
This work provided additional insight regarding the systemic and financial 
influence of Division I (FBS) athletics shown through the allocation of offers and 
inducements in violation of Bylaw 13.2.  First, prospects that participate in a revenue 
sport and are a racial minority (non-white) are more likely to be offered inducements of 
a higher monetary value such as cash, cars, or loans to family members. On the other 
hand, prospects that are white and play a non-revenue sport are more likely to be offered 
memorabilia (e.g. pennants, clothing, and souvenirs) as an inducement.  Thus, violations 
of Bylaw 13.2 have financial and racial implications. Financially, individuals offering 
inducements in violation of Bylaw 13.2 were found to place greater emphasis on revenue 
sports. True to McDonnell and Elmore’s (1987) inducement alternative policy 
instrument, athletic inducements are used to receive immediate returns in a sport (e.g. 
football or men’s basketball) that violators may feel has the greatest return on  
investment. In terms of racial implications, minority prospects may be targeted for their 
willingness to violate NCAA inducement rules as a matter of socio-economic 
stereotyping. The findings of this study on unreported violations of Bylaw 13.2 did not 
determine the income level of prospects to be a significant factor. Therefore, the tacit 
belief that giving financially underprivileged minority prospects money is the major 
determining factor for Bylaw 13.2 violations is not supported in this work. The current 
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practice of unreported cash inducement violations of Bylaw 13.2 given by universities 
(coaches, staff, or boosters) to minority revenue sports prospects displays the continued 
racial stereotyping that exists in the Southern region of the United States.  
Establishing Institutional Control 
 In order to protect institutional prestige, universities must balance the drive to 
win championships by asserting institutional control through a comprehensive athletics 
compliance program. The recipe for successful institutional control by a university 
follows a four-step process. First, the University President must be engaged in the 
process of rules compliance. By understanding that institutional control of the athletics 
program is correlated to the integrity and reputation of the entire university, athletics 
compliance must be valued by university administrators. Moreover, the university 
president must be involved in athletics compliance or else the director of athletics 
compliance will have no ability to enforce rules compliance on a daily basis.  Second, 
the priorities of the athletics department should be ordered as follows, a) maintain 
integrity through rules compliance, b) promote academic success of student-athletes, and 
c) win championships. This particular order is vital because if the integrity of the 
institution is in question, so too will be the value of the education student-athletes are 
receiving and the integrity of the athletics competition victories. Third, the University 
must establish a culture of compliance by having an outstanding director of compliance 
and asserting that compliance is an expectation of everyone. Without individuals capable 
of performing the director of compliance responsibilities, there would be little 
confidence in the culture of compliance being established. A competent director of 
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compliance is insufficient because there should be an expectation of all individuals in the 
athletic department and university to comply with NCAA regulations. By combining 
human resource competence and an expectation for compliance, a culture of athletic 
compliance may spread throughout the university. Fourth, the University must 
acknowledge and address specific compliance problems of the past in order to build or 
rebuild institutional prestige. Each university must be aware of the NCAA violations to 
which they are most vulnerable and directly address these issues through policies, 
procedures, rules education, and monitoring of recruiting actions conducted by 
institutional staff members (e.g. coaches). By so doing, universities may prevent issues 
that could become reputation damaging violations of NCAA regulations. 
Curtailing Future Recruiting Violations 
There are seven methods of curtailing future recruiting violations that may assist 
universities in protecting its prestige from reputation damaging major recruiting 
violations of NCAA Bylaw 13. First, the recruiting rules should be simplified in a manner 
that would require fewer changes. Because member institutions may propose alterations 
to NCAA regulations, the deregulation of NCAA recruiting rules may be accomplished 
through the proposals of university and conference compliance staffs. Such actions are 
beginning with Proposal 2009-32 and may lead to further deregulation of overly 
complex recruiting regulations.  
Second, universities should consider hiring at least three full-time athletics 
compliance coordinators on its campus. The findings of this work indicate that the 
number of compliance coordinators on an institutional campus is correlated to a 
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university being sanctioned for major recruiting infractions. Non-BCS institutions may 
have a greater chance of eliminating all sanctions of major recruiting violations with the 
hiring of three competent athletics compliance coordinators. BCS conference affiliated 
universities that seek to curtail future recruiting violations may also greatly decrease the 
likelihood of reported major recruiting infractions by hiring three competent athletics 
compliance coordinators.  
Third, compliance coordinators should utilize a service-oriented approach, where 
they seek to assist individuals to accomplish their work while following the NCAA 
rules, thereby bridging the gap that exists between “winning-at-all costs” and “winning 
the right way.” A service-oriented approach should allow coaches and staff to feel that 
the processes of institutional control are supportive rather than preventing them from 
completing the tasks needed to win championships.  
Fourth, universities should seek means to financially reward compliant behavior. 
Because there is financial incentive to violate NCAA rules (Humphreys & Ruseski, 
2006; Padilla & Baumer, 1994), the antithesis must exist to counterbalance the 
incentives to cheat. Universities should establish a system that compensates coaches and 
their staff for not exceeding over a certain number of secondary recruiting infractions. 
This stipulation could be included in the employment contract of a coach or athletic 
administrator, which may include bonuses or fines for exceeding over a certain number 
of secondary recruiting infractions or rewarding individuals that self-report secondary 
infractions to the compliance staff. Hopefully these incentives will create a compliant 
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culture in the university’s institutional system of hiring coaches and athletic 
administrators. 
 Other methods that may curtail future recruiting violations focus upon systemic 
alterations of the NCAA and conference offices. One such suggestion is to alter the 
NCAA recruiting certification exam for coaches in order to appropriately increase 
requirements to hold coaches individually responsible for knowing the rules. According 
to Jubenville and Goss (2008), violations have not decreased since the examination was 
instituted. While this might indicate that the examination lacks validity, the outcomes of 
the current examination warrant further research to determine more effective means of 
instituting compliant behavior. This may include altering the examination to include 
situational recruiting encounters that coaches will inevitably face, rather than a simple 
series of multiple choice questions.  
A sixth method to prevent recruiting violations is to universalize NCAA rules 
interpretations in scope and application among member institutions. If one university is 
allowed to commit secondary infractions because they are unaware of a recent rules 
interpretation, university coaches and staff that are educated on  the interpretation and do 
not violate the rule may be at a recruiting disadvantage. Thus, institutions seeking to 
comply with the rules intended to prevent recruiting advantage, may find themselves at a 
recruiting disadvantage due to the current system of enforcement by the NCAA. 
Although the NCAA has made rules interpretations widely available to all universities 
through the LSDBi database, this does not prevent some university coaches and staff 
from claiming ignorance to the rules as they continue to violate rules and file an ex-post 
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facto secondary recruiting violation. This practice undermines the enforcement of 
NCAA rules and furthers the incentives to violate NCAA recruiting rules. Rules 
interpretations should be inherent in the language of the written NCAA bylaw and 
deregulated in order to avoid superfluous rules interpretations.  
As the final suggestion to curtail future recruiting violations, the NCAA 
Committee on Infractions should appropriately balance institutional and individual 
sanctions for recruiting violations. There is a disconnect between the accountability for 
institutional and individual violations of NCAA recruiting regulations, particularly 
Bylaw 13.2.  Both the institution and individuals may be held accountable for rules 
violations and enforcement should function like the scales of justice, where the 
violations increase for the individual when they are responsible for the cause of action 
and lessen for the institution. If the institution does not assert control, the individual that 
followed institutional policy and procedures should be penalized less and the institution 
should be highly sanctioned. Individual penalties for NCAA rules violations include 
show-cause orders for coaches and staff members and loss of playing eligibility for 
student-athletes and some prospects. The show-cause sanction may be more effectively 
used by the NCAA enforcement staff, whereby coaches may be more likely to receive a 
show-cause at the onset of an individual infraction. For example, Kelvin Sampson 
violated multiple NCAA recruiting regulations at Oklahoma and left for Indiana with 
minimal implications in changing locations of employment. After another series of 
major recruiting infractions at Indiana, Sampson was sanctioned with a show-cause and 
left college basketball for the NBA. Had this sanction occurred at Oklahoma, the future 
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violations at Indiana might have been avoided. From time to time, prospects involved in 
recruiting violations at one university may attend another institution without loss of 
eligibility. This practice places undue burden on NCAA member institutions and allows 
individuals to skirt responsibility for impermissible actions. Institutional penalties may 
range from major violations to secondary violations with the added labels of lack of 
institutional control or failure to monitor. Major violations that lead to a finding of lack 
of institutional control will generally lead to greater sanctions by the NCAA Committee 
on Infractions.  
One glaring omission of individuals involved in major recruiting infractions is 
representatives of athletic interest, or boosters. The institution is held responsible for 
controlling the actions of boosters; however, the individual sanctioning of boosters 
displays the inability of the NCAA to control booster actions. The penalty of university 
disassociation is the only means of enforcement to sanction boosters for under-the-table 
payments to recruits in violation of Bylaw 13.2. Disassociation of a booster prevents the 
individual from donating to the university and receiving the benefits afforded to 
donors—traveling with the team to away contests, attending booster gatherings, sitting in 
luxury box seats, upgrading season tickets, and other amenities. This sanction does not 
prevent a booster from purchasing individual game tickets to university games. It is very 
likely that a booster could be caught violating Bylaw 13.2 by giving a recruit $200,000 
and still attend the next home game for the university. Therefore, a means to enforce the 
recruiting mandates exists for student-athletes, coaches, and institutional staff, but some 
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recourse must be instituted to hold rogue boosters and prospective student-athletes 
accountable for reputation damaging recruiting violations. 
NCAA Recruiting Violations and the Law 
Coaches 
 Certain legal actions have been taken in the past to remedy the issues of damages 
resulting from NCAA violations. Both coaches and student-athletes sign contracts that 
specifically prohibit the violation of NCAA rules. Many coaching contracts have 
included a provision stating that the violation of recruiting regulations is just cause for 
termination of employment with no severance pay due to the employee. Just cause refers 
to the immediate termination of an employment contract due to conduct by an employee 
that is incompatible with his or her duties resulting in an employment relationship that is 
too fractured to expect the employer to provide an additional employment opportunity. 
Although Ohio State basketball coach Jim O’Brien found a friendly court (O'Brien v. 
Ohio State University, 2006), other coaches have not been so fortunate. In O’Brien v. 
Ohio State (2006), the University terminated O’Brien’s coaching contract for cause 
stating that he had violated NCAA recruiting regulations. The court found that his 
recruiting actions did not justify a just cause termination and ordered the University to 
pay him approximately $2.5 million. In other circumstances, employment contracts 
allow coaches found in violation of the NCAA rules to be terminated for just cause and 
award coaches a monetary settlement after termination of the contract. This may also 
include coaches like Kelvin Sampson, who received a $750,000 contract settlement even 
though he was sanctioned twice for major violations at Oklahoma and Indiana for a 
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show-cause order violation of Bylaw 13.1 with over 500 excessive telephone call 
violations. Other coaches, like former SUNY Buffalo basketball coach Timothy Cohane, 
have received a “just cause” termination without financial remuneration for involvement 
in major recruiting infractions. Stangel (2000) suggests that buyout or remunerations 
after “just cause” contract terminations should be eliminated by universities and athletic 
directors to assert institutional control when executing coaching contracts. Thus, legal 
force may be inserted into the process of establishing a compliant culture with coaches 
and coaches may be held responsible for damages caused to universities in major NCAA 
recruiting infractions. 
Student-Athletes 
Potential student-athlete liability for damages from major NCAA violations stem 
from the contractual agreements that student-athletes sign in the Student-Athlete 
Statement. In Parts III and VI of the 2009-2010 NCAA Student-Athlete Statement, 
incoming student-athletes verify their amateurism status (e.g. did not accept 
impermissible payment for being an athlete in violation of Bylaw 13.2 and Bylaw 12 
prior to enrolling at the university) and student-athletes transferring to a different 
university affirm that they were not involved in a NCAA violation at their previous 
institution. Furthermore, student-athletes specifically agree to the following terms:  
You affirm that you meet the NCAA regulations for student-athletes regarding 
eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status and involvement in 
gambling activities. You affirm that all information provided to the NCAA, the 
Eligibility Center and the institution’s admissions office is accurate and valid, 
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including ACT or SAT scores, high school attendance, completion of coursework 
and high school grades, as well as your amateur status. You affirm that you have 
reported to the director of athletics or his or her designee of your institution any 
violations of NCAA regulations involving you and your institution. You affirm 
that you understand that if you sign this statement falsely or erroneously, you 
violate NCAA legislation on ethical conduct and you will further jeopardize your 
eligibility (NCAA, 2009). 
Moorman and Hums (1999) suggest that student-athletes may be held liable for damages 
caused by actions leading to major NCAA violations. However, this action may damage 
not only institutional reputation as an educational non-profit institution, but also future 
recruiting opportunities. By acting in a manner that would destroy institutional prestige, 
holding student-athletes financially liable for the purpose of revenue generation violates 
the principles espoused in Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue (1980)—where universities 
expend all their revenues in order to obtain institutional prestige. Therefore, the most 
effective sanction for current student-athletes who violate NCAA rules may be loss of 
eligibility. As such, legal action against current student-athletes may be more damaging 
than simply rendering them ineligible (Moorman & Hums, 1999).  
Boosters and Prospective Student-Athletes 
Other alternative legal remedies include a Texas state statute that establishes 
liability for parties who violate NCAA rules and regulations. This particular state statute 
was established in response to the major recruiting infraction case at SMU that included 
the impermissible under-the-table payments to student-athletes and prospective student-
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athletes from boosters, including the involvement of former chairman of the SMU Board 
of Governors and then Texas state governor Bill Clements. Texas Civil Practice and 
Remedies Code Chapter 131 legally mandates that a person who violates a NCAA rule 
may be held liable for the damages caused to an institution if: 
1) the person knew or reasonably should have known that a rule was violated; 
and 2) the violation of the rule is a contributing factor to disciplinary action taken 
by the NCAA against the institution or a student at the institution (Sec.131.004). 
These damages include lost revenues from television, ticket sales, and postseason 
revenues (Sec.131.006), as well as damages delineated in the legal mandate including 
attorney’s fees and court costs (Sec.131.008).  
The statute provides defenses to select individuals and circumstances that 
coincide with the findings of Moorman and Hums (1999). Employees of the NCAA, 
conference offices (e.g. Big 12, SEC, Pac 10, etc.), and the university involved in the 
violation are protected from liability resulting from a major NCAA violation. Also, 
student-athletes at the institution during the time of the violation are also exempt from 
liability for damages stemming from a major NCAA violation.  Further protections are 
offered to avoid undue influence by the NCAA and member institutions in seeking 
damages if the NCAA rule in question was either: a) not a rule at the time of the 
violation or b) the rule had been substantially changed (Sec. 131.005 (a)). Therefore, the 
Texas statute does not interfere with ability of the NCAA to enforce its rules and 
regulations in areas where its influence of sanctions could be sufficiently strong (e.g. 
loss of eligibility, inability to coach games, institutional fines, public ridicule through the 
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media, etc.). However, the statute does protect individuals from manipulation of the 
fluidity of NCAA rules to assert individual liability for rules that were not yet in the 
regulations at the time when the violation occurred. The Texas statute does isolate two 
groups of individuals that may do the most harm to an institution because the NCAA is 
relatively incapable of imposing sanctions upon boosters and some prospects. However, 
the defenses in the Texas statute will not protect coaches and staff from just cause 
termination of a contract or the sanction of a show-cause order that may lead to loss of 
future employment at NCAA institutions. It also does not protect student-athletes from 
losing eligibility for violating NCAA regulations. 
While the statute provides protection for university employees and students, it 
does not protect either boosters or prospective student athletes who enroll in another 
university. Although the enforcement of university disassociation may be a sufficient 
deterrent for some boosters to comply with NCAA recruiting regulations, it may be 
insufficient for boosters that may be involved in more serious violations of Bylaw 13.2. 
The Texas statute provides additional and serious repercussions for rogue boosters that 
should have known the NCAA rules and overtly violated them. Institutions are allowed 
to seek legal recourse for violations by boosters thereby reasserting the seriousness of 
compliance to the institution in order to seek financial damages and restore institutional 
prestige. The Texas statute does not interfere with universities’ ability to assert 
institutional control through NCAA sanctions on university and athletics staff, coaches, 
student-athletes, and boosters. Additionally, the institution may also seek damages from 
prospective student-athletes that should have known recruiting regulations, yet 
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knowingly violated NCAA rules leading to a major infraction. While this course of 
action may not be wise if the university would like the prospect to attend their 
institution, this could be a wise course of action for an institution that seeks damages 
from a prospect that attends another institution. It becomes increasingly more important 
that prospective student-athletes are educated on the recruiting rules that they will be 
expected to follow and with which they may be held liable if compliance to the rules is 
willingly skirted. 
Systemic Legal Alternatives 
 There are four possible alternatives to the current system of regulating the actions 
of rogue boosters violating NCAA rules and damaging the prestige of NCAA member 
universities. Each of these four alternatives is discussed in the following section, with 
recommendations for legal remedies to follow. 
Federal Regulatory Body 
 Most nations have adopted a national regulatory body for sports. The 
nationalization of intercollegiate athletics is a viable option with serious financial and 
bureaucratic repercussions. Although the NCAA has emerged as the most prominent 
national sporting body in intercollegiate athletics, the federal government does not 
manage nor operate the organization. If the federal government became the regulatory 
body of the NCAA, the organizational structure would become very complex as a 
national sport organization (Slack & Hinings, 1992). Furthermore, the process of NCAA 
rules enforcement would also increase in bureaucracy, become highly resource-
dependent (Slack & Hinings, 1992) specifically in terms of cost of operations, and would 
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be dependent upon tax-payer money. By increasing bureaucracy of NCAA rules 
enforcement, additional concerns regarding the ability to deregulate NCAA recruiting 
rules would become nearly impossible. Therefore, the NCAA would become highly 
cost-inefficient in terms of resources and bureaucracy, which could lead to the continued 
promotion of violating NCAA recruiting regulations. 
Federal Statutes 
 The adoption of federal statutes to regulate the actions of NCAA member 
institutions, coaches, staff members, student-athletes, and boosters is appealing. 
Foremost, the enforcement of NCAA rules would shift from its current vernacular of 
“impermissible” actions to “illegal” actions. The United States government would 
enforce recruiting regulations and hire compliance officials in order to monitor the 
actions of the aforementioned institutions and individuals. Enforcement of NCAA rules 
would certainly have a greater legal impact for violations of Bylaw 13. Not all results of 
the NCAA being a state actor are negative. While increased punishment could lower the 
frequency of NCAA violations, the NCAA and its universities could also be held 
accountable for utilizing student fees and tax payers’ dollars for athletics programs. This 
could increase the awareness of superfluous spending on athletics, such as having teams 
staying in local hotels the night before home games. Also, the NCAA would be held to a 
higher standard to protect the constitutional rights of student-athletes established in the 
14th Amendment Due Process clause. However there would be major fiscal and legal 
implications for this alternative to the current system. 
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 The state action doctrine of the NCAA and fiscal burden on United States tax-
payers would certainly be questioned. In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
NCAA is not a state actor (NCAA v. Tarkanian, 1988), holding that the NCAA is a 
voluntary association of universities and that any university could withdraw membership 
if it so desired. Furthermore, the Court held that NCAA rules did not necessarily 
constitute state law because the,  
Source of the rules adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada, but the collective 
membership, the vast majority of which was located in other States…Moreover, 
UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's rules did not transform them into state 
rules, and the NCAA into a state actor, since UNLV retained plenary power to 
withdraw from the NCAA and to establish its own standards (NCAA v. 
Tarkanian, 1988).  
If NCAA rules were adopted into federal statutes, then the source of the rules adopted by 
the NCAA would be the United States and its enforcement would be paid by tax-payers. 
Therefore, the NCAA would become a state actor subject to providing protections 
established by the United States Constitution. While some believe that the NCAA being 
deemed a state actor would open the door for more constitutional protections under the 
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, the NCAA could be crippled with litigation.  
If the NCAA were a state actor, then all of the NCAA bylaws would have to 
become codified federal law. Otherwise, different states would have varying standards 
for recruiting regulations and eligibility requirements possibly causing an imbalance of 
competition among the members of the NCAA due to state leniency. The NCAA could 
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not enforce penalties, without federal laws requiring it to do so, because there would be 
no penalty for breaking the rules without ensuing litigation. If an individual accidentally 
violated an NCAA rule and it was federal law, the punishment would be criminal rather 
than the current NCAA model of educating the offender and re-paying financial 
restitution for the infraction. Although this alternative could curtail violations, this could 
also inflict criminal punishment on individuals that are not intentionally violating 
regulations. Also, student-athletes could sue the universities and NCAA for deeming 
them ineligible for violations, transfer rules, or accepting cash inducements from 
boosters. If the NCAA became a state actor, the NCAA rules would have to be adopted 
into federal statutory law to establish order in the NCAA member institutions and their 
stakeholders. 
Uniform Act Adopted by States 
In the 1980s, athlete agents acted with no regulatory supervision, causing 
numerous violations of NCAA amateurism rules by student athletes. In response, several 
states established statutory Athlete Agent Acts which attempted to regulate agent 
activities, and punish violators of the regulations. Based on the desire of many university 
administrators and state legislators to protect student athletes, many other states sought 
to draft and establish athlete agent statutes, resulting in 28 states ultimately drafting and 
enacting regulatory legislation. Unfortunately, the individual state statutes varied greatly, 
and other states were reluctant to adopt regulations due to the lack of uniform standards. 
In response to the need for a uniform statute, in 2000 the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act. The 
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purpose of the act was to standardize the athlete agent regulations in one document, and 
then encourage individual states to enact the regulations as written. The effort was 
successful with 36 states and the District of Columbia currently having adopted the 
provisions in the Uniform Act. 
A similar effort by the National Conference of Commissioners to enact a uniform 
act similar to Texas Chapter 131 would enable states to pass a regulatory scheme to 
provide to universities the same potential legal remedies currently existing in Texas. The 
major potential financial ramifications might cause boosters and athletes to rethink any 
temptations to violate NCAA recruiting regulations.  
No Changes from Current System 
 Without changes to the current system, undisclosed recruiting violations will 
persist. Even more frustrating to universities seeking institutional control over athletics 
is that rogue boosters that willfully violate NCAA rules may continue to damage 
institutional prestige, brand the university as an “outlaw” school, and avoid individual 
punishment for violating NCAA bylaws. Universities may also be forced to pay 
exorbitant legal fees for litigation or investigation of major infractions that may ensue 
due to lack of institutional control of boosters. Thus, inaction will prevent the 
enforcement mechanism of the NCAA from influencing all of its constituencies because 
boosters will continue to be an unenforceable entity. 
Recommendations for Legal Remedies 
There is a need to enforce NCAA rules so that individuals are held responsible 
for actions that may damage the reputation of universities. University and athletic staff 
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members may lose employment over individual actions that lead to NCAA violations 
through just cause terminations stipulated in employment contracts. Student-athletes 
may be held liable for breach of contract in the Student-Athlete Statement, but loss of 
eligibility may be a sufficient sanction preventing them from participating in NCAA 
athletics. But, what about prospective student-athletes that violate NCAA rules during 
recruitment at one university and then attend another? Or, what about boosters that 
willfully violate NCAA regulations that prohibit under-the-table payments even though a 
university athletic compliance staff specifically warned that the booster should not be 
involved in recruiting? 
Through the findings of this study, it is recommended that each state that houses 
a NCAA Division I (FBS) institution should adopt a Uniform Act holding boosters and 
prospective student-athletes liable for damages deriving from willful violations of 
NCAA regulations. These statutes do not prevent the NCAA from enforcing its 
mandates upon university staff and coaches by show-cause order and student-athletes by 
loss of eligibility, while holding boosters and prospective student-athletes liable for 
financial damages caused by efforts to willfully violate NCAA mandates. The exemplary 
state statute known as the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 131 should 
serve to shape other states in formulating statutes that hold rogue prospects and boosters 
liable for damages caused by overt violations of NCAA recruiting regulations, which 
inevitably damage the prestige of the universities involved. Because it is likely that some 
states would not adopt such a statute, the enforcement of these statutes depends upon the 
ability to equitably enforce the rules from state-to-state. Recruiting prospective student-
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athletes often involves the recruitment of individuals that may reside out-of-state. As 
such, it is recommended that state governments establish a Uniform Act that would hold 
boosters and prospective student-athletes liable for damages universally across all 
geographic regions of the United States. This legislation would further strengthen the 
organizational legitimacy of the NCAA as the dominant sport governing body in United 
States intercollegiate athletics without inciting the effects of state action doctrine.  
Furthermore, it would present a theoretical shift from NCAA rules functioning 
under Meyer and Rowan’s (1988) myth of rationality. Thus, the mandates of the NCAA 
that are not legally binding, but have a legitimate influence, may be shifted to a genuine 
governing sport body with enforcement capabilities for all of its constituents (e.g. 
prospects, student-athletes, staff, coaches, and boosters). This shift from myth to law 
would also shield student-athletes, coaches, and employees of the NCAA and 
universities from undue financial liability stemming from NCAA recruiting violations. 
Simultaneously, it would hold boosters and prospects that violate rules at one school and 
go to another responsible for actions that cause financial and reputational damage to 
universities.  By following the suggestions for institutional control, managerial strategies 
for athletic departments, suggestions for change in NCAA rules, and increasing 
enforcement capabilities against rogue boosters and prospects, reputation-damaging 
violations of NCAA recruiting regulations may be curtailed in the future. Thereby, 
universities may avoid superfluous legal fees resulting from major recruiting violations 
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As NCAA institutions seek to implement recruiting policies into their daily 
operations, the underlying assumptions of legal precedence and social normality 
becomes a prevalent means of its formal structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1988). Particularly 
in educational formal structures, layers of bureaucracy are established in order to create 
an environment of power and authority that are highly institutionalized. Meyer and 
Rowan (1988) found that these formal structures lead to ideas and concepts being 
rationalized as legitimate structures and adopted as an integral part of the institution, or 
institutionalized. Rationalization and institutionalization lead to the two-part “myth of 
rationality” that permeates from formal organizational structures. These myths are ideas 
or concepts that are rationalized to be truth, when in reality they are constructed by two 
notable properties. First, they identify social purposes as technical in nature and are 
rationalized by enforcing these purposes through mandate (Meyer & Rowan, 1988). 
Secondly, these mandates become highly institutionalized, or socially accepted in an 
institution to the point where there is a belief that they are legal, and thus goes beyond 
the power of individuals within an organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1988). In order to 
comprehend the “myth of rationality” from which the NCAA operates, it is important to 
understand the types of policies utilized, the institutional context of athletics housed 
within higher education institutions, and the values of recruiting that have been 
legitimized in higher education administration. 
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 According to McDonnell and Elmore (1987), there are four types of alternative 
policy instruments, which are the mechanisms that transform substantive policy goals 
into practical application, they are: mandates, inducements, capacity-building, and 
system- changing. These alternative policy instruments attempt to ensure that behavior 
coincides with the intended outcomes of the institution. First, mandates “are rules 
governing the action of individuals and agencies” (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 134). 
NCAA rules are forms of mandate policy instruments, where the expected outcome is 
that all individuals within an institution will enact behavior that is compliant with the 
established rules of the institution (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Second, inducements 
are the transfer of “money to individuals or agencies in return for the production of 
goods or services” (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 136). The expected effect of 
inducements is short-term returns through production (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987), 
such as an incentive-laden coaching contract for winning conference championships. 
Third, capacity-building policy instruments are “the transfer of money to individuals or 
agencies for the purpose of investments in future benefits” (McDonnell & Elmore, 
1987). Capacity-building policy presumes that without the immediate investment of 
resources, future benefits will not be realized in the long-term (McDonnell & Elmore, 
1987). Fourth, system-changing policies shift official authority among individuals within 
institutions. The intended outcome of system-changing instruments is to alter an 
ineffective system through changing reporting lines, terminating the employment of an 
individual, or even altering the distribution of funds other than authority (McDonnell & 
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Elmore, 1987). Mandated educational policy is critical to the enforcement of NCAA 
recruiting rules. 
NCAA mandated educational policy has followed the “myth of rationality” in its 
scope and application. McDonnell & Elmore (1987) found that mandates function under 
the assumptions that a) acquiescent actions are expected to be performed by all 
individuals, regardless of power within the institution and b) that compliant actions 
would not occur without the mandated policy in place (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). 
When violations of NCAA mandates are committed by individuals or groups within an 
institution, severe repercussions may occur. In this regard, mandates use coercion 
through enforcement or threat of sanctions by initiators of the policy (McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1987). Mandates seldom result in uniform compliance because compliance 
usually results in high enforcement costs (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). It could be 
expensive to hire monitoring staff or NCAA compliance staff on the campus of the 
institution that uncovers violations of the mandates. Therefore, the individuals and 
institutions responsible to follow these mandates will assess the opportunity cost of 
compliance. Mandate policy differs greatly from other policies because mandates: a) use 
coercion instead of money to affect behaviors, b) outcome is compliance, not production, 
c) assume that no one is exempt from complying with the rules, and d) positive 
outcomes can result from resistance or avoidance of complying with the rules 




The Institutional Context 
The NCAA and its member conferences have established rules and bylaws to 
govern the actions of its member institutions. Because these bylaws are not necessarily 
legally binding, according to the NCAA v. Tarkanian (1988) holding that member 
institutions of the NCAA entered into a voluntary agreement to abide by these bylaws. 
Therefore, the NCAA bylaws are mandate policy to its member institutions that are 
expected to abide by its requirements at the behest of sanctions. Within this mandate on 
the Division I (FBS) level, the NCAA has established minimum standards of action and 
behavior in regards to recruiting, amateurism, financial aid, academic eligibility 
standards, playing and practice seasons, requirements to retain Division I status, the 
actions of staff, coaches, and student-athletes inside or out of competition. The 
overarching standard of all these NCAA rules is known as the principle of institutional 
control. The NCAA defines institutional control as, 
The control and responsibility for the conduct of intercollegiate 
athletics…exercised by the institution itself and by the conference(s), if any, of 
which it is a member. Administrative control or faculty control, or a combination 
of the two, shall constitute institutional control (NCAA Bylaw 6.01.1). 
If a university does not require its athletic department to follow the rules of the NCAA, it 
is subject to termination or suspension of its NCAA membership status for lack of 
institutional control pursuant to Bylaw 3.01.3. The purpose of these established bylaws is 
to create a balance of competition among NCAA member institutions (Depken & 
Wilson, 2004) and, particularly, to not give any team an undue recruiting advantage over 
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another. Simultaneously, the NCAA prohibits inducement policy instruments in 
recruiting or giving money and/or gifts to a prospect or prospect’s family member 
(NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1). This restriction of economic inputs has led many researchers to 
believe that the NCAA functions as a classic economic cartel (Fleisher, Goff, & 
Tollison, 1992; Kahn, 2006; Grant, Leady, Zygmont, 2008; Dumond, et al., 2008).  
 The characteristics of a cartel explain how the NCAA enforcement of recruiting 
mandates function and why NCAA violations might occur. A cartel is an economic 
collusion where firms in the marketplace cooperate to control production and sales in 
order to maximize profits (Kahn, 2006; Grant, et al. 2008). The three challenges 
presented to an economic collusion are: a) agreement on the appropriate actions of the 
group, b) preventing cheating, and c) controlling entry into the group (Grant et al., 
2008). All three of these characteristics are mandated policies that have become 
institutionalized by member institutions of the NCAA. The agreement of appropriate 
actions leads to established rules that are essential to entry and retaining membership in 
the cartel. In order to prevent cheating, sanctions are placed upon institutions or 
individuals within the cartel for violating the rules. These sanctions can be restrictions 
on production, actions, monetary fines, and the stigma that the rules violator cheats. 
When the expected cost associated with the sanction from a violation of the cartel 
agreement is less than the expected benefits, cartel members will have incentive to 
follow the rules (DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996). Therefore, the cartel requires sanctions to 
enforce mandates. The third challenge of a cartel is controlling entry into the group. This 
can be the restriction of human capital resource inputs or simply controlling which 
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institutions are permitted entry into the cartel. Grant et al. (2008) found that the market 
of football and men’s basketball in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics constitute a cartel, 
but the non-revenue sport markets do not. 
Researchers have distinguished an economic difference between revenue sports 
and non-revenue sports, but the NCAA continues to report violations by the name of the 
university that often involves multiple sports that are both revenue and non-revenue. 
NCAA Division I (FBS) men’s football and basketball account for over 70% of all 
NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics departments’ revenue (Mahony Fink, & Pastore, 1999; 
Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006) and are known as revenue sports. However, the NCAA 
named men’s basketball, women’s gymnastics, and men’s gymnastics in a major 
recruiting violations report in 2006. Although institutions’ athletic departments must 
utilize the revenues generated by men’s basketball and football to pay for the other 
sports that do not generate revenue such revenue, the NCAA mandates require complete 
institutional control regardless of economic status. Therefore, if the NCAA were a true 
economic cartel seeking to restrict competition and maximize revenue (Kahn, 2006), 
why wouldn’t the NCAA eliminate non-revenue sports from the business model?  Upon 
asking this question, many legal issues of gender equity, Title IX, and other issues 
demonstrate that there are other factors that influence the institutional context of 
intercollegiate athletics on the Division I level besides cartel behavior. The NCAA may 
certainly have tendencies of a cartel (Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992; Kahn, 2006; 
Grant, et al., 2008), but the institutional atmosphere of intercollegiate athletics being 
housed within in universities directly influences the institutional context of the NCAA. 
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The Pursuit of Prestige in Higher Education 
When examining NCAA rules compliance, the university environment presents 
perspective that requires supplementary theoretical frameworks to the NCAA acting an 
economic cartel. Comparable to the claims that the NCAA acts like a cartel, higher 
education has also been placed in this institutional context. Researchers have found that 
higher education acts as a cartel through collusions found in accreditation standards 
(Koerner, 1994), law school admissions (Cohen, 2008), academic instruction and 
practices of students, race-based admissions standards (Rauch, 2003), and tuition price-
fixing (Leslie & Brinkman, 1989). The commonality of the NCAA and the institutions of 
higher education in which they are housed is cartel behavior. However, higher education 
is well-regulated by legal guidelines to prevent sex discrimination in the administration 
of educational programs not only through employment law (e.g. Title VII), but also 
educational amendments (e.g. Title IX) that directly impact the business practices and 
pursuits of intercollegiate athletics.  
Bowen (1980) found that there are certain aspects of higher education that further 
distance itself from traditional economic practices. These principles of higher education 
business practice directly impact the goals of higher education institutions and their 
athletics departments and are known as Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue. These “laws 
of higher education costs” (Bowen, 1980, p.4) include the dominant goals of educational 
excellence, prestige, and influence where there is no limit to the amount of money an 
institution would spend in the pursuit of these goals (Bowen, 1980). Also, each 
institution of higher education raises all the money it can in order to spend all it raises 
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with the cumulative effect being increased fiscal inefficiency (Bowen, 1980). While 
business cartels seek to maximize profits (Fleisher et al., 1992; Kahn, 2006; Grant et al., 
2008), institutions of higher education seek to obtain prestige through increasing 
revenues in order to spend it all (Bowen, 1980). NCAA member institutions are fixed in 
a divergent path between cartel behaviors of maximizing profits and pursuing 
institutional prestige of winning championships by spending all of the money that it 
raises. Therefore, a tenuous relationship between intercollegiate athletics’ pursuit of 
championships and the educational institution’s pursuit of academic prestige collide on 
each campus of NCAA member institutions. The NCAA utilizes mandate policy 
instruments to reconcile this tenuous relationship, but the unintended weaknesses of 
mandate policy (e.g. incentives to violating recruiting rules) can jeopardize the pursuit of 
prestige of the entire institution. Thus, NCAA-affiliated universities accept cartel 
behavior in athletics while asserting Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue to achieve 
heightened institutional prestige. 
Ethical Failures That Can Jeopardize Institutional Prestige 
When ethical violations occur on a campus, it can be a detriment to the overall 
level of prestige that a university seeks to enhance. Kelley and Chang (2007) created a 
typology of ethical failures that occur in the university environment. These ethical 
failures can vary in severity from mild to severe and include individual/academic related, 
sports related, departmental, and organizational failures. First, individual/ academically 
related ethical failures consist of falsifying research, curriculum vitae, breaching 
contracts, sexual harassment, improper relationships with students, biased grading, etc. 
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(Kelley & Chang, 2007). These ethical lapses are committed by individuals within the 
organization and can have an effect on the ethical lapses that occur in the university. The 
second type of ethical failures are departmental, some of which include ignoring 
individual ethical failures, not following professional standards for fundraising or 
compliance, over-billing Medicare, admitting students based upon endowments of 
parents instead of qualifications, etc. (Kelley & Chang, 2007). These ethical lapses are 
directly addressed by mandated policies and are more visible to the university due to the 
breadth of failures that occur, whereas some individual ethical failures could easily go 
unnoticed. Third, organizational ethical lapses are some of the most visible because they 
involve issues such as gender discrimination, racial discrimination, lack of institutional 
control in athletics, permitting sexual harassment, etc. (Kelley & Chang, 2007). 
Typically the results of these ethical lapses are lawsuits utilizing mandate policy 
instruments that explicitly prohibit organizational ethical failures. For instance, a student 
could sue a university for sexual harassment under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972. While the principle of institutional control is not legally binding, 
the stigma attached to the violations has become taboo to the point of institutionalizing 
the notion that it is a legal principle. Thus, NCAA related ethical breaches are 
considered severe by Kelley and Chang (2007), which confirms that the value of 
institutional control has become institutionalized and follows the “myth of rationality.”  
 Although the types of violations differ in academia compared to athletics, 
research suggests that sports-related university ethical lapses have an overall negative 
effect on the university (Kelly & Chang, 2007; Cullen, Byrne, & Holman, 1990; Gerdy, 
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2002). These ethical failures included academic fraud, recruiting violations, 
impermissible benefits, use of illicit drugs, gambling, etc. (Kelley & Chang, 2007). 
Sports related ethical failures may affect the identity and reputation of students, faculty, 
the organization, and the community (Kelley & Chang, 2007; Duderstadt, 2003). If a 
university is heavily criticized in the media for breaking NCAA rules, the reputation of 
the entire institution could be questioned by outside parties (Duderstadt, 2003). While 
Kelley and Chang’s (2007) typology casts sports related ethical lapses in an auxiliary 
relationship to the university, violations of NCAA rules can greatly hinder the pursuit of 
institutional prestige. When a violation of NCAA rules occurs on the individual level 
and is discovered by the NCAA, severe repercussions from lack of institutional control 
on the department and organizational levels can also occur (NCAA Bylaw 6.01.1 & 
6.4.2). With the knowledge that a university is willing to spend unlimited revenues on 
building and sustaining a positive reputation (Bowen, 1980), recognition of and 
strategies used to prevent sports related ethical violations on the university campus is 
paramount. 
NCAA Rules Violations and Enforcement 
Merging the aspirations and values of intercollegiate athletics and academics on a 
university campus is legitimized through the mandates of the NCAA (Helman, 1989; 
Heck & Takahashi, 2006). Thus, ethical behavior regarding NCAA mandates in the 
higher education environment is context specific (Begley & Stefkovich, 2007). The 
NCAA has defined ethical actions in NCAA Bylaw 10.01.1. The purpose of this ethical 
mandate is “so that intercollegiate athletics as a whole, their institutions and they, as 
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individuals, shall represent the honor and dignity of fair play and the generally 
recognized high standards associated with wholesome competitive sports.” (NCAA 
Bylaw 10.01.1). Furthermore, the NCAA stipulates specific actions that are deemed 
unethical conduct pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 10.1. Of these actions, the NCAA has 
adopted rules to affect the use of financial aid, amateurism status, recruiting practices, 
eligibility and academic standards, awards and benefits, and conducts of student-athletes 
and athletics personnel. The purpose of recruiting mandates by the NCAA is to “balance 
the interests of prospective student-athletes, their educational institutions and NCAA 
member institutions” (NCAA Bylaw 2.11). From an institutional perspective, the NCAA 
mandates are designed to “promote equity among member institutions” in recruiting 
(NCAA Bylaw 2.11).  From an individual level, the NCAA seeks to “shield [prospective 
student-athletes] from undue pressures that may interfere with their scholastic or 
athletics interests” (NCAA Bylaw 2.11). Thus, the NCAA has addressed the importance 
of combining academic interests and athletic competition in its mandates. But, the 
violation of these mandates can lead to sanctions against individuals and institutions 
categorized as a major infraction or secondary, depending upon the severity of the 
violations. 
 There are two levels of violations that distinguish the severity of infraction in 
Division I (FBS) athletics, according to NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2. A violation that is 
“isolated, or inadvertent in nature [that] provides, or is intended to provide only a 
minimal recruiting advantage” is a secondary violation (NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.1). 
Secondary violations are further divided into a Level I secondary violation, that affects 
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the eligibility of a student-athlete, and Level II secondary violations that do not affect 
eligibility. As such, Level I secondary violations are more severe than Level II and are 
subject to sanctions including fines up to $5,000, vacating game victories, suspensions of 
players and coaches, loss of eligibility, etc. (NCAA Bylaw 19.5.1). When a combination 
of multiple secondary violations occurs, it can become a major violation. A major 
violation is any violation of the rules that is not a secondary violation and provides an 
extensive recruiting or competitive advantage to the violator of the rules (NCAA Bylaw 
19.02.2.2). Major infractions can lead to loss of scholarships, reduction of television 
revenues, fines, banishment from postseason competition, vacating championships, 
termination of employment by an institution, negative publicity in the media, and 
reduced university prestige (NCAA Bylaw 19.5.2.1 ; Kelly & Chang, 2007; Cullen, 
Byrne, & Holman, 1990; Gerdy, 2002). Further research has investigated the trends of 
NCAA violations. 
 Major infractions of NCAA legislation are most prevalent in Division I (FBS, 
formerly Division I-A), as opposed to Football Championship Subdivision (FCS, 
formerly Division I-AA), Divisions II, and III (Mahony et al., 1999). The Knight 
Commission (2001) found that more than 50% of Division I programs were placed on 
sanctions for major violations of NCAA mandates. Furthermore, both the Knight 
Commission (2001) and Mahony et al. (1999) found that NCAA rules violations have 
become normative behavior. Clark and Batista (2009a) found that the frequency of 
secondary infractions increased drastically from 2002-2007 and that universities that are 
members of a conference where a team won a national championship in NCAA Division 
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I (FBS) football that year were most likely to commit a major infraction. Specifically, 
universities that are currently members of the Big Ten, Southeastern Conference (SEC), 
and Big 12 committed the most major violations since 1973 (Clark & Batista, 2009a).  
As one of the responses to violations of mandates, the NCAA has sanctioned 
rules violators. By increasing the severity of the NCAA enforcement penalties, Hagerty 
and Sims (1978) found that the number of overall violations decreases. Depken and 
Wilson (2004) confirmed this finding and added that NCAA sanctions serve as a quasi-
effective deterrent to rules violations. The Division I universities most likely to receive 
these sanctions are: a) repeat rules violators, b) dependent on other conference 
universities for resources, c) less selective in the admissions process of student-athletes, 
and d) are from the geographical regions of the South, Midwest, and Southwest (Baxter 
et al., 1996).  Furthermore, Fleisher et al. (1988) found that increased variance of 
victories from one season to the next is evidence that there could be an investigation by 
the NCAA of rules violations. Clearly, the existence of NCAA mandates and 
enforcement attests that the NCAA does not condone unethical conduct and rules 
violations. Nevertheless, some researchers have found benefits to committing major 
violations. 
 Padilla and Baumer (1994) found that there were minimal adverse economic 
effects of sanctions by the NCAA in the short run on rules violators and no major 
economic change from penalties in the long run. Additionally, the penalty of reduced 
scholarships skews the competitive balance of college football toward perennial winners 
by reducing the inputs of mid-level teams in recruiting (Sutter & Winkler, 2003). Even 
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so, the greatest economic impact on the revenue sports of football and men’s basketball 
was not NCAA sanctions, but was winning games (Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Humphreys 
& Ruseski, 2006). Because victories increase ticket revenue, postseason or bowl 
revenues, sponsorships, application rates to the university, and may influence the overall 
prestige of the university, violating NCAA mandates can actually lead to increased 
revenues (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; Padilla & Baumer, 1994). Moreover, Fleisher et 
al. (1988) found that the enforcement activities of the NCAA have mostly benefitted 
traditional football universities that are perennial victors because they have a competitive 
advantage to recruit the most talented athletes. Thereby, “non-powerhouse” universities 
have incentive to break the mandates of the NCAA cartel to attain institutional prestige 
by winning football games (Fleisher et al., 1988). This financial incentive to violate 
NCAA rules presents a major ethical dilemma of whether or not there are benefits to 
rules compliance. Yet, these findings assert that financial benefits are the goal of the 
institution, when Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue would assert that prestige is more 
than financial solvency. 
Recruiting 
While the cartel behavior focuses upon the economic benefits, Bowen (1980) 
refocuses the analysis that the goal of a university is prestige. Brewer, Gates, and 
Goldman (2002) stated that university prestige is based upon an institution’s choices of 
operation within the specific market activities of student quality, research, and sports. 
Athletics prestige at a university is built over a long period of time by victories of teams, 
the ability to recruit and retain high quality athletes and institutional staff members, and 
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the perception of running a “clean program” that is compliant with NCAA rules (Heck & 
Takahashi, 2006; Brewer et al., 2002; Duderstadt, 2003). As such, prestigious university 
athletic departments have student-athletes that participate in professional football after 
the completion of their intercollegiate athletics career. Thus, the popular quote from 
former West Virginia assistant coach Billy Hahn,  
[Recruiting] is the lifeblood of the program. It’s not the X’s and O’s.  It’s the  
Jimmys and Joes (O’Neil, 2008). 
 This popular belief of the importance of recruiting was affirmed, as recruiting is one of 
the most statistically significant factors in the success of an athletic program (Heck & 
Takahashi, 2006; Humphreys and Ruseski, 2006; Cunningham & Dixon, 2003). Langlett 
(2003) found that football programs that are perennial winners are able to attract higher 
quality recruits, thereby, increasing the future quality of team performance.  
There are many factors that influence recruiting decision making of prospective 
student-athletes prior to attending and participating in athletics at a particular university.    
Some mitigating factors of college football recruiting choice of prospects are on-field 
performance, conference affiliation, facilities, playing time, and the geographic distance 
of the university from the prospect’s home (DuMond, Lynch, & Platania, 2008). The 
Bowl Championship Series (BCS) structure of six conferences, ACC, Big East, Big Ten, 
Big 12, Pac 10, and SEC is a major influence in a recruit’s decision making (Dumond, et 
al., 2008), as the media makes teams highly visible from these six conferences. While 
prospects weigh the aforementioned factors into their recruiting decision, coaches 
actively pursue prospects in order to discover and obtain the highest quality players that 
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suit the needs of the athletic program. Simultaneously, athletic directors and university 
administration utilize capacity-building policies by fundraising to update, renovate, and 
build state-of-the-art facilities to attract prospects instead of financially compensating 
athletes more (Brown, 2001). Brown (2001) found that an NFL caliber recruit could 
bring a marginal profit of approximately $500,000 to a university. The influencing 
factors of coaches, people affiliated with a university, and economics are highly 
monitored and regulated by NCAA legislation contained in Article 13 of the NCAA 
Bylaws.  
Recruiting Violations 
Recruiting violations are the most prevalent major violations in Division I (FBS) 
athletic departments. Since 1987, 73.53% of all major violations that occurred in NCAA 
Division I (FBS) athletics programs were related to the recruitment of prospective 
student-athletes stipulated in Article 13 of NCAA legislation (Clark & Batista, 2009a). 
Also, recruiting violations account for 47.03% of all secondary violations (Clark & 
Batista, 2009a), conjecturing that recruiting violations are considered much more serious 
types of violations than most other NCAA mandates. Factors that influence major 
violations of Article 13 are conference affiliation, geographical region, gender, and type 
of sport. Clark and Batista (2009b) found that BCS conference universities committed 
significantly higher major recruiting violations than Non-BCS affiliated conference 
schools in Division I (FBS). Furthermore, the SEC, Big Ten, and Big 12 respectively 
committed the most major recruiting violations from 1987-2007 (Clark & Batista, 
2009a). The South and Midwest accounted for over 66% of all major recruiting 
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violations (Clark & Batista, 2009a), men’s sports committed 80% of all major recruiting 
violations (Clark & Batista, 2009b), and football and men’s basketball committed 
approximately 60% of all major recruiting violations from 1987-2007(Clark & Batista, 
2009b).  These recruiting violations can occur because of the lack of knowledge, amoral 
decision making (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008) or blatant disregard of NCAA rules 
by individuals or institutions known as moral decision making that leads to an unethical 
decision (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).  
While researchers have analyzed the reported recruiting violations that have 
occurred in the NCAA from 1987 to the present, there has been minimal research as to 
the extent recruiting violations that have occurred without the knowledge of the NCAA. 
Sack (1991) found that the underground economy of paying student-athletes and recruits 
“under the table” is extensive in NCAA football. Thus, on the institutional level, Sack 
(1991) found that major football conferences and universities located in the South and 
Southwest were more likely to commit covert violations of impermissible benefits and 
inducements to football. Also, success by increased victories of football teams paralleled 
the increased inducements given to prospects and student-athletes (Sack, 1991). On the 
individual level, Sack (1991) found that African-American football players and football 
players from a low socio-economic status were more likely to accept impermissible 
inducements and extra benefits. This covert behavior of student-athletes and boosters 
signals a shift in power attributable to a system-changing alternative policy through the 
use of an inducement alternative policy. However, this study has considerable limitations 
regarding its generalizability to the entire population of NCAA Division I (FBS) student-
 177
athletes.  Sack sampled former football student-athletes that eventually played in the 
National Football League (NFL). Only 3.44% of student-athletes that play college 
football go on to play in the NFL (NFL Players Association, 2007), and thus only 
explaining less than 1% of the total NCAA Division I (FBS) student-athlete population. 
Therefore, the extent to which unreported recruiting violations (including inducements) 
are occurring in NCAA Division I (FBS) athletics without the knowledge of the NCAA 
is relatively unknown. 
Another issue of concern is whether or not policy implementation by the NCAA 
and its member universities can effectively alter recruiting actions of coaches, athletic 
administration, and university administration. McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield (2001) 
found that cheating and dishonesty in universities can be best addressed through 
institutional mandates. These policies should:  a) clearly communicate expectations of 
compliance, b) be supportive and respectful when dealing with personnel and athletes, c) 
consistent in application, d) focus on the experience not the outcomes of college sports, 
d) encourage affective commitment or character, e) provide harsh deterrents for 
cheating, f) remove opportunities to cheat, g) make educational opportunities interesting, 
and h) replace incompetent personnel from the staff (McCabe et al., 2001). Specific to 
recruiting, Heck & Takahashi (2006) analyzed the impact of academic requirements for 
initial eligibility of recruits, called Proposition 48, on recruiting strategies of coaches and 
athletic administrators. Proposition 48 was a mandated policy attempting to increase the 
academic standards of prospects entering NCAA athletics programs (Heck & Takahashi, 
2006). These standards were further stipulated in the NCAA Articles 13 and 14 
 178
regarding recruiting and eligibility standards. Heck and Takahashi (2006) found that 
these mandated policy instruments did alter recruiting strategies of coaches in order to 
find student-athletes with higher academic standards. Therefore, policy mandates can 
effectively alter disreputable recruiting actions of coaches, but do these alterations lead 
to system-changing behaviors of clandestine inducement policy under-the-table? 
Conclusion 
While the NCAA acts as a cartel, it also conforms to the university spending 
habits and goals of institutional prestige in Bowen’s Cost Theory of Revenue. Therein, 
the goal of the university is to build, establish, and maintain university prestige through a 
winning athletic program that is compliant with the mandates of NCAA legislation. 
From these goals, athletic compliance becomes an integral part of establishing university 
prestige in order to not be considered unethical by the NCAA and media. The social 
pressures from the media and boosters to win coupled with the pressure to be compliant 
with NCAA rules poses a major ethical dilemma, as one of the benefits of rules 
violations is increased winning percentage (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006) and the 
incentive of rules compliance is to avoid sanctions. Furthermore, recruiting violations 
are the most prevalent form of major violations that can hinder institutional prestige 
(Clark & Batista, 2009a). They are manifested on the institutional level by conference 
affiliation, geographical region, gender, and type of sport.  
By addressing a multilevel theoretical approach to institutional and individual 
influences, universities can establish policies in order to address this recruiting ethical 
dilemma. Multilevel theoretical analysis specifies the relationships that exist among 
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various levels of an organization.  One of these multiple levels can come from a top-
down perspective, where the policies and procedures of an organization can shape the 
actions of individuals within the organization (Kanter, 1977).  Another level can come 
from the bottom-up perspective, where individuals within the organization can influence 
the policies and procedures of the organization (Kanter, 1977).  Klein and Kozlowski 
(2000) found that, in order to capture the entire scope of the organization, both the top-
down and bottom-up processes should be presented.  This study utilizes the multilevel 
theoretical approach from the NCAA level, university administration, athletic 
administration, mezzo-level athletic compliance administration, and lower levels of 
coaches and boosters. By instituting policies through the ethic of the profession, 
universities can do what is best for the student-athlete and the university (Begley & 
Stefkovich, 2007) and establish policies that can positively affect recruiting behaviors 
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